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Introduction
Suppose that in 1996, a virulently anti-Western, antisecular, anti-Christian,
anti-Jewish Islamic extremist group takes over Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the
United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain in rapid succession. It
fuses them into a new federation following elections which are reasonably
fair, albeit carried out in an atmosphere of fundamentalist religious fervor.
The new state successfully avoids the excesses of many recent revolu-
tions-taking no foreign hostages, violating the immunity of no embassies,
and seizing no neighboring territory. In short, it takes no steps which
would give the other regional powers, the West, or the world community
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at large any handy pretext, let alone justification under international law,
to intervene. Then, applying its enormous wealth to the acquisition of
advanced military capabilities, it strives to become a major regional mili-
tary power.'
Now consider two different scenarios. In the first, the lessons of Iraq's
nearly successful efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are forgotten, and
efforts to improve the control of weapons of mass destruction languish.
The new federation has only modest difficulty obtaining materials, parts,
and expertise relevant to the indigenous construction of nuclear weapons
and is able to purchase long range delivery systems. By 2015, the federa-
tion has 500 nuclear weapons of a proven, tested design, each powerful
enough to destroy a large city. It can deliver these weapons on regional
targets or at intercontinental range with purchased state-of-the-art bomb-
ers and nuclear submarines, both carrying indigenously produced but ade-
quate cruise missiles.
In the second case, the world's nations continue to build on the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty2 (NPT) and to supplement it with bold,
new, and legally binding instruments constraining nuclear weapons and
delivery systems.3 As a result, despite its enormous resources, by 2015 the
1. This is a hypothetical, not a prediction; as should be clear from the recent civil
war in Yemen, the bigger challenge in the Arabian peninsula is keeping countries from
falling apart, not creating new federations. In putting forward this hypothetical, no
implication is intended that behavior threatening to the international community is the
exclusive province of the Gulf region or of Islamic fundamentalists. Indeed, the most
serious current concern is with North Korea, which is seeking nuclear weapons and
which has shown itself both willing and capable of carrying out extraordinarily bizarre
and dangerous acts. See infra note 38.
2. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT].
3. As this Article is being written, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Yemen are
currently NPT parties; Oman and the United Arab Emirates are not. That raises the
question of whether, under prevailing state succession doctrine, such a federation
would have the option of succeeding to the NPT party status of its former members or
the nonparty status of the others. The current state of international law on succession
to treaty rights has been properly described as "murky." Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Freder-
ick M. Abbott, A U.N. Dilemma: Who Gets the Soviet Seat on the Security Coun6 CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONrroR, Oct. 4, 1991, at 19. In U.S. practice, a state succeeds to the treaty obliga-
tions and rights of the predecessor state only if it accepts those agreements and the
other party or parties agree or otherwise acquiesce in the acceptance. See, e.g., In re
Extradition of Tuttle, 966 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES § 210(3) (1987)). For a more
sophisticated view than that of the Restatement, see George Bunn & John B. Rhine-
lander, The Arms Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 323
(1993). In any case, most discussion concerning the doctrine in recent years has dealt
with the break-up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and not with the fusion of states
into a new federation. In this hypothetical, the new federation would not accept obliga-
tions of the NPT. Of course, assuming that decision is the new federation's legal right,
it could still have political ramifications and bring into question the willingness of the
United States and the European Union to recognize the new entity. The EU has made
"[a] cceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear
non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability" one of the requirements
for recognition. Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New
States, 31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992).
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federation is only able to acquire five heavy low-yield devices, deliverable
by jerry-rigged transport aircraft.
Here is the question: is there any difference between the two scena-
rios from the perspectives of United States, regional, and global security?
For the prospects for arms control? In terms of its impact on the pros-
pects for a more peaceful international legal order? Even posing these
questions answers them, for it would be hard to argue that the two circum-
stances are equally dangerous. Yet to date, the international community
has crafted its nuclear nonproliferation policies almost exclusively in sup-
port of the wholly admirable goal of preventing countries from acquiring
any nuclear explosives. 4 Except in the area of ballistic missile controls,
little of a concrete nature has been undertaken with the specific goal of
keeping nuclear threshold states from advancing to militarily more signifi-
cant capabilities. Indeed, at a time when nonproliferation efforts have
had an unusually large number of successes, current interest seems aimed
more at "coping" with or "countering" further proliferation than trying to
prevent it.5 Yet these approaches are unnecessarily defeatist because cop-
4. There is vast literature on the general topic of nuclear nonproliferation. Hun-
dreds of books and thousands of articles have been written on the subject in the past
three decades, certainly far too many to survey here. For example, the Programme for
Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN), in the most recent edition of Newsbrief,
lists 10 books and over 160 articles, reports, and other materials that have come out in
just its fourth quarter review. Recent Publications, NEWSBIEF (PPNN, New York, N.Y.),
Fourth Quarter 1994, at 21-25. Two noteworthy books on the general subject of non-
proliferation are Louis DUNN, CONTROLLING THE BOMB (1982) and BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF,
INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (1983). The best works on the status
of nuclear weapons efforts and programs which may be relevant to nuclear weapons in
particular countries are by Leonard S. Spector. These include NUCt.aR PROLIFERATION
TODAY (1984); THE NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS (1985); GOING NUCLEAR (1987); THE
UNDECLARED BOMB (1988); and LEONARD S. SPECTOR & JACQUELINE R. SMITH, NUCLEAR
AMBToNs (1990). See also NUCLE.AR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA (Stephen P. Cohen
ed., 1991). Important earlier works on the subject include ARNOLD KRAMISH, THE
PEACEFUL ATOM IN FOREIGN POLICY (1963); A WORLD OF NUCL.AR POWERS? (Alastair
Buchan ed., 1966); MASON WILIRcH, NoN-PRoLIFERATION TRATY. FRAMEWORK FOR
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL (1969); and ALBERT WOHLSTETTER ET AL, SWORDS FROM PLOW-
SHARES: THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF CrnsA NUCLEAR ENERGY (1979). Keeping up
with nonproliferation developments can be challenging. Fortunately, there are two
very helpful compilations, PPNN's Nesbrief, supra, put out quarterly, and Proliferation
Watch (U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Washington, D.C.), published
five times yearly.
5. Four categories of counter-proliferation measures have been suggested:
(1) Political accommodation, whereby the international system would reconcile itself
to the new nuclear powers and make adjustments to meet the changed regional security
situation. See, e.g., Shal Feldman, Managing Nuclear Prolferation, in LIMITING NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION 301 (Jed C. Snyder & Samuel F. Wells, Jr. eds., 1985).
(2) Cooperation with the new nuclear states to make their forces more secure and
safe. This sounds innocuous, but it can be very dangerous. See infra note 229.
(3) Construction of defensive systems to protect against ballistic missiles. If such
anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) systems could be successful, they would tend to
reduce the incentives for the development of nuclear forces in some threshold states, as
they would have to assume that many of their nuclear weapons might be destroyed
before reaching their targets. Three major problems arise when attempting to cope
with advanced proliferation through the development and deployment of ABM systems.
The first is cost. If the issue is global security, then designing, testing, and deploying
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ing with large and sophisticated nuclear forces, which are deliverable at
intercontinental distances, will be far more difficult than coping with small
crude ones, which pose threats only to their nation's immediate
neighbors.
This nearly exclusive focus on preventing the acquisition of a first
nuclear device is based, in part, on the common-sense proposition that if
countries never acquire nuclear explosive devices, they will never acquire
anything more significant. Sadly, we cannot be certain that a nation of
actual or potential concern will never cross the initial threshold or put
itself into a position to do so on very short notice. Indeed, at least three
countries-Israel, India, and Pakistan-are already in that posture, and a
fourth-South Africa-was, but it recently stepped back and adhered to
the NPT. Several more states seem to be positioning themselves to "go
nuclear" within the next decade. 6
We need a better strategy, an integrated one which will make it far
harder, more time consuming, and extrerfiely expensive for the current
and future nuclear threshold countries to acquire more significant
enough anti-ballistic missiles to eliminate entirely the actual and potential ballistic mis-
sile threats faced by every country cannot be accomplished for less than hundreds of
billions, and more likely trillions, of dollars. It is hard to imagine where resources of
this magnitude would come from. Second, it is still unclear whether such anti-ballistic
missile systems will work sufficiently well to provide real security. Declining Pentagon
estimates of the success rate of Patriot missiles in the Gulf War are, at a minimum,
grounds for adopting a wait-and-see attitude toward the efficacy of ground based missile
systems intended to destroy intermediate range ballistic missles (IRBMs) and interconti-
nental ballistic missles (ICBMs). General H. Norman Schwartzkopf was quoted two
weeks into the war as stating that "the Patriot's success, of course, is known to everyone;
it's 100 percent so far." Barton Gellman, New Study Cuts Patriot Missile Success Rate to 9
Percent, WASH. Posr, Sept. 30, 1992, at A4. Later, the Pentagon revised its estimates of
success downward four timesjudging that over 70% of Patriot engagements against the
Scud were successful in Saudi Arabia and over 40% were successful in Israel. John A-
Farrell, Pentagon Reduces Its Success Rate for Patriot in War, BosroN GLOBE, Apr. 8, 1992, at
1. A General Accounting Office report, challenged by the Pentagon, said it could con-
firm a kill rate of only 9%. Gellman, supra. Third, even if such systems could be made
highly successful, they will literally do nothing to protect against other types of delivery
methods such as naval systems, bombers, and/or cruise missiles.
(4) Enhanced military preparation to be able to deter or to attack the new nuclear
states. Some in the U.S. nuclear weapons establishment want to develop a whole new
class of low yield nuclear weapons (equivalent to roughly 1000 tons of TNT) to attack
targets in nascent proliferating countries. It is hard to imagine anything which would
provide a country already possessing some nuclear weapons capabilities with a stronger
incentive for advanced proliferation than the need to have enough weapons, with
enough explosive power, to deter the United States from such attacks.
6. Iraq was seeking nuclear weapons and has not given up its interest in obtaining
them, though its capabilities were significantly set back by allied bombing in the Gulf
War and by U.N. teams dismantling some of its facilities after the war. See infra note 40.
Some experts believe North Korea may already have two nuclear weapons. Other
nations which have been mentioned as having possible nuclear weapons ambitions
include Libya, Iran, Syria, Taiwan, Algeria, South Korea, and Cuba. The evidence of an
intent to obtain nuclear weapons is far stronger for some of these countries than for
others. The degree to which they already possess nuclear materials, equipment, and
technology also varies greatly. Argentina and Brazil, two countries on everyone's list of
potential proliferators until quite recently, have largely resolved concerns as to their
nuclear programs and intentions. See infra note 48.
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nuclear weapons capabilities and which will instead provide them with a
politically attractive and legally binding means to keep their existing capa-
bilities limited, at least pending developments in regional security which
might induce them to abandon their nuclear weapons capabilities.
This article examines this "advanced proliferation" problem and the
tools available to the international order to minimize it. In addition to its
intrinsic importance, the problem has important implications for our
understanding of how international law works in the area of international
security.7 This article demonstrates the power of complex international
regimes to transform aspects of international society, but it also argues
that further progress in this field will almost certainly require a greater
resort to standards which are binding under international law, i.e., treaties
and collective action through international organizations. 8
Part I provides the background on the advanced proliferation prob-
lem. It includes definitions, a brief overview of the science and technology
of nuclear weapons, reasons why we should be concerned with advanced
proliferation, the kinds of weaponry advances with which we should be
concerned, and the status of advanced nuclear weaponry efforts in the
threshold countries. Part II discusses the legality of further nuclear weap-
ons proliferation under international law. It explains the existing nuclear
nonproliferation regime and its relationship to international law. It also
provides illustrations of the vitality of that regime.9 Part III explores meas-
ures which can be taken by the international community to restrain
advanced proliferation, including new constraints on advanced nuclear
weapons development, new initiatives to restrain delivery systems, and
additional arms control measures to freeze the threshold states' current
nuclear weapons capabilities in place, thereby temporarily allowing them
7. Many of the issue areas discussed in this article not only have international law
implications but are also subject to various U.S. statutes, regulations, and, in a few cases,
court opinions. These are dealt with in this article, if at all, only in passing.
8. The topic also has important implications for international relations theory. It
suggests that complex regimes, such as that for nuclear nonproliferation, differ from
simple international regimes in that they have a transformative quality, significantly
altering the perceptions of states on the norms of international behavior and of their
national interest. Such regimes subtly alter the international order, giving greater
emphasis to collective interests in a world still dominated by state autarchy. In short,
once set in motion and given careful tending, such complex regimes change the inter-
national landscape. For a more thorough discussion, see infra note 180. For an excel-
lent analysis of contemporary international relations theory which discusses these and
other theories in considerable detail, while it also discusses the relationship of interna-
tional relations theory to developments in international law, see Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 205 (1993). See also infra note 179.
9. Most measures to strengthen the nonproliferation regime in the past 15 years,
and all aspects of the current constraints on the spread of ballistic missiles, rely on
nonlegally binding measures. These nonbinding measures have sometimes proven to
be the only practical means available to resolve some international security conflicts.
They will unquestionably be an important element in dealing with the advanced
proliferation problem. However, some aspects of the problem cannot be dealt with in
that manner, and legally binding measures will be required. See infra part IMl.
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to keep their bombs "in the basement" while prohibiting the growth of the
size and sophistication of those arsenals.
I. Background to the Advanced Proliferation Problem
A. Definition of Advanced Proliferation
"Nuclear proliferation" was first used to mean the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by nations which did not already have them, and that is still the
most common usage. Over time, however, additional jargon developed in
the field. That kind of nuclear proliferation came to be called "horizon-
tal." There is a second kind, "vertical proliferation," the proliferation of
ever greater numbers and growing sophistication of nuclear weapons in
the hands of the five existing nuclear weapons states.10 "Advanced
proliferation" could be defined conceptually as the process of subsequent
vertical nuclear proliferation by states which have recently achieved hori-
zontal proliferation.
A more functional definition of advanced proliferation is the develop-
ment of a militarily significant nuclear force (i.e., beyond a first nuclear
device) by one or more of the nuclear threshold states. Gains in military
power could take several forms, perhaps occurring simultaneously, includ-
ing growth in the number of weapons, increases in their yield, and
improvements in their deliverability.11
B. The Science and Technology of Nuclear Weapons
This is not the place to provide a full explanation of the science and tech-
nology relevant to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, since the
problem has a substantial technical component, a brief overview may be
helpful to some readers. 1
2
All peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy derive from an unu-
sual property of one isotope of uranium, namely U235. When such an
atom is hit by a neutron, it destabilizes and breaks apart into two frag-
ments, releasing energy and one or more additional neutrons. Under
proper conditions, this phenomenon can be used to create a chain reac-
tion in which neutrons released by the fissioning of one U235 atom are
captured by other U235 atoms. If this chain reaction is controlled in a
10. Article IX(3) of the NPT, supra note 2, defines as "nuclear weapons states" those
states that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior toJanuary 1, 1967,
i.., the United States, the Soviet Union (Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and
China. They remain the only states which have declared themselves to possess nuclear
weapons. They are also the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.
11. These and other constituent elements of advanced proliferation are explored in
detail in part I.D, infra.
12. Those with knowledge of the relevant technical background may wish to skip
this section. It is a highly condensed explanation which, given the need for brevity,
leaves many key facts not fully explained. Readers interested in obtaining additional
information on various technical aspects of the nuclear proliferation problem should
consult THE NuTs AND BOLTS OF NucLEAR PROLIFERATION: A GUIDEBOOK (David H.
Albright, Center for War, Peace, and the News Media ed., 1991).
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nuclear reactor1 3 so that the number of U235 atoms which undergo fis-
sion remains constant, a useful source of energy results. On the other
hand, if conditions are such that the chain reaction grows exponentially, a
powerful explosion can occur.
However, U235 is found in nature mixed with the far more common
U238 isotope. 14 It is possible to create a controlled chain reaction using
natural uranium' 5 and a moderator 16 of either nuclear-grade graphite 17
or heavy water.' 8 On the other hand, natural uranium does not have a
sufficient density of U235 atoms to create a chain reaction of the uncon-
trolled sort necessary for either nuclear weapons or to fuel the more com-
mon type of reactors, which use ordinary light water as both the
moderator and coolant. To do either, it is necessary to "enrich" the U235
fraction by increasing its concentration relative to the more common
U238. If the enrichment process continues until the U235 fraction is
greatly increased, typically to ninety percent or more, the resulting highly
enriched uranium (HEU) can then be used to create a nuclear
13. Nuclear power reactors produce electricity. Naval reactors propel submarines
and surface naval vessels. Research reactors are used to generate isotopes used in
industry, agriculture, and medicine and to carry out various kinds of scientific research.
14. About 0.7% of all uranium found in nature is U235.
15. Natural uranium fuel has the same ratio of U238 to U235 as uranium ore. How-
ever, it does not have the same chemical composition or physical form. The uranium
must be mined, refined, fashioned into ceramic pellets in the form of uranium dioxide
(U02), and placed in tubes usually made of specially prepared zirconium alloys.
16. A typical nuclear reactor needs a moderator (graphite, heavy water, or ordinary
"light" water) to decrease the velocity of the neutrons, thereby increasing the
probability that they will strike and fission a U235 atom. A coolant (which can be either
a liquid like heavy or light water or a gas such as helium) is also necessary in order to
maintain the reactor temperature and, in power generation reactors, to produce steam.
Finally, control rods are needed to absorb excess neutrons, thereby preventing the
nuclear chain reaction from accelerating out of control.
17. Nuclear grade graphite is made by special processes which remove trace impuri-
ties that "poison" the nuclear chain reaction. Large graphite moderated reactors have
been operated in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the for-
mer Soviet Union. The reactor which caught fire at Chernobyl was a graphite moder-
ated reactor; it was the graphite which provided most of the fuel for the fire. There is
currently little interest in graphite reactors for commercial power generation. On the
other hand, there is increasing concern that small graphite moderated reactors will be
used for nuclear proliferation purposes. North Korea has such a reactor. See infra note
38. Until recently, the Brazilian military had plans to acquire several. See infra note 48.
18. Heavy water (D20) appears identical to ordinary water, but instead of hydrogen
atoms with a nucleus of only one proton, the molecule contains the heavier deuterium
isotope, which has one proton and one neutron. Deuterium exists in nature but only as
a very small percentage of all hydrogen. It can be concentrated by any of several means,
but commercial-scale production of heavy water has proven a difficult and expensive
technology. Nuclear power plants utilizing natural uranium and heavy water are cur-
rently operational only in Canada, India, Argentina, and Pakistan. Countries of
proliferation concern would probably face difficulties obtaining heavy water which is
not subject to the safeguards (inspection) system of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Heavy water moderated research reactors with a capacity to produce
enough plutonium for at least one simple nuclear weapon per year are currently oper-
ating in Canada, India, Talwan, and Israel.
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explosion.' 9
Since U235 and U238 are isotopes of the same element, they are virtu-
ally identical and thus their separation is not possible by normal chemical
means. Instead, various enrichment technologies have been developed to
separate U235 from U238 utilizing small differences in the mass or other
properties of the two isotopes. The most common approach to the large-
scale enrichment of uranium is called gaseous diffusion.20 Concern about
proliferation from the enrichment route has increased considerably in the
past quarter century2 ' because of the development of another enrichment
technology called centrifuge enrichment or ultracentrifugation.2 2 This is
the process Pakistan used to obtain the nuclear materials for its weap-
ons.23 Other enrichment techniques are possible and have been impli-
cated in actual or potential nuclear proliferation problems, including
calutrons,2 4 nozzle processes,2 5 and laser isotope separation processes.
26
19. There is no international consensus on terminology, and it is therefore impossi-
ble to say at exactly what point enriched uranium qualifies as "highly enriched" or
"HEU." But see infra note 30.
20. Gaseous diffusion facilities send uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas through a
long series of specially constructed membranes through which the slightly smaller U235
atom diffuses more readily than the U238. Facilities for commercial separation of U235
by this method are enormous, requiring very large and highly specialized equipment
and consuming extraordinary amounts of electrical energy. Commercial gaseous diffu-
sion facilities exist only in the United States, France, and the former Soviet Union.
Unfortunately, facilities too small to compete in supplying enrichment services interna-
tionally can still be large enough to produce enriched uranium for many nuclear weap-
ons. Gaseous diffusion plants of various sizes have been built in the United Kingdom,
China, and Argentina, either for nuclear weapons, as pilot plants for possible future
commercial-scale enrichment, or for both.
21. Public concern about the proliferation risks of centrifuge technology for enrich-
ment of uranium goes back at least to a 1969 Pugwash conference held in Sochi,
U.S.S.R. Walter Sullivan, 3 Countries Plan 2 Nudear Plants, N.Y. TiAmEs, Oct. 28, 1969, at
11.
22. Centrifuges spin at extraordinary speed, using slight differences in weight to
separate the U235 from the heavier U238 isotope. The development, construction, and
operation of large-scale facilities for centrifuge enrichment require the mastery of sev-
eral different sophisticated technologies. The construction of the centrifuges them-
selves requires precision machining and exotic materials. Moreover, operating many
centrifuges together in a successful "cascade" also requires considerable expertise, spe-
cialized electronics, and vacuum technology. Centrifuges have been developed com-
mercially by URENCO, a consortium of British, Dutch, and German firms, which is the
only entity currently offering commercial enrichment services using centrifuges. Cen-
trifuge programs in states of actual or potential proliferation concern are or were
known to exist in, among others, Pakistan, India, Brazil, and Iraq.
23. The Pakistani government was able to circumvent much of the centrifuge devel-
opment process because one of its nationals, A.Q. Kahn, who worked at a URENCO
supplier in the Netherlands, stole the plans for the centrifuges. See, e.g., Rod Nordland,
The Bombs in the Basement, NLvsWEE,July 11, 1988, at 42. At first, Pakistani agents were
able to obtain the needed parts, materials, and expertise from Western companies,
many of which were unaware of the uses to which their equipment or technology would
be put. Subsequent diplomatic initiatives and improved export controls in Western
countries greatly slowed, but did not halt, the Pakistani effort.
24. A calutron is a device for separating isotopes by electromagnetic means. It was
the first approach used by the United States during World War H, but it was abandoned
in favor of gaseous diffusion. In the past three decades, however, aspects of the tech-
nology have become easier to master. Iraq based its enrichment program in good part
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There is an alternate route to nuclear weapons that does not require
the enrichment of uranium. In a nuclear reactor, some of the neutrons
released from the fissioning of U235 do not go into a continuation of the
chain reaction but are instead captured by the U238 in the nuclear fuel.
When this happens, the U238 undergoes two internal changes and
becomes a new man-made element, plutonium, specifically Pu239. Pluto-
nium, like U235, can be used either as a nuclear fuel or as the material for
a nuclear explosive. In order to remove the plutonium from the uranium,
no isotopic separation is necessary; because the plutonium and uranium
are different elements, chemical separation techniques performed in a
reprocessing plant will suffice. 27 Thus, to acquire weapons by the pluto-
nium route, a country must have both a nuclear reactor (preferably one
which can run on natural uranium 28 ) and a reprocessing plant. 2 9
on calutrons. See infra note 79. There has also recently been concern over a calutron
device sold by China to Iran, though at present it appears that only one was sold,
whereas a far larger number are needed (hundreds, perhaps) to have a militarily signifi-
cant program. Dr. Gordon Oehler, head of the interagency Non-Proliferation Center,
made this point recently. See Nuclear Proliferation: Hearing of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony ofJames Woolsey, Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency), quoted in Fmn. NEws SERvicE, Feb. 24, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. There is also some question as to whether the device
was technically capable of separating uranium isotopes. Leonard S. Spector, Is Iran
Building a Bomb, CnaisrLAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Dec. 31, 1991, at 18.
25. West Germany developed, but never deployed, an enrichment technology
called the Becker nozzle process (named after its inventor Erwin Becker) which uses
large compressors to accelerate uranium hexafluoride gas through a slit over a curved
surface (sometimes called a fixed wall centrifuge). Jet Nozzling, ECONOMIST, OCL 11,
1975, at 57. It later sold this technology-under IAEA safeguards and strict controls for
replication of the technology-to Brazil in a controversial deal. Richard House, Bomb
Potential Denied; Brazil's Nuclear Dream Falters, WASH. Posr, Feb. 12, 1983, at A8. The
South Africans have also developed and deployed a nozzle process, which they call the
"helicon" process. They claim their technology is indigenous, although they apparently
received some assistance from individuals and firms in Germany without the active sup-
port of the German government.
26. Technologies for uranium enrichment using laser separation are under devel-
opment in several countries, most notably the United States, but also in France, South
Africa, India, and Israel. In theory, laser isotope separation techniques could make the
proliferation problem much worse because they are so efficient that a laser isotope
separation facility, sufficient for producing a few nuclear weapons per year, would be
small and difficult to detect. Developing such a technology would be such a major
scientific undertaking for any country that wholly indigenous development of laser iso-
tope separation, for the vast majority of countries, would not be a wise strategy for
acquiring nuclear weapons materials. However, once developed by the more advanced
countries, information about any technology eventually leaks out and can be copied by
others with far less effort.
27. Reprocessing on a large scale, while easier than enrichment, is not without diffi-
culty. The "fission products," the fragments resulting from the splitting of the U235 or
Pu239 atoms, are intensely radioactive. Therefore, specially shielded chemical facilities
are needed in order to separate the plutonium from the uranium and nuclear waste.
28. Natural uranium reactors are preferable to would-be proliferators because natu-
ral uranium, while scarce, is far easier to obtain than enriched uranium without
encountering IAEA safeguards obligations and other controls. Commercially viable
power reactors using heavy water are a technological marvel currently available only
from Canada and Germany. The constraints on the construction of much smaller
heavy water or graphite moderated research reactors are far less severe. Plutonium for
Vol 28
1995 Law and the H-Bomb
To cause a nuclear explosion, it is necessary to have enough weapons-
usable nuclear material,3 0 called a "critical mass."31 Under the right con-
ditions, an amount of HEU or plutonium which is subcritical in one con-
figuration can be brought together in an alternate configuration that has
more than a critical mass. With HEU devices, sufficiently rapid assembly
of a critical mass can be achieved by relatively simple means, as was done
with the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.3 2 With plutonium devices, high
explosives are used to create an implosion which rapidly squeezes a sphere
of plutonium into a much smaller supercritical shape.
38
weapons can also be extracted from a reactor which utilizes enriched uranium. Doing
so, however, would have a serious cost associated with it. All actual and potential suppli-
ers of enriched uranium on a commercial scale are NPT parties and are thus obliged to
require IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply. Under NPT article 111(2), supra note
2, each state party agrees not to provide, inter alia, enriched uranium to any non-
nuclear weapons state unless it will be subject to IAEA safeguards. Accordingly, if a
non-nuclear weapons state were to violate or abrogate safeguards on spent fuel contain-
ing plutonium and use it for weapons purposes, the TAEA Director General could no
longer certify that safeguards would be applied to that country. Therefore, no NPT
party could legally supply that country with enriched uranium fuel. In time, the violat-
ing state's power reactors would have to shut down.
29. Countries of proliferation concern known to have nuclear reactors which are
not under international safeguards (or whose safeguards status is in doubt) but which
are capable of generating at least one nuclear weapon's worth of plutonium per year
and which also have a reprocessing plant of appropriate size to separate the plutonium,
include India, Israel, and North Korea. Many other countries have appropriately-sized
reactors under IAEA safeguards and small shielded facilities where limited reprocessing
might be carried out.
30. An enormous amount of nonsense can be found in the press about which kinds
of nuclear materials are "weapons-grade." In brief, with two minor exceptions not rele-
vant here, all plutonium in sufficient quantity is weapons-usable. Indeed, both France
and the United States have tested nuclear explosive devices which used so-called reac-
tor-grade plutonium. However, not all plutonium is weapons-optimal. The best "low
burn-up" plutonium has a very low fraction of the isotope U240 in it. In contrast, not
all uranium is weapons-usable. It is infeasible to make deliverable nuclear devices if the
U235 percentage is below 20%. Enriched uranium above 20% is weapons-usable, but
not optimal, until the enrichment level reaches at least 90%. For countries already
possessing enrichment technology, raising the enrichment from 20% to 90% poses few
obstacles. For less advanced countries and terrorist groups, the need for further enrich-
ment poses an insurmountable barrier.
31. The amount of material required to make a critical mass depends on its isotopic
composition, chemical form, density, shape, and various other factors. For planning
purposes, the TAEA assumes a critical mass is 25 kg. (about 55 lbs.) of HEU or 8 kg.
(about 17.6 lbs.) of plutonium. However, smaller amounts can be used. See infra part
I.D.3.
32. During World War II, the United States was severely limited in the amount of
nuclear material available to it. It was confident that the "gun-type" device it had assem-
bled using HEU would detonate. Testing the device would have used up precious mate-
rial. While the "gun-type" nuclear weapons design is reliable and obviates the need for
nuclear explosive testing, it does have limitations. It cannot be used with plutonium as
the explosive material. It is wasteful in the amount of nuclear material used when com-
pared with implosion designs. It is very heavy, and thus it cannot be used with certain
delivery systems. Of states of proliferation concern, it is believed that only South Africa
chose to limit itself to this weapons design. See infra note 211.
33. Prior to the implosion, the plutonium is subcritical in the configuration in
which it is placed in the bomb. The squeezing of the plutonium into a smaller shape
makes the same amount of plutonium become supercritical. Implosion approaches are
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Important differences exist between nascent proliferation and
advanced proliferation in terms of the areas which pose difficulties. For a
beginning program, the vast majority of the difficulty comes from develop-
ing and constructing facilities for the production of HEU or separated
plutonium.- In advanced proliferation, the absolute demand for special
nuclear material 35 increases considerably,3 6 but the relative importance of
obtaining those materials decreases. Instead, weapons design and access
to more advanced delivery systems take on a comparatively greater
importance.37
C. Reasons for Concern with Advanced Proliferation
The nonproliferation agenda is crowded. The situation in North Korea
continues to be dangerous. 38 The fact that Iraq could covertly acquire
desirable for HEU and plutonium because less nuclear material is needed. They are
essential with plutonium because any nuclear reaction creates tremendous heat and
pressure which will naturally cause the plutonium to fly apart into a noncritical mass.
With plutonium there is a greatly increased probability that the device will pre-ignite,
flying apart before enough of the chain reaction has taken place to cause the intended
nuclear yield.
34. True quantification of that difficulty is not possible because much depends on
the technology selected to produce the nuclear materials, the device design, the degree
of outside assistance the country can obtain, and whether the country is constructing
the facilities overtly or going through the more difficult and expensive approach of
attempting to hide reactors, enrichment plants, and weapons-oriented facilities. These
factors will vary considerably from country to country. Nevertheless, one can say that
roughly 75% to 95% of the total effort will be aimed at obtaining nuclear materials,
with the rest devoted to designing and manufacturing the explosive devices themselves.
35. "Special nuclear material" is the U.S. term for enriched uranium, plutonium, or
U233, which, in nonproliferation jargon, contrasts with source material, which is natu-
ral uranium, thorium, and depleted uranium (in the enrichment process, the level of
U235 drops from its normal 0.7% to a lower level, commonly 0.2% to 0.3% in the
residual uranium). Confusingly, the IAEA uses "special fissionable material" to mean
the same thing as the U.S. term special nuclear material.
36. See infra part I.D.1.
37. Information on the materials and technologies relevant to more advanced
nuclear weapons designs are described throughout this article, especially in part I.D.2-4,
part III.A2-3, and part Ill.C.2, infra.
38. The situation in North Korea is not yet fully settled. On October 21, 1994, the
United States and North Korea (DPRK) entered into an agreement in which the United
States undertook to supply North Korea with two light water reactors and heavy oil to
meet energy needs until the reactors are built. North Korea would freeze its existing
nuclear program, meaning that work would halt on its 50 MW and 200 MW reactors,
and they would eventually be dismantled. The 5 MW reactor would cease to operate,
and its fuel would be disposed of without reprocessing in North Korea (meaning in
practice that it would have to be removed from the country). North Korea would
remain in the NFl' and comply with its safeguards agreement, but until the new reac-
tors were substantially completed, the DPRK would not be required to let the IAEA
carry out a supplemental inspection of two suspected sites (euphemistically called "all
steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA... [to verify) the accuracy and com-
pleteness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material to the DPRK"). Both
countries would work to normalize relations. For a more thorough discussion, see Edi-
torial Note NEMBIaEF, (PPNN, New York, N.Y.), 4th Quarter 1993, at 1-4. (The text of
the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement can be found in id. at 27-28.) There is ample
opportunity for things to go wrong with this agreement, and thus a residual risk that the
situation will lead to renewed political tension, a nuclear arms race, or worse. In any
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extensive technology relevant to nuclear weapons while publicly appearing
to remain in compliance with its NPT obligations and those of the associ-
ated safeguards (inspection) system of the International Atomic Energy
Agency3 9 (IAEA) revealed serious weaknesses in aspects of the current
nonproliferation regime. Concern remains high over the nuclear inten-
tions of several states such as Iran, Libya, and Iraq, even if their current
capabilities are modest. 4° The demise of the Soviet Union left the status
of some of its successor republics, most notably Ukraine, under the NPT
and other arms control treaties uncertain. While many of those difficul-
ties were finally resolved, full implementation of the non-nuclear weapons
status of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan is still several years away.4 ' The
event, the primary focus of this article is the countries which have the near-term poten-
tial to acquire significant nucleai forces. As that category will not include North Korea
for many years, if ever, this article will deal only briefly with the North Korean situation.
See infra notes 86, 222 & 226.
39. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T.
1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
40. Prior to and during the Gulf War, there was considerable skepticism as to how
close Iraq was to a nuclear weapons capability and how large its nuclear programs were.
See, e.g., David Albright & Mark Hibbs, Iraq and the Bomb: Were They Even Close? BuLL.
ATOMic ScI., Mar. 1991, at 16. The author was one of the skeptics. However, although
it was not "months away" as President Bush had stated, it is now clear from the IAEA
inspection reports that Iraq had made very considerable progress toward a nuclear
weapon. See U.N. Role in the Persian Gulf and Iraqi Compliance with U.N. Resolutions: Hear-
ing of the Europe and Middle East Subcomm. and the Human Rights and International Organi-
zations Subcomm. of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1991)
(testimony of Thomas R. Pickering, then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations),
reprinted in FED. Nws SERVICE, Oct. 21, 1991 [hereinafter Pickering Testimony] (Iraq
was "engaged in an ambitious nuclear weapons development program, which may have
been within one to two years of producing a nuclear weapon at the time it was
interrupted.").
Some observers believe that the combined effect of air and cruise missile attacks dur-
ing and since the war, along with the destruction of equipment by U.N. inspectors, has
fully destroyed Iraq's nuclear capabilities, at least in terms of equipment and materials,
if not expertise. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, U.N. Issue, Again: The Rein on Hussein, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 1993, at A6. Meanwhile, concern over the intent of the Iraqi nuclear program
remains and has entered the popular culture, sometimes with strange results. See., e.g.,
Psychics Wanted-But You Already Knew That, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 8, 1993, at 18
(Prophet in Parowan, Utah declares the United States will be in a nuclear war with Iraq
by year's end; will sell survival information kit for $6.00.).
41. In the U.S. view, and that of virtually the entire world, only one state, Russia,
may legally succeed to the nuclear weapons state status of the former Soviet Union
under the NPT. See Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 3. While all tactical nuclear weap-
ons have been relocated to Russia, some of the more powerful (and more difficult to
remove) strategic nuclear weapons remain in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. They
are under the nominal control of the Commonwealth of Independent States and appar-
ently under the operational launch control of Russia. Belarus, which had nuclear-
armed SS-25 ICBM missiles, has adhered to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. Its
Parliament consented to NPT adherence and ratification of START I on Feb. 4, 1993.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., S. TPzrATv Doc. No. 20, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter START I];
BelarusApprovesFi rstArms-LimitationPact N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5,1993, atA8. The SS-25s are
to be sent to Russia for dismantling by the end of 1994. Arnold Biechman, Dismal Days
forPost-Soviet Belarus, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1993, at C3. The Belarus decision is notable
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Soviet breakup also raises the prospects of a frightening legacy-nuclear
mercenaries 42-as well as the possibility that nuclear materials may begin
moving to terrorists or rogue regimes through the black market. 45 Exten-
not only because of the potentially grave consequences if it had not done so, but also
because it is arguably the first nation with nuclear weapons in its possession to de-
nuclearize. But see infra note 211, concerning South Africa.
Kazakhstan has both ICBMs and Bear H heavy bombers in its territory. Steve Coll,
Nuclear Goods Traded In Post-Soviet Bazaar, Export Controls Lacking on Russia's Rim, WASH.
PosT, May 15, 1993, at Al. It has ratified START I as amended by the Lisbon Protocol
(needed to take the break-up of the Soviet Union into account), though not all of the
implementing steps have been completed. Id.; see also Protocol to the Treaty with the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms, May 23, 1992, S. TRF.AEY Doc. No. 32, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Lisbon Protocol]. After an intense debate, its Parliament overwhelmingly agreed to
the ratification of the NPT. John Broder, Kazakhs Ratif Non-Proliferation Treaty, L.A.
TiMES, Dec. 14, 1993, at A20. Kazakh President Nazarbayev personally deposited its
instrument of accession to the NPT with President Clinton on Feb. 14, 1994. The U.S.
and Kazakhstan: A Strategic Economic and Political Relationship, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, Feb.
21, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file. It then moved rapidly to con-
clude an NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which includes the precedent-set-
ting provision for inspections to assure that plutonium and other nuclear materials are
not diverted from the 104 SS-18 ICBMs still on Kazakh territory. Kazakhstan Agrees to
Open Nuclear Sites to Agency, REuEtrs WoRLD SERVICE, July 26, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws file. Subsequently, Kazakhstan transferred 600 kg. (roughly
1,320 pounds) of BIEU to the United States. Jurek Maratin & Steve Levine, Kazakhstan
Uranium Put Out of Reach, FINANCIAL TMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at 6.
According to the Deputy Director of the Arms Control Association, Ukraine has the
largest arsenal of the former republics other than Russia with 176 multiple-warhead
missiles, approximately 1200 warheads, and 40 heavy bombers with perhaps 600 to 700
cruise missiles or bombs. Frank Sesno, Ukraine Seeking Security Guarantees, Says Mendel-
sohn, CNN, June 7, 1993 (Interview with Jack Mendelsohn, Transcript #376-3), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. Whatever the exact numbers, the Ukrainian stock-
pile would make it the third-largest power in terms of fabricated, deliverable nuclear
warheads. Indeed, its strategic arsenal might be as large as those of the U.K., France,
and China combined. Ukraine signed the Lisbon Protocol to the START I agreement
on May 23, 1992, and its Parliament ratified START I and the Lisbon Protocol on Feb.
3, 1994. Fact Sheet: Ukraine, DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, May 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws file. Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, at the time he signed the
Lisbon Protocol in ajoint written statement with President Bush, committed Ukraine to
joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state "at the earliest possible time." Dan
Oberdorfer, Ukraine Agrees to Eliminate Nuclear Arms, WASH. Posr, May 7, 1992, at Al.
However, no action was taken to make that pledge a legal reality. Fact Sheet: Ukraine,
supra The Ukrainian Parliament, by a 226-15 vote, declared that the nuclear weapons
on Ukrainian soil were the property of Ukraine. Robert Seely & Richard Boudreaux,
Ukraine Claims Ownership of NuclearArms on Its Soil, LA TiME,JuIy 3, 1993, at Al. Russia
and Ukraine then agreed to a deal whereby the 1800 warheads in Ukraine would be
transferred to Russia in exchange for equivalent amounts of low enriched uranium to
fuel Ukrainian nuclear power reactors. See Celestine Bohlen, Ukraine Agrees to Allow
Russians toBuyFleet and DestroyArsenal, N.Y. TmES, Sept. 3, 1993, atAl. Some shipments
of warheads have already taken place. See State Department Briefing by Lynn Davis, Under-
secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, FED. NEWS SERVIcE, Aug. 3,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Davis Press Briefing]. In
the end, the Ukrainian Parliament overwhelmingly approved the NPT, 301 to 8. Steven
Greenhouse, Ukraine Votes to Become a Nuclear-Free Country, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at
A10.
42. See infra part I1A4.
43. There have been numerous press accounts of attempted sales of plutonium or
highly enriched uranium, purportedly from the former Soviet Union. See, e.g., Bruce
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sive and time-consuming preparations and consultations are already
underway for the twenty-fifth anniversary review conference of the NPT, at
which a decision must be made whether to extend the period of validity of
the treaty indefinitely or for some fixed period.4 Finally, the many recent
positive nonproliferation developments, including NPT adherence by
South Africa,45 France, 46 and China,4 7 the decision of Argentina and Bra-
zil to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, 48 the major
Frankel, New Mafia Begins Trafficking in Uranium, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 1993, at IA;
Jonathan Kaufman, Smuggling of Nuclear Material from Former USSR Rising Sharply, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Dec. 9, 1992, at Nat'l. 1; Steve Col, For Sale: Nuclear Contraband; Smuggling
Cases Wory Europe, WASH. PosT, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al. Although some of these have
been shown to be frauds, and although there have been many such scares in the past
which proved to be groundless, the threat is being taken very seriously this time. See
Davis Press Briefing, supra note 41. For a report by two highly regarded experts, see
William C. Potter & Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Terrorism Is Next Russian Nightmare,
HoUSON CHRONIcLE, Dec. 20, 1994, at A29.
44. Article X(2) of the NPT, supra note 2, requires such a review conference. A
majority of the parties are needed to make the decision on indefinite extension, exten-
sion for some other period, or (though no one favors this) non-renewal of the treaty.
Obviously, this is a matter of great importance, and it will interact with other develop-
ments, including not only those directly involving nonproliferation but also nuclear
disarmament and cooperation in peaceful uses of atomic energy.
45. South Africa announced onJune 27, 1991 that it would adhere to the NPT. See
Christopher S. Wren, Pretoria Accepts Atom-Arms Ban and Agrees to Plant Inspections, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 28, 1991, at Al; South Africa Has Enough Uranium for 25 Nuclear Bombs, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 30, 1992, at M4. South Africa deposited its instrument of accession to the
NPT onJuly 10, 1991. 80 LL.M. 1450 (1991).
46. France deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT on August 3, 1992. 31
I.L.M. 1596 (1992). President Franfois Mitterand signed the decision to adhere on July
1, 1992. See also Beating Swords into Ploughshares, ALA.rrAJ. & CONSY., Aug. 4, 1992, at
AS; World Brief HousrON CHRON., Aug. 4, 1992, at A12; France Finally Signs On To Non-
Proliferation Treaty, LA TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1992, at A8; France Promises to Follow the '68 Nuclear
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1992, at A7.
47. China deposited its instrument of accession to the NPT with the British govern-
ment on March 9, 1992. 31 l.L.M. 1596 (1992); NucLoNIcs Wa., Mar. 12, 1992, at 12.
48. Argentina, Brazil Sign Arms Pact, Cm. TRB., Dec. 14, 1991, at 13. For years,
Argentina and Brazil accepted safeguards only when suppliers of reactors, nuclear
materials, or sensitive technology made them a condition of transfer. While they pro-
claimed their programs were intended only for peaceful purposes, both nations had
significant clandestine programs to produce enriched uranium. Argentina built a
secret facility at Pilcaniyeu for enriching uranium using the gaseous diffusion process.
Argentina's military leaders began the facility in 1978, and its existence was disclosed in
1983. Michael R. Gordon, Argentina and Brazil Begin NuclearDiscussions, N.Y. TIMES,July
22, 1987, at A3. The plant has a production capacity of 20,000 separative work units
(SWU) (about the size of the Y plant in South Africa which produced the HEU for its
nuclear weapons), and the government planned to increase it five fold. It was designed
to produce 20% enriched uranium. Richard Kessler, CNEA Officials Provide More Details
About Pilcaniyeu Enrichment Plant, NucLEAR FuEL, May 30, 1988, at 4. Brazil had a secret
military facility, also since disclosed and now called the Aramar Experimental Center,
for developing uranium enrichment by the centrifuge method at Ipero. By 1988, it had
enriched uranium to 5% and planned to reach 20% that year. Rik Turner, Samay and
Alfonsin Inaugurate Brazilian Enrichment Facility, NucLEoNics W., Apr. 14, 1988, at 6.
The Brazilian military planned to build a small plutonium production reactor. Mark
Hibbs, Policy Shift to Full-Scope Safeguards Could Happen Soon, Brazils Goldemberg, NucLEAR
FUEL, Oct. 29, 1990, at 6. Brazilian civilian President Collor later admitted that Brazil
had a nuclear weapons program under military leadership since 1975. Id. Collor then
personally closed what was said to be a nuclear test site in the Amazon built by the Air
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improvement in the existing export control lists,49 and the decisions of all
major suppliers to require full-scope safeguards5° will require some time
to be fully incorporated into the existing nonproliferation regime. Is this
Force. SNI lives on in Collor's SAE; Secret Funding for Military's Parallel' Nuclear Program,
LATIN AM. REGIoNAL REP.: BRzu, Sept. 19, 1991, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File. Mark Hibbs, Color Moving to End Influence of Military in Nuclear Program,
NUCLEONICS WVi, Oct. 4, 1990, at 6.
The new civilian leadership in both countries agreed to improve nuclear cooperation
(as a part of a broader program of economic cooperation and integration) and to allow
their respective experts to inspect each other's nuclear facilities. On July 18, 1991, Bra-
zil and Argentina entered into a bilateral treaty at Guadalajara, Mexico, which estab-
lished a joint control entity, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC), which requires IAEA safeguards. See IAEA:
Argentina and Brazil Sign Safeguards Agreement, EUR. ENERGY, Jan. 10, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; Brazil & Argentina Eschew the Bomb, LATIN A. WKLY.
REP., Aug. 1, 1991, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. The next step
was to convert that agreement in principle into a binding obligation. Later, the two
countries (and Chile) announced their intention to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco and
bring it into force. See Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,
Feb. 14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 [hereinafter Treaty of Tlatelolco]; IAEA, Declaration by
the Governments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile on the Entry into Force for Them of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/410 (Sept. 21, 1992). In a dramatic ceremony upon the
occasion of the signing of the agreement, Presidents Collor and Menem addressed a
special meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, correctly describing the agreement as
an "historic" and significant contribution to nonproliferation and disarmament. IAEA:
Argentina and Brazil Sign Safeguards Agreement, supra; John R. Redick, Argentina-Brazil
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Initiatives, PPNN IssuE REV., Jan. 1994, at 1. Subsequently, on
Jan. 18, 1994, Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, along with Chile, waived
the entry into force conditions, thereby bringing the Treaty into immediate effect.
OPANAL General Conference Doc. CG/E/415 Rev. (Feb. 4, 1994). Brazil deposited its
waiver of conditions on May 30, 1994. Telephone Interview between Mrs. Eva Lopez of
the OPANAL Secretariat, Mexico City, and Mr. Edgardo Rotman, Foreign Law Libra-
rian, University of Miami (July 1, 1994). Argentina subsequently adhered to the NPT
on February 10, 1995. Statement by President Clinton on Argentina's Adherence to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, U.S. NEwswuet, Feb. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Usnwr File. For an excellent analysis of the factors which contributed to the change
from a near-nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazil to their full integration
into the nonproliferation regime, see John R. Redick et al., Nuclear Rapprochement:
Argentina, Brazil and the Nonproliferation Regime, WASH. Q., Winter 1995, at 107.
Completion of the ratification and waiver into force conditions by Argentina and
Brazil, and the other de-nuclearization steps they took, was a major accomplishment.
Brazil and Argentina have long been competitors for influence and prestige, but they
have not been serious security threats to each other and have not had a direct military
conflict since the two modern states took form, i.e., since Uruguay was established and
recognized. The only military conflicts in which they directly participated were ones
where they were on the same side. There was accordingly no security need for nuclear
weapons, but both countries' militaries nevertheless took active steps toward their
acquisition. If they had chosen another course, both states would be very high on the
list of states about whom there would not only be proliferation concern, but who seem
likely candidates for advanced proliferation given their extensive nuclear programs and
ballistic missile activities.
49. See infra notes 245-246 and accompanying text.
50. A state following a full-scope safeguards policy will sell nuclear materials and
equipment only to countries that have all their nuclear materials regulated by the IAEA
safeguards system. See infra note 217 and accompanying text. Such a policy goes
beyond the obligations imposed on nuclear suppliers by the NPT, supra note 2, which
only requires safeguards on the nuclear materials and equipment being supplied or
produced from such supply. Specifically, article 111(2) provides that
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the time to raise a new concern? If threshold countries get the bomb, isn't
the harm to international security interests already done?
To understand why we should be very concerned about advanced
proliferation and why the international legal order needs to move deci-
sively to deal with it, it is useful to recall the major reasons why any further
nuclear weapons proliferation would be disadvantageous.
1. Increased Risk of Widespread Casualties
The acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states could increase the
risk that nuclear weapons might actually be used again. The potential for
armed conflict in the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean peninsula, or
between warring republics of the former Soviet Union is serious enough
without the risk that the antagonists might fight with nuclear weapons. 51
Of course, this consideration might be fully or partially offset by the possi-
bility that the risks of conflict breaking out will be reduced if both sides in
a regional dispute have nuclear weapons.5 2 Whatever the merits of that
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or pre-
pared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to
any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or spe-
cial fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this
article.
This is in contrast to article M1(1) which requires those non-nuclear-weapons states that
are party to the NPT to have IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.
Thus, it is possible under the NPT for a party to supply a nuclear power reactor to a
nonparty, even though the recipient country has other facilities which are not under
IAEA safeguards. Indeed, many such transfers took place.
51. This is not a theoretical concern. One highly regarded investigative reporter
claims Pakistan moved nuclear weapons to its air bases and had its F-16 fighter aircraft
on full alert during the height of the 1990 Indo-Pak crisis. Seymour M. Hersh, On the
Nuclear Edge, NEw YomtRR, Mar. 29, 1993, at 55, 65. Other U.S. observers doubt the
claim that India and Pakistan carne close to nuclear war. However, virtually everyone in
Washington involved in those matters at the time was very concerned about the possible
outbreak of conventional war and knew that an escalation to nuclear weapons was tech-
nically possible. See Douglas JehI, Did India and Pakistan Face Atomic War? Claim Is
Debated, N.Y. TrMEs, Mar. 23, 1993, at A3.
52. It is likely, though not certain, that the existence of nuclear weapons in the
hands of the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the knowledge that those weapons
would in all likelihood destroy both societies if used, caused both states to be more
cautious, reducing the risk of a conventional war breaking out between them.
On the other hand, it is also possible that even in the U.S.-Soviet context, it was less a
matter of a nuclear balance providing real stability and more a matter of luck. See ROB-
ERT S. McNAMAa, A Retrospective View of the Cuban Missile Cisis, in IN RETROSPEc. THE
TRAGEDY AND LESSONS OF V1ETNAm, annex (1995) (At a time when U.S. officials were
urging President Kennedy to use force to destroy Russian missiles, there were already
162 warheads in Cuba, and the Soviet commander had authority to launch them at U.S.
targets if attacked.).
Whether the spread of nuclear weapons to a single pair of enemy states would have a
comparable stabilizing effect, or alternatively be destabilizing, is debatable. The possi-
bility that it is stabilizing has led some academics to suggest that the further spread of
nuclear weapons would be beneficial. The classic expression of that view is in KNNTmH
N. WAL-z, THE SPREAD OF NucLEAR WEAPONS: MORE MAY BE BETTER (International
Institute for Strategic Studies, AdeIphi Paper No. 171, Autumn 1981). More recently,
John Mearsheimer has argued that proliferation by some states would be destabilizing,
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argument with respect to nations such as India or Israel, few in the West
would be content to rely on it with respect to Iraq, Iran, North Korea, or
Libya.
Whether the possession of nuclear weapons increases or decreases the
odds of armed conflict taking place, it is beyond dispute that if war does
break out, and nuclear weapons are used, the human toll would be vastly
higher if the states used nuclear weapons.53 Advanced proliferation
makes that problem far worse. If states have and use large numbers of very
high-yield weapons, far more will die than if they use only a few crude
ones.
5 4
but that the great powers such as Germany and Ukraine should have them. John J.
Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Nudear Deterrent, FOREIGN ArF., Summer 1993, at
50. But see Steven E. Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian NuclearDeterrent, FOREIGN Arr.,
Summer 1993, at 67. Others have doubted the transferability of the U.S.-Soviet experi-
ence to the case of further proliferation. See RobertJ. Lieber, Existential Realism After the
Cold War, WASH. Q., Winter 1993, at 152 ("[W]hat was applicable to the superpowers
would, in all probability, be inapplicable for most others. The stabilizing characteristics
of assured destruction, massive internal restraints, and geographic distance all acted as
inhibitors. A world of growing nuclear proliferation, however, would be one of lethal
danger.").
The controversy is unlikely to be resolved, as the matter involves untestable theories
and extrapolation from a very limited amount of data from the U.S.-Soviet context to
draw conclusions about other potential cases. About the most that can be said with
certainty is that we do not know the effect of further proliferation on the likelihood of
war in the case of fairly evenly matched paired enemy states in the same region. In any
event, there is no reason to assume that the case of two relatively symmetrical, geo-
graphically remote states represented by the United States and the U.S.S.R. is indicative
of the risks where there are more than two concerned states, as with China, India, and
Pakistan or with Israel, Iraq, and Iran.
53. When comparing two possible scenarios, one should multiply the odds of each
undesirable event occurring by the consequences if it does. Suppose the likelihood of
all-out war between two regional enemies sometime over the course of a decade, where
neither is armed with nuclear weapons, is one in four, and the consequences of such a
war would be one hundred thousand casualties. Suppose that both acquire nuclear
weapons, and as a result, the chances of an all-out war drops to one in ten. But, if a war
does break out there would now be four million casualties. One could correctly state
that the acquisition of nuclear weapons had significantly reduced the risk of war, i.e., by
a factor of two and a half. However, the likely fatalities over the decade increased by a
factor of sixteen, ie., (1/10) x (4,000,000) / (1/4) x (100,000) = 16. Those who would
argue that the chances of war would drop by a greater percentage than the percent
increase in fatalities if there is war, and that further proliferation is accordingly benefi-
cial, ought to bear the burden of proof and also some of the moral responsibility if they
are wrong.
54. Suppose a state has five Hiroshima-type devices, deliverable only by obsolete
light bombers. If three of the planes are shot down and one of the remaining devices is
a dud, the one bomb which successfully detonates on a large city (which is assumed for
these purposes to have an urban construction, density, and topography similar to the
Japanese cities) might cause fatalities in the range of 100,000 (the Hiroshima and Naga-
said devices combined caused 200,000 deaths, about half of them by the blast or its
immediate aftermath). On the other hand, suppose the state has twenty-five devices
with yields of 120 kts., each deliverable by IRBMs. If only 60% of them land on similar
cities and only 66% of those actually detonate with their expected yield, it would cause
roughly 40 times as many fatalities, i.e., approximately 4,000,000 fatalities. Carnage on
that scale with conventional weapons can probably only occur in circumstances similar
to the two world wars.
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2. Increasingly Serious Consequences in the Event of Accidental Nuclear War,
Nuclear Civil War, or Nuclear Terrorism
Once armed with nuclear weapons, states have important security and eco-
nomic reasons to protect their devices from sabotage and theft. Based on
the limited experience to date, states which acquire nuclear weapons capa-
bility become conservative about allowing other countries or subnational
groups to obtain them. But placing too much confidence in that tendency
would be imprudent; with many more nuclear powers, the chances of
something going wrong would greatly increase, perhaps exponentially.5 5
Certainly, the consequences of an accidental nuclear war or a nuclear civil
war would be far worse following advanced proliferation than if only
crude, virtually undeliverable weapons were in the new nuclear states'
arsenals. Additionally, if state-sponsored nuclear terrorism does take
place, or if other terrorists are able to seize fabricated nuclear weapons,
56
it will be far more deadly under conditions of advanced proliferation.
57
3. Reduction in the Relative Strength of the Major Powers
It is virtually certain that the relative strength of the larger powers, nuclear
and non-nuclear alike, would erode if regional and lesser powers obtain
55. "The greatest danger to our security is that one of these covert proliferators may
lose control of its nuclear weapons because of inadequate technical safeguards or
domestic political turmoil." Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Arms Control After the Cold War, FOREIGN
Art., Winter 1989-90, at 42, 60. Of course, there are things we could do in the name of
reducing those risks once a state deploys nuclear weapons. Some of those steps might
reduce terrorist risks and should be considered. Others would involve actively assisting
the new nuclear weapons states in improving the readiness and command and control
of their nuclear forces and hardening them to be less vulnerable to attack. Those steps
would make the new states' forces more effective, more of a threat to Western interests,
and harder for us to attack. See also supra note 5 and infra note 229.
56. There is little reason to fear terrorists developing thermonuclear weapons, TOM
CLANcy, THE SUM OF ALL FEARs (1991) notwithstanding. On the other hand, if they are
given nuclear weapons or can steal ones with inadequate security, the situation would
be significantly worse if those are high yield weapons than if the terrorists attempt to
construct their own crude fission devices. Incidentally, Clancy, whose information
sources are superior to the intelligence services of many nations, appears to have delib-
erately put mistakes into his book to provide a great deal of verisimilitude in a riveting
tale while avoiding providing nations with a textbook of how to construct thermonu-
clear weapons. In any event, his concluding remarks are correct to the extent that he
makes clear that access to special nuclear material is the critical step in acquiring
nuclear weapons. See id. at 913-14.
57. For example, if an irrational or irresponsible country wants to develop weapons
similar to the U.S. man-portable atomic demolition munitions (ADM) (a kind of
nuclear land mine in a backpack) it will discover that it involves a very difficult job of
miniaturization. But if it succeeds and subsequently these ADMs were to fall into the
wrong hands, they would make highly effective terrorist weapons. Consider the bomb-
ing of the World Trade Center. A much larger truck than that used by the bombers
would be needed to bring in a crude Nagasaki-type device. Of course, even given a
fizzle-yield of only 3 kts., the total force would have been roughly 3,000 times greater
than the crude chemical explosive which was detonated, and it would have caused far
more fatalities. In contrast, an ADM could be placed in the trunk of a compact car and,
if detonated, would have destroyed much of southern Manhattan. In short, if it hap-
pens, nuclear terrorism could be terrible; with advanced proliferation it could be much
worse.
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nuclear weapons. As the only remaining superpower, this is a matter of no
small consequence to the United States. Moreover, the problem greatly
increases as nuclear forces become larger and more sophisticated. Thus,
in all likelihood, the United States would tread much more carefully if
North Korea possessed several dozen 100 kiloton devices deliverable on
U.S. forces and our allies throughout the Pacific.
4. Harm to Prospects for Greater Reliance on International Peacekeeping
If a "new world order" does ultimately emerge, it will succeed largely
because of the strength of new ideas, changing norms, and the increasing
reliance on international legal and political institutions to resolve con-
flicts. However, at least initially, the common resolve and consensus of the
international community in the realm of international security will have to
be backed by the military power of the individual U.N. member states.
Realistically, that will be done, as it was in Kuwait, Somalia, and Bosnia, by
"deputizing" existing states to act on behalf of the United Nations Security
Council under article 42 of the U.N. Charter.5 8 Thus, in the short term,
strengthening and enforcing a new world order requires that the states
which provide the military forces to back the decisions of the Security
Council retain a large margin of strength over the likely international law-
breakers. An Iraq armed with a few nuclear weapons might have decided
not to use them, much as it apparently chose not to use its stock of chemi-
cal weapons. But if Iraq's nuclear forces were identical to those of China
(or even Israel), the enthusiasm in Western circles for the use of military
force to throw the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait would have been greatly
diminished. Thus, the more capable the nuclear force of threshold states,
the more it will undermine prospects for the development of a new inter-
national security system.
5. Diminished Prospects for Further Arms Control
Widespread proliferation will virtually eliminate the chances for additional
reductions in the arsenals of the existing powers. We only recently
reached the point where deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals of the United
States and Russia became both militarily prudent and politically possi-
58. Article 42 of the U.N. Charter authorizes the Security Council to "take such
action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore interna-
tional peace and security. Such action may include ... operations by air, sea, or land
forces of Members of the United Nations." U.N. CHata'r= art. 42. The exact relation-
ship between the United Nations and the forces used in recent cases has varied, with
the operational role of the United Nations perse substantially stronger in Bosnia than in
the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, we are apparently still a long way from the alternative of
the Council having U.N. forces at its immediate disposal under articles 43 to 47. Article
43 foresees members entering into special agreements to make military forces available
to the Security Council for its use in peacekeeping. Article 45 calls on members to hold
air force units available for the immediate use of the Council. Articles 46 and 47
authorize a Military StaffCommittee to assist the Security Council. In contrast to article
42, these provisions have remained dormant.
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ble.5 9 However, few things in international politics can be predicted with
greater certainty than that the United States and Russia will not reduce
their nuclear forces to the point where they have fewer nuclear weapons
than, for example, Pakistan, Iran, or North Korea. For that reason, the
more powerful the nuclear forces of threshold states become, the more
reluctant the two great nuclear powers will be to undertake further
reductions.6 0
6. Increased Pressure for Destabilizing, Expensive, or Dangerous Responses
The development of additional nuclear weapons states is likely to result in
increased pressure in Western societies to find ways of protecting against
those nuclear forces. This may result in destabilizing and expensive ballis-
tic missile defense systems, more air defenses, and even nuclear war-fight-
ing capabilities to destroy such forces, either preemptively or in
retaliation. But, such "counter-proliferation" measures could be a "hard
sell" with the public in democratic countries so long as the proliferating
states' capabilities remain modest. Demand for such protections is likely
to be far greater, but the "counter-proliferation" measures are far less
likely to be successful if states acquire significant nuclear forces.
7. Possible Decline in Civil Liberties
To be highly effective, the measures necessary to prevent "clandestine
insertion"61 of a nuclear weapon by new nuclear weapons states and to
59. The U.S. Senate has voted its consent to ratification of the START I agreement
which will require substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. See START I,
supra note 41. Thirty to fifty percent reductions in strategic systems are needed for the
United States and the four relevant states of the former Soviet Union to meet the
START I limits. The START Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1992) (prepared statement of Ronald F. Lehman II, Director,
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency). The START I agreement entered into force
December 5, 1994, following Ukraine's accession to the NPT. Message to the Senate
Transmitting the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty, 27 WEEKLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 1726
(Nov. 25, 1991) (President's transmittal to Senate); Statement of Senate Ratification of the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRaS. Doc. 1836 (Oct. 1, 1992) (Senate
ratification); Remarks at a Nuclear Agreement Signing Ceremony in Budapest, 30 WEEXLY
COMp. Pam. Doc. 2464 (Dec. 5, 1994). U.S. and Russian leaders have reached agree-
ment on a START II treaty, under which they will reduce their total strategic warheads
to 3,500 and 3,000 respectively. START II was signed by U.S. President Bush and Rus-
sian President Yeltsin on January 3, 1993. The treaty provides for a further two-thirds
reduction in the nuclear arsenals of each country. Treaty with the Russian Federation
on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 3, 1991, U.S.-
Rus., S. TaR.Ar Doc. No. 1, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter START II]; see
Ann Devroy, Bush and Yeltsin Sign Treaty to Slash Nuclear Arsenals, WASH. POsT, Jan. 4,
1993, at Al; Keeping START'S Promise WASH. TImEs, Jan. 6, 1993, at G2. That will be a
dramatic reduction, certainly far better than even the most optimistic arms control
advocates could realistically have hoped for only a few years ago.
60. Similarly, chances for future Chinese participation in arms reductions or limita-
tions would be obliterated if it meant Chinese nuclear capabilities would have to be
reduced below those of a rapidly growing Indian arsenal containing very high yield
weapons which are readily deliverable on Chinese cities.
61. Clandestine insertion is a nuclear delivery system in which one state smuggles a
fully fabricated nuclear device into a target country or smuggles in relevant compo-
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reduce the increased risks of nuclear terrorism would almost certainly
require security measures which would reduce civil liberties in the Western
democracies. 62 The more capable the nuclear systems of threshold coun-
tries, the worse these threats may seem, and political pressures to protect
ourselves even at the cost of some privacy and liberty interests would be
likely to grow.6 3
In sum, every interest which would be harmed by further proliferation
will be far more seriously harmed by advanced proliferation.6 4
nents and then assembles the device in the target country. The bomb or the compo-
nents are left in a secure location until needed and can then be detonated by the
sending country or its agents. Given the severe porosity of borders in democracies-
wimess the largely unsuccessful efforts to slow international traffic in narcotics-the
smuggling aspect would be hard to guard against.
Of course, the consequences to the sending country of getting caught could be
severe. There are technical means which can sometimes detect nuclear materials, and
the sending country also runs the more ordinary risks of detection by the police or
intelligence services or having the plans come to light by bad luck. Clandestine inser-
tion is more likely to appeal to states which do not have better delivery systems at their
disposal, e.g., smaller states which conclude that being able to detonate one or two
nuclear weapons on the territory of a larger nuclear power is better than no defense at
all. It is also likely to be the delivery mode of choice for nuclear terrorists.
62. There has long been concern with the possible implications of intrusive arms
control inspections on U.S. civil liberties. The classic work on the subject is Louis HEN.
KIN, ARMS CONTROL AND INSPECION IN AMErucAN LAW (1958). A more recent work
dealing with "open skies" confidence-building and verification provisions and their con-
stitutional implications is David A. Koplow, Back to the Future and Up to the Sky: Legal
Implications of "Open Skies" Inspection for Arms Control, 79 CAL. L. REV. 421 (1991). But
those intrusions would be comparatively minor (though perhaps too intrusive to pass
constitutional muster, especially if not limited to particular industries and government
installations) when compared with the major intrusiveness needed to be highly effective
against clandestine insertion and nuclear terrorism. In that regard, for many years,
pundits asserted that terrorists only want publicity and concessions in response to
threats, not mass death for its own sake. But the bombing of the Pan Am flight over
Locherbie, Scotland, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, and the
recent attacks on Jewish targets in several countries suggest that some terrorists may be
interested in causing extensive fatalities. If they had nuclear weapons, they might actu-
ally use them, not merely threaten to do so.
63. As mentioned in note 61, supra, a country with advanced nuclear weapons pro-
grams and the capacity for accurate delivery at any desired distance is substantially less
likely to be interested in clandestine insertion. However, if a country does decide to use
clandestine insertion, small light devices will be easier to import and hide than large
heavy ones. Moreover, a terrorist group, backed by a state with nuclear weapons, can
cause vastly more damage with a thermonuclear weapon than with a crude Nagasaki-
size device.
64. In times past, the greatest concern with proliferation was the possibility that
regional conflicts, involving some participants who possess nuclear weapons, would
increase the odds that the nuclear weapons states would become involved, resulting in a
concomitant risk of global nuclear war. See Imws A. DuNN & HERMAN KAHN, TRENDS IN
NucLEA PROLIFERAnON, 1975-1995, at 114-29 (1976); ALBERT WOHLsrErER Er AL.,
U.S. ARMs CONTROL AND DisARMaMrNr AGENCY, MoviNc TOWARD LIFE IN A NucLEAR
ARMED CROWD? 152-53 (1976). However, the risk of global nuclear war from an escala-
tion of a regional conflict has apparently been greatly reduced by the demise of the
Soviet Union.
Vol. 28
1995 Law and the H-Bomb
D. Elements of Advanced Proliferation
This section outlines the various areas in which threshold states might seek
to enhance the capabilities of their nuclear forces, and it provides public
information on efforts by the nuclear weapons states and the threshold
states to acquire or improve those capabilities. As will be shown, once a
state nears the nuclear threshold, it is unlikely to be content with a small
force of crude devices. Rather, it will want to acquire militarily more sig-
nificant nuclear forces. This has been the case for the five current nuclear
weapons states, the three states currently at the nuclear threshold, pre-
Gulf War Iraq, and three of the four states which approached the thresh-
old but then reversed course, instead choosing a non-nuclear weapons
policy.65
1. Increases in Arsenal Size
A prime characteristic of advanced proliferation is an increase in the
number of nuclear weapons that a country has at its immediate disposal.
Although the addition of ever more weapons to a nuclear arsenal might
not be inevitable, none of the five nuclear weapons states halted produc-
tion after initially acquiring a handful of devices. Instead they continued
to establish arsenals with hundreds to tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons.66
65. Argentina and Brazil were laying the groundwork for significant nuclear forces
before they decided to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. See supra
note 48. The same was true of the Swedish nuclear weapons program before it was
abandoned. See infra note 207. In contrast, although South Africa had facilities capable
of providing HEU for many nuclear weapons, it claimed that the handful it had was
enough and that it did not need a more sophisticated design. See infra note 211. The
South Africans maintain that they froze their device design with a relatively low yield
and did not give serious consideration to more modem, survivable delivery vehicles.
This may be correct, and if so, it is the sole case of a state with nuclear weapon capabili-
ties wishing to acquire only a small, low-yield arsenal. On the other hand, some believe
South Africa planned a much bigger, more sophisticated force. This theory draws sup-
port from reports of South African acquisition of tritium from Israel and work on Li6,
implosion designs, and miniaturized neutron generators. Mark Hibbs, Top Secret Group
Managed Swap of South African Ufor Israeli Tritium, NucLEAR FuEL, Feb. 14, 1994, at 9
(South Africa obtained 30 grams of tritium, said to be enough to boost 12 weapons);
Mark Hibbs, Evidence Builds of Advanced Weapons Work by South Africa, NucLEoNIcs WEEK,
Jan. 20, 1994, at 5; see infra note 211. The author's guess is that both of these are true.
The government only gave final approval to the seven weapons with the existing design.
However, it also laid the groundwork for a much larger nuclear weapons program with
far higher yields.
66. The existing nuclear powers have varied greatly in the ultimate size of their
arsenals and the rate at which they have added weapons. A country's perceptions of
threat, its then-prevailing strategic doctrine, and its economic, scientific, and technical
capabilities have been important factors. Recent estimates credited the United States
with 11,000 strategic warheads in a total arsenal of about 25,000. David French, Expert
Says START H Siping an Historic Occasion, CNN, Jan. 2, 1993, (Interview with Edward
Warner, RAND Corp. analyst, Transcript #274-2), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Script File.
The four states of the former Soviet Union with nuclear weapons still on their terri-
tory had a combined total of 10,000 strategic warheads, id., and perhaps 17,000 tactical
nuclear weapons, supposedly all accounted for and under Russian control. Britain,
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The manufacture of large numbers of weapons requires facilities for
the large-scale production of special nuclear material. Countries inter-
ested in increasing their number of nuclear weapons will rarely be content
with the amount of weapons-usable nuclear material supplied by a pilot-
scale uranium enrichment facility or a research reactor and reprocessing
plant.6
7
The nuclear threshold states are already taking steps to increase the
amount of nuclear material available to them. Pakistan is widely credited
with having a handful of nuclear weapons.68 Although one highly
respected nongovernment analyst says Pakistan can already produce
enough highly enriched uranium for several devices a year,69 it has contin-
ued to increase the size of its centrifuge enrichment facilities. 70
France Urged to Join Nuclear Cuts, ATtrArAJ. & CoNST.,June 26, 1992, at A3. According
to a Kremlin report, China has several hundred nuclear weapons, while France and the
United Kingdom have about 1000 each. Is 3,000Enough? OFFmCLAL KREMLIN INT'L Naws
BRoADcASrJuly 31, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. The Russian num-
bers may be a bit high for the United Kingdom and France but are probably correct for
China. A 1987 report put China's nuclear arsenal at between 300 and 400 weapons.
China: Bang, They Explained, ECONOMIST, June 13, 1987, at 46. Another report put the
total Chinese inventory at 300, including bomber, ICBM, and submarine ballistic mis-
sile devices. George Leopold, Experts Suggest China May Accede to Ban on Nuclear Tests,
DEF. NEws, June 22, 1992, at 12.
Whatever the exact numbers, the arsenals of the other three nuclear weapons states
are substantially smaller than those of Russia and the United States, but they are grow-
ing at a time when the U.S. and Russian arsenals are shrinking. One report stated that
France is increasing its total to 416 and Britain to 850. This is largely the consequence
of putting multiple warheads on their respective submarine-based ballistic missiles. Ian
Mather, The Cold War, U.S., Russia Agree to Cut Nuclear Weapons, but Wat About Britain
and France?, GAzETTE (Montreal), Jan. 6, 1993, at B3.
67. Some will attempt to build larger enrichment facilities. Others will strive for
much larger reactors, most likely heavy-water or graphite moderated reactors, and cor-
respondingly larger reprocessing plants. Where acquisition of larger reactors is infeasi-
ble, states may try to increase the thermal output of their existing reactors. Some may
acquire weapons-usable nuclear materials by illegal means. States with the largest
nuclear ambitions can be expected to try to acquire large-scale facilities to produce
both plutonium and highly enriched uranium because HEU is better for some nuclear
weapons purposes and plutonium is better for others. The ability to produce both is
desirable for the most common approach to attaining yields of a half a megaton or
more.
68. Senator Pressler stated that the Pakistanis have seven devices which can be put
together on short notice. Pakistan Says Nuclear Programme is Peaceful, REUTERs LIMITED,
Dec. 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. A Russian intelligence
report, recently quoted by Senator Glenn, credits Pakistan with four to seven nuclear
weapons. Restrictions Hurt U.S. Arms Makers, Congress Told, DEF. & AEROSPACE ELECTRON-
ics, Mar. 15, 1993, at 1. Senators Glenn and Pressler are two of the most knowledgeable
and active Senate members regarding nuclear nonproliferation issues.
69. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation and U.S. National Security: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) (testimony of Leonard S.
Spector, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
70. Doing so has been expensive in the face of a concerted Western effort to pre-
vent Pakistani purchasing agents from clandestinely acquiring the needed equipment
and materials. See LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NucLEAR AMBITIONs 89-112 (1990). These
efforts have forced them to take the slower, less certain, and more costly route of indig-
enous manufacturing of the centrifuge parts. Continuing to expand its enrichment
facilities has also been costly in a political sense, further straining relations with the
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India, not content with the plutonium generation available from the
CIRUS reactor, which it used to produce the plutonium for its 1974
nuclear weapons test in the Rajasthan Desert, 71 proceeded with the R-5 or
"Dhruva" reactor, which is roughly capable of five times CIRUS' annual
plutonium production.7 2 Although estimates of the total plutonium avail-
able to India vary considerably,7" it seems certain that the stockpile of sep-
arated, unsafeguarded, weapons-optimal plutonium in India is probably
large enough for a dozen or more nuclear weapons, and it is growing.
74
United States, its ally of convenience and prime arms supplier. There have been press
reports that Pakistan has threatened to resume work on a 50-70 MW natural uranium
production reactor in the absence of Indian agreement to cease producing plutonium.
Russian intelligence reports are credited with the assessment that the reactor is 70%
complete. Mark Hibbs, Bhutto May Finish Plutonium Reactor Without Agreement on Fissile
Stocks, NuCLEONICS WY., Oct. 6, 1994, at 10.
71. On May 18, 1974, the Indian Government announced that it had successfully
tested a 10-15 kt. nuclear explosive device. See Bernard Weinraub, India Becomes 6th
Nation To Set Off NuclearDevice, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1974, at 1. The CIRUS reactor was
supplied by Canada prior to the era of IAEA safeguards, and the heavy water was sup-
plied by the United States with assurances from the Indian government that it, and the
materials produced from its use, would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. India
claimed that its test was a "peaceful nuclear explosion," and therefore using plutonium
from the CIRUS reactor for the explosion did not violate those assurances. The
Canadians cut off nuclear supply in retaliation; the United States did nothing beyond a
faint protest.
72. Like the CIRUS, the R-5 is not under IAEA safeguards, but in contrast to
CIRUS, it is not subject to a peaceful use guarantee. See Gary Milhollin, Stopping the
Indian Bomb, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 593, 597 (1987). Dhruva, which began operations in
1985, is essentially a copy of Canada's NRU reactor. It is rated at 100 MW and, accord-
ing to an Indian source, can produce 55 kg of "weapons-grade" plutonium per year.
Brahma Chellaney, Indian Scientists Exploring UEnrichment, Advanced Technologies, NucL_-
omics Wi.-, Mar. 5, 1987, at 9. However, there have been troubles at the reactor, id., and
its total plutonium production is certainly far less than the roughly 430 kg. it could have
produced by now if it had operated at rated capacity.
73. In the case of India, it is important to distinguish between total produced pluto-
nium and produced plutonium not subject to IAEA safeguards. The amount of total
plutonium is enormous, and that is probably what is behind one estimate that India
could have enough nuclear material by the end of the century to have as many nuclear
weapons as China currently possesses. Nordland, supra note 23. But under present
political and military circumstances, India is not likely to violate IAEA safeguards when
it has plutonium available which is not under safeguards. In that regard, in addition to
its two big research reactors, India has indigenously-built heavy water power reactors
which are not under IAEA safeguards. One should also distinguish produced pluto-
nium from separated plutonium. Estimates of separated unsafeguarded plutonium in
the Indian inventory range from a high of 400 kg., from a Pakistani source, to a
reported "best guess" from Western intelligence sources of 285 kg. Mark Hibbs, Indian
PUProduction Overstated, No Pit Production, Iyengar Says, NuCLEONIcs WK., Apr. 9, 1992, at
6. Professor Milhollin's own estimates for produced (separated and unseparated) plu-
tonium are more modest. He states that production from the CIRUS and R-5 research
reactors and the Madras power reactors supply enough plutonium for 15 nuclear weap-
ons per year. Milhollin, supra note 72, at 597. Finally, it is useful for some purposes to
distinguish between "low bum-up" weapons optimal plutonium and less desirable "high
bum-up" weapons-usable plutonium, as the Indians would look first to the former for
its weapons. See infra note 74.
74. India's stockpile of separated, low bum-up plutonium not subject to IAEA safe-
guards is probably over 100 kg. and under 300 kg. If each device requires five to eight
kilograms of plutonium, which should correspond roughly to India's presumed level of
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The Indians also have a centrifuge enrichment program which could ulti-
mately provide highly enriched uranium.75
Israel has found it politically difficult to construct additional nuclear
facilities for weapons purposes because of concern over the American
reaction and the potential consequences which might flow from eliminat-
ing any residual doubts that it possessed nuclear weapons. Faced with
these roadblocks, Israel has instead increased the thermal rating of its
unsafeguarded Dimona reactor, thereby substantially increasing its annual
plutonium production. 76 In addition, there are persistent rumors that
Israel purchased highly enriched uranium from South Africa and that it
stole special nuclear material from the United States.77 It also smuggled
large numbers of krytrons (triggering switches for nuclear weapons which
have virtually no credible non-nuclear weapons applications) out of the
United States, an act wholly inconsistent with the needs of a small nuclear
arsenal.78
Iraq's efforts were not aimed at acquiring a tiny handful of nuclear
weapons. To the contrary, given the facilities it had in operation and
under construction, or for which it had firm plans, it is clear that Iraq
aimed at a production level of many devices per year.7 9 Moreover, the
large number of krytrons Iraq attempted to smuggle out of the United
States is consistent only with ambitious nuclear weapons plans.8 0 One esti-
mate placed Iraq's expenditures on its various nuclear programs at $10
billion81 spread over tventy-four nuclear-related facilities,82 which is indic-
design sophistication, that would mean a potential arsenal in the range of 12 to 60
nuclear weapons. Of course, the fact that India could have an arsenal that large does
not mean that it has fabricated all the plutonium into weapons and deployed them to
its military forces.
75. India operated a 100 centrifuge cascade by 1985, and recently it announced
that it had completed a second, multi-hundred centrifuge facility at Mysore. Mark
Hibbs, Second Indian Enrichment Facility Using Centrifuges is Operational, NUCLEONICS WL,
Mar. 26, 1992, at 9. If so, in the absence of a crash effort, production of enough
enriched uranium for either significant nuclear weapons production or to fuel the
Tarapur reactors would still be a number of years away.
76. See EA Wayne, IsraelAccused Anew of Nudear Violations, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 2, 1987, at 1; Israel Nuclear Stockpile Plentiful, Cm. TRiB., Jan. 9, 1987, at C6.
77. For a discussion of a possible diversion of HEU from the NUMEC plant in Penn-
sylvania, see SPECTOR, supra note 70, at 152-54.
78. In 1985, a California grand jury returned an indictment charging Richard
Smyth with illegally exporting 800 krytrons to Israel. Indictment Charges Californian Ille-
gally Sold Munitions List TriggeringDevices to Israe INrr'L TRADE REP., May 22, 1985, at 704;
Californian Indicted in Export of Tiggers to Israel, N.Y. TimEs, May 17, 1985, at A8.
79. Iraq had both centrifuge and calutron enrichment programs and a program in
chemical enrichment. It was in the process of producing the equipment and had partly
completed a 100 calutron facility. SPECTOR, supra note 70. There have also been dis-
puted reports that it had an additional uranium enrichment facility based on the
Becker nozzle process, though the U.N. inspectors have not found such a facility. See
Paul Lewis, U.N. Suspects Iraq Has a 4th A-Plant, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at A3. Reports
have also persisted that Iraq had an underground plutonium production reactor, but
the United Nations has not found supporting evidence.
80. See supra note 79.
81. Paul Lewis, Iraq is Said to Have Hidden Nuclear Records From U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1991, at A6. Another source put the expenditures at $4 billion. Leonard Doyle,
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ative of an appetite for many nuclear weapons.
Other states which had active nuclear weapons programs but turned
away from those efforts include Sweden,8 3 Brazil, Argentina,8 4 and South
Africa.85 All of these states acquired nuclear facilities capable of produc-
ing comparatively large amounts of special nuclear material, certainly
more than enough for a handful of nuclear weapons. Even North Korea,
though in most respects a nascent program, has taken major steps to
increase its plutonium availability. If successful, these steps could give it
enough plutonium to fabricate ten or more nuclear weapons per year by
the end of the decade.8 6
2. Increases in Explosive Power
The power of nuclear weapons is normally expressed as the equivalent
weight of an equally powerful conventional high explosive. Therefore,
since the Hiroshima bomb is thought to have been the equivalent of
approximately 15,000 tons of TNT,8 7 it is considered a 15 kiloton device.88
The other four nuclear states also began with weapons of roughly the same
explosive power.
Documents Deal Ends Baghdad Bus Siege, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 28, 1991, at 1. Additional
sites have been discovered since these estimates were made. Whatever the exact cost, it
was a massive program.
82. Andrew Borowiec, Wily Iraq is Able to Preserve Cache of Chemical Arms, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 20, 1991, at AS.
83. See infra note 207.
84. See supra note 48.
85. See infra note 211. Although South African officials may be telling the truth in
declaring that the six nuclear weapons fabricated and the one under construction were
all they wanted, they had positioned themselves so that the two uranium enrichment
facilities could be used in conjunction (at the expense of fuel for their civilian power
reactors) to produce large amounts of highly enriched uranium. See id.
86. The North Korean reactor subject to the most press comment is a five megawatt
natural uranium-fueled reactor which had been operating since 1986 with an unknown
duty schedule. It takes approximately 25 megawatt years to produce enough plutonium
for a single, simple nuclear weapon. This is apparently what is behind the oft-quoted
CIA estimate that North Korea may have enough plutonium for one to two nuclear
weapons, which they may have already fabricated. However, the North Koreans were
obviously not content with obtaining plutonium for a device every four to six years.
They have constructed a 50 MW reactor, which may have been ready to go on line
shortly, and they also had a 200 MW reactor under construction which may be ready for
commissioning in 1995. See Editorial Note, supra note 38, and sources cited therein.
87. See David Evans, Secret U.S. Nuclear TestingDiscovered, CHI. TmB., Jan. 19, 1988, at
SC; Betty Parham & Gerrie Ferris, Q &A On The News, ATLANTAJ. & CoNST.,June 2,
1992, at A2; France Ends Nuclear Test Secrecy, CH. TmB., June 3, 1990, at 31C; Bill Gertz,
U.S. Can Do Battle With 'Tactical Nukes, 'WASH. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1991, at B9; Melissa Healy,
Bush Aides Fear Major Fight on Arms Treaty, LA. TIMES, June 3, 1990, at A14; R. Jeffrey
Smith, DOE Says Decade is Needed to Weigh More A-Test Curbs, WASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1990, at
A10.
88. Caution is needed when comparing the destructive power of nuclear weapons.
The area which can suffer a given level of damage is not proportional to the kiloton
rating of the device, but rather is an exponential function that varies roughly with the
two-thirds power. Thus, a 4.1 megaton device will release over 500 times more force
than an 8 kiloton device. However, it will destroy an area approximately 64 times as
large, not 500 times.
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However, all five states saw military utility in being able to destroy
greater areas. Greater explosive yields also increase the kill probability for
a particular target, especially those which have been hardened against a
nuclear attack, such as missile silos and command bunkers. For these two
reasons, all the nuclear weapons states put extensive effort into perfecting
high yield devices, 89 though the United States and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics later reduced their emphasis on yield per se.90
Going from simple fission devices to more sophisticated ones can
increase the yield threefold or more. However, doing so requires a sub-
stantial effort in both weapons design and testing of at least the non-
( 4,096,000 t 2/S = 64
8,000 t. )
89. The United States once tested a 25 megaton device. Nathaniel Green, The
Bomb, 45 Years Later, STATES Nws SERvicE, Aug. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File. The Titan II had a warhead of 9 megatons and the United States
had a bomber-delivered device which was slightly larger. See generally Lynn R. Sykes &
Dan M. Davis, The Yields of Soviet Strategic Weapons, Sci. AM.,Jan. 1987, at 29; David Evans,
Missiles, Accuracy and Several Kinds of Overkil; CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1988, Perspective Sec-
tion, at 13. Many of the strategic weapons in the current U.S. arsenal range in power
from 300 kilotons to 500 kilotons, i.e., one-half a megaton. For example, the W87 war-
head on the U.S. MX missile has a nominal yield of 300 kilotons, though 475 kilotons is
possible. Each MX missile carries ten warheads. Richard C. Gross, Bigger Kick for MX
Possible, UPI, May 13, 1984, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Devices fash-
ioned in the former Soviet Union tended to be larger. Sykes & Davis, supra. The Sovi-
ets once tested a 58 megaton device. Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
[Extract], October 31, 1961, in DOCUMENTS ON DIsARMAMENT 1961, at 555, 559 (United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ed., 1961) (reprinting Soviet Embassy
press release 223, Nov. 27, 1961). That is an explosive power roughly 4,000 times
greater than the Hiroshima device. The test took place Oct. 30, 1961 at Novaya Zemlya.
It is hard to imagine a military or non-military purpose for such a device. Nothing that
large was ever deployed. Fred Hiatt, Russian Test Site Displays Pride, Perils of a Superpower,
WASH. Posr, Oct. 18, 1992, at Al. Each of the other three states chose to test-and
generally to deploy-nuclear weapons with yields roughly 10 to 100 times larger than
their first device. The largest Chinese test was four megatons, according to Shen Din-
gli, a Chinese nuclear expert. Leopold, supra note 66. The largest French test at its
Mururoa test site reportedly had a yield of 140 kilotons. France Carries Out 101st Under-
ground Nuclear Test, REuTRs LIMITED, Nov. 5, 1988, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File.
90. Major improvements in accuracy meant that enormous weapons were no longer
needed to assure the destruction of a target. Moreover, considerably more destruction
can be caused by ten 500 kiloton devices than by one five megaton device, though the
total explosive force is the same. Therefore, in an era of multiple, independently
targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), whose number on any given missile is constrained
primarily by total weight, yield has been sacrificed for the ability to add even more
warheads. In addition, military planners were concerned with "fratricide," the loss of
incoming weapons due to the size of the fireball of one's own weapons which had
already been detonated in the same area. For threshold state programs, which cannot
aspire either to MIRVing their missiles or to highly accurate delivery, these considera-
tions would not apply for many years. In any event, they do not detract from the enor-
mous attraction to the military of being able to increase yield from 10-20 kilotons into
the 100 kiloton to one megaton range.
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nuclear components.9 1 Beyond pure fission devices are "boosted" devices,
which can greatly increase the yield, but they are no small accomplish-
ment.92 Finally, even greater yields can be achieved through the develop-
ment of true multi-staged thermonuclear weapons.93 It will not be easy for
threshold countries to achieve major improvements in yield without assist-
ance in weapons design.94
The threshold states have all engaged in activities relevant to increas-
ing the yield of their devices. India, which continues to have an interest in
thermonuclear weapons, 95 maintained a major research program in the
physics and materials relevant to those weapons throughout the 1970s and
1980s.96 In the late 1980s it accelerated those efforts.
9 7
91. Improved fission yield devices may require both specialized non-nuclear materi-
als and more sophisticated fabrication techniques. Nevertheless, for these devices, the
dominant consideration is the availability of special nuclear material, followed by
design sophistication.
92. In a boosted device, the tremendous temperature and pressure produced by the
fission explosion can achieve a small fusion yield. The fusion adds very little of the total
explosive power per se. However, it produces very high energy neutrons. When these
neutrons collide with fissionable material, many more neutrons are released. This
increased neutron flux causes far more nuclear material to fission, which significantly
increases the yield of the device.
93. A thermonuclear weapon uses a fission stage (the "primary stage"), which is
often itself boosted, to ignite a "secondary stage," which uses lithium deuteride as the
fuel for a very large fusion yield. Often a further stage uses the high energy neutrons
from fusion to fission more uranium, further increasing the yield. Far more complexity
is involved than the preceding sentences suggest.
94. Development of those capabilities by the British, French, and Chinese was sub-
stantially aided by the mere fact that they knew from Soviet and U.S. successes that it
could be accomplished. Nevertheless, extensive-and expensive-development and
testing were required. For a more thorough discussion of these difficulties and their
relation to a possible comprehensive test ban treaty, see infra notes 347-53 and accom-
panying text. It is important to note that with respect to increases in yield (in contrast
to increases in numbers of weapons) a critical change in emphasis has taken place:
design sophistication is the single most important consideration, not the availability of
nuclear materials.
95. Proliferation Threats of the 1990s: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Government
Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (testimony ofJames Woolsey, Director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency)
(Sen. Glenn: Almost four years ago, one of your predecessors, Jim, Judge Web-
ster, testified before this Committee that the Intelligence Community had, and
I quote, "indicators that tell us that India is interested in thermonuclear weap-
ons capability." Do you share that assessment? ... Mr. Woolsey: I believejudge
Webster's comment is unfortunately still valid, Mr. Chairman.).
96. A 1985 German intelligence report stated that Rajiv Ghandi, who was Prime
Minister at the time, had ordered P.K. Iyengar, then Director of the Bhabha Atomic
Research Center (BARC) and later Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, to develop a thermonuclear weapon in response to growing concern over Paki-
stan's nuclear efforts and to prepare to test it shortly after any Pakistani test. Mark
Hibbs, India and Pakistan Fail to Include New SWU Plants on Exchanged Lists, NucLEAR
FUEL, March 30, 1992, at 6. Indian officials no longer deny they have pursued research
relevant to thermonuclear devices, but they claim the German report overstates their
interest in the H-bomb. Hibbs, supra note 73. In any event, work relevant to develop-
ing higher yield fission devices at BARC is an open secret. Id.
97. In 1987, India established a Centre for Advanced Technology (CAT) at BARC,
the nuclear complex where its 1974 nuclear explosive was developed and prepared.
Cornell International Law Journal
There are indications that Israel has been working on, or even pos-
sesses, boosted devices. Israeli interest in obtaining high speed com-
puters, combined with their acquisition of advanced nuclear weapons-
related materials98 and equipment, strongly suggests, but does not conclu-
sively prove, that there is merit in these accusations. 99 Certainly, if it is
true that Israel's nuclear weapons program was primarily intended as a
force de dissuasion against the then-Soviet Union, 10 0 such a purpose would
provide a powerful incentive to develop higher yield weapons.
Pakistan attempted, by clandestine means, to obtain specialty beryl-
lium metal,' 0 which can increase the yield of fission devices without
increasing the required amount of nuclear material.' 0 2 Evidence on the
public record of active Pakistani interest in full-fledged thermonuclear
weapons is scant, but the Pakistanis did attempt to acquire tritium separa-
tion equipment from Germany,' 0 3 which suggests an interest in boosting.
Finally, we know from the IAEA inspections following the Gulf War
that Iraq had gone through five successive refinements in its device
design.10 4 Even more ominously, it acquired a specially separated isotope
of lithium (Li6) from China,'0 5 had indigenously produced several
The CAT was to concentrate on the application of lasers and accelerators to create
thermonuclear reactions. Science and Technology: Planned Research in Thermonuclear
Energy, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASrs, FE/W1428/A/16, Feb. 18, 1987 (quoting
a Press Trust of India report of Feb. 11, 1987), available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl
File. While there has been hope that such inertial confinement fusion (ICF or "laser
fusion") programs could someday provide useful electrical power, even the most
advanced countries have had only modest successes and are decades away from com-
mercializing civilian applications of ICF, if ever. On the other hand, the United States,
Russia, France, and the United Kingdom use ICF to obtain information for their ther-
monuclear weapons programs. See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. Given
the exceedingly remote chances that this technology will work in relevant time frames,
any claim that India is pursuing this technology for bona fide peaceful purposes is
highly doubtful, but it could be a substantial aid to its nuclear weapons-related
research.
98. Mordechai Vanunu, who had worked at the Negev desert complex which con-
tains the Dimona reactor, exposed Israel's success in producing tritium and lithium
deuteride. Vanunu was later kidnapped by Israeli agents, charged, and convicted of
revealing state secrets. See generally LEONARD S. SPEcTOR, THE UNDECLARED BOMB 164-
93, 381-402 (1988). See infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the importance of tritium and lithium deuteride to advanced nuclear weapons.
99. In part because of Vanunu's revelations, SPECTOR, supra note 98, at 164-93, 381-
402, a number of experts in and out of government privately believe the Israelis already
possess boosted devices.
100. See SEYMOUR HERSH, THE SAMPSON OPTiON 174-81, 220-21 (1991).
101. Retired Pakistani General Guilty in Exporting Case, OR.ANDO SENnNEL TIB., July
10, 1992, at A15 (In an unreported case, a federal court jury found General Inam UI-
Haq guilty of conspiring to export maraging steel and beryllium to Pakistan.).
102. There are exceedingly few peaceful uses for beryllium of this type, and those
only require small amounts.
103. Mark Heinrich, Chemical Arms Row Spurs Bonn to Tackle Holes in Export Laws,
REUTERS, Jan. 6, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; Pakistan Regrets
Indian Prime Minister's Statement on Nuclear Program, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 5, 1989,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
104. Pickering Testimony, supra note 40.
105. See Spiking the Big Guns, TIME, Oct. 21, 1991, at 71.
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pounds of Li6, and had plans to make about 220 pounds per year.10 6 That
is enough to produce tritium for many boosted devices' 0 7 or for direct use
in a smaller number of thermonuclear weapons.' 08 This material has no
peaceful uses in those quantities and is of no use to a simple fission device,
but it is critical for boosted and/or thermonuclear weapons.' 09 We also
know the Iraqis were engaged in relevant weapons physics.1 0 Although
Iraq was attempting to construct a sophisticated nuclear force, it was still a
considerable way from obtaining it when the Gulf War broke out."'
It is beyond the purposes of this article to prove that each of these
states has an active program to obtain thermonuclear weapons. In terms
of a major program aiming at early acquisition and distribution of those
weapons to its forces, it is probably not the case for all of them and cer-
tainly not the case for some. Rather, the critical point is that threshold
states have a strong motivation to develop and deploy weapons of much
higher yield.
3. Reduced Requirements for Special Nuclear Material
For planning purposes, the LAEA assumes that eight kilograms (about 17.5
pounds) of plutonium or twenty-five kilograms of IEU (about fifty-five
pounds) are needed for a typical first nuclear explosive. However, weap-
ons designers in the existing nuclear weapons states can make devices of
equal or greater yield with substantially less material. Thus, improvements
in design sophistication can allow a state to increase the number of
nuclear weapons it can produce from any given inventory of special
nuclear material. These improvements can be a vital consideration if the
size of a country's prospective arsenal is primarily constrained by the
amount of special nuclear material at its disposal, as would be the case for
Israel and Pakistan. In fact, U.N. inspectors discovered that the Iraqis
were investigating designs which would have improved yields with lower
106. Pickering Testimony, supra note 40. According to reports, China also sold Iraq
seven tons of lithium hydride, a possible feedstock for Li6 separation. Chemical Sale to
Iraq Reported, FACTs ON FiLE WORLD NEWs DIGEsr, Oct. 12, 1990, at 765.
107. One former U.S. nuclear weapons designer, Dr. Theodore Taylor, stated that
220 pounds of Li6 would be enough for dozens to thousands of boosted devices,
depending on the reactor used to irradiate it. Lewis, infra note 112.
108. Id.
109. Li6 is essential to efficient tritium production and is directly used in thermonu-
clear devices. See infra part IIIA.3.
110. WilliamJ. Broad, U.N. Says Iraq was Moving Toward More Potent Bombs, N.Y. TiMEs,
Oct. 15, 1991, at Al. According to U.N. inspectors, Iraqi documents showed they were
working on what they called "two-dimensional hydrodynamic and neutronic models" to
"simulate the behavior of nuclear weapons." Id. These days, such computer models of
the forces in a detonating nuclear weapon are essential to efficient weapon
development.
111. IAEA inspectors who had access to the design for Iraq's intended first device
reported that it was an implosion device utilizing a solid-core of HEU, a polonium neu-
tron initiator, and a natural uranium reflector/tamper. That is a level of sophistication
approximately equal to the Nagasaki device. Even that design was probably two years
from completion, as Iraqi documents indicate that there were a number of areas which
required further work. Mark Hibbs, Iraqi Execution of Bomb Design 'Two Years Away, 'Data
Suggests, NucLER FuEL, OCt. 14, 1991, at 8.
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fissile material requirements than that required for a typical first fission
device. 11 2
4. Enhanced Deliverability
A fourth major effort of the five declared nuclear weapons states has been
to improve the deliverability of the nuclear weapons themselves, making
them easier and safer to deliver. The first major change was to reduce the
weight. The Trinity device, the first nuclear explosive, weighed approxi-
mately 10,000 pounds." 3 A nuclear weapon of that size is far too heavy to
be delivered effectively at extended range by fighter planes; indeed many
fighters could not carry such a device at all. Limiting a device to bomber
delivery substantially reduces its utility, as the state may not possess mod-
em bombers and thus is dependent on older, less capable aircraft.1 14 A
10,000 pound device wholly precludes delivery by small, difficult to detect,
cruise missiles and is also too heavy to be delivered by nearly all intermedi-
ate range ballistic missles (IRBMs)." 5 Bringing the weight below 1300
pounds, the size of the larger of the two Swedish nuclear weapons designs
completed by 1958,116 provides a major benefit in deliverability, while fur-
ther reductions in weight for any given yield are also possible. Reduced
weight is especially important for placing multiple warheads on a single
missile and for man-portable atomic demolition munitions. 117 Finally,
major weight reductions could help countries get around restrictions built
into the current Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)." 8
112. Iraq had been working on a fission device with an "air-gap" design capable of
increasing the amount of explosive force for a given amount of special nuclear mate-
rial. Paul Lewis, Iraq Is Said to Have Hidden Nuclear Records From U.N., N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
14, 1991, at A6. This information was confirmed to the author by an individual who
took part in the U.N. inspections and who wishes to remain anonymous.
113. LAN SING LAMONT, DAY OF TRINrn' 11 (1965).
114. There used to be commerce in small and/or obsolete bombers, particularly
sales by the Soviets and British. However, no state has sold state-of-the-art heavy bomb-
ers, and none has sold medium bombers for some time. For a discussion of the need to
control the sale of bombers, see infra notes 306-10 and accompanying text.
115. According to one report, the U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile has twice the cruis-
ing range with a nuclear payload than it has with a 1,000 lb. conventional bomb because
the nuclear warhead is lighter. Eric Nalder, Warfare Has Never Had Weapon Like Navy's
Tomahawk Missie, SEATT= TIMEs, Jan. 16, 1991, at Al (citing as sources United States
Naval Intelligence Military Database and Janes Weapons Systems). Another source
states that the difference in range between the nuclear and conventional versions is
considerably greater, crediting the T-LAM-N version and the GLCM version, each
armed with a 200 kiloton nuclear warhead, with 2,500 km ranges but the LAM-C and
TASM conventional versions with only a 450 km range with a 450 kg (i.e., 1000 lb.) high
explosive warhead. Ian Curtis, Missile Technology in the Glasnost Era, DEFENSE & FOREIGN
Arr., Mar. 1990, at Special Supplement: World Missiles 2.
116. See LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS 66 (1985).
117. Weight reduction, like improvements in yield, is largely a function of design
capability, including computer modeling and extensive testing of both non-nuclear and
nuclear components. Access to exotic low-weight materials can also be important.
118. The MTCR is a nonbinding undertaking initially entered into by selected West-
ern states to halt the spread of ballistic missiles and technology along with space launch
technology, which could be used for ballistic missiles. See Guidelines for Sensitive Mis-
sile-Relevant Transfers, 26 I.L.M. 599, 600 (1987) [hereinafter MTCR Guidelines]. It
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Other major improvements in deliverability include the construction
of implosion devices which occupy shapes other than spheres, 1 19 in order
to make them sufficiently rugged for supersonic flight (if carried exter-
nally by fighter or supersonic bomber) and re-entry (if used in missiles)
and to optimize them for various kinds of fusing options and delivery tech-
niques. These improvements are especially important for advanced
nuclear programs and require considerable testing, advanced engineer-
ing, and in some cases, sophisticated materials and manufacturing
capabilities.
Evidence of substantial work on improvements in the deliverability of
nuclear devices by the threshold states is sketchy at best. However, a Ger-
man intelligence report asserts that Pakistan has designed a nuclear war-
head that can fit under an F-16 and has undergone wind-tunnel tests.' 2 0
5. Greater Safety and Survivability
Because nuclear weapons are very valuable and because an accidental det-
onation would be both a radiological hazard and a political disaster, coun-
tries have an incentive to make those weapons reasonably safe from
accidental explosion. Similarly, they will also want to make them rugged
enough to withstand accidential detonation or destruction from near
misses during hostile attack.
A common goal has been to make them "one point safe," meaning
that if the high explosives used in the device to start the chain reaction are
detonated at a single point there will not be a nuclear explosion; instead
only the conventional explosives will go off. One point safety requires
considerable design work and testing.' 2 ' Both the efforts by several
threshold states to acquire advanced diagnostic equipment and computers
(suitable for testing the ruggedness of warheads) and the acquisition of
exotic materials by those states are consistent with an interest in the safety
and survival of their weapons, but they are not strong enough evidence to
prove that those states are actively pursuing such an objective.
6. Acquisition of Better Delivery Systems
Nuclear explosives are high-value weapons. For a state with a nascent pro-
gram, considerable time, effort, money, and diplomatic costs have gone
is designed, by its terms, to limit the spread of missiles capable of delivering a 500 kg.
(about 1100 lbs.) payload a distance of 300 km. Oust over 185 miles) or more. Thomas
G. Mahnken, Ballistic Missile Prolferation: Seeking Global Solutions to Regional Problems, 14
DisAIA aEsNTr 1, 11 (1991). Some observers believe these limits are too generous
because nuclear warheads could be designed within the weight limit, and there are
fairly simple means of increasing range. See, e.g., CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECUrY
AND ARMs CONTROL, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, ASSESSING BALLisTic MISSILE PROLIFERATION
AND ITS CONTROL 170 (1991).
119. Missile nose-cones and the outer cases of bombs are not ideally sphere-shaped.
An efficient design must conform the nuclear weapon shape closely to the ideal shape
of the bomb or warhead. Although this is important for single warhead devices, it
becomes critical for multiple warhead missiles.
120. Hersh, supra note 51.
121. Nordland, supra note 23.
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into the creation of the first few devices. The state may have risked pre-
emption by an existing nuclear power or conventional attack by a neigh-
boring regional power. In military terms, nuclear weapons are useless
unless they reach their designated targets with reasonable accuracy. In
deterrence terms, the possession of nuclear weapons will be substantially
discounted by an adversary who doubts that the devices can be delivered
successfully.
Threshold states thus have powerful incentives to acquire delivery sys-
tems with greater weight-carrying capability, range, accuracy, and
survivability than the fighter aircraft which all nations of potential
advanced proliferation concern already possess. Certainly the existing
nuclear weapons states put tremendous emphasis on the acquisition of
delivery systems and, until the demise of the Soviet Union, were spending
billions of dollars per year on their development, testing, deployment,
maintenance, and improvement.' 22
Nuclear-capable delivery systems can take several forms, including
advanced fighter aircraft,123 bombers (especially those whose survivability
can be enhanced through supersonic speed, electronic counter measures,
very low altitude capability, "stealth,"' 24 and "stand-off' capability),125
122. Deployingjust one ICBM can be a very considerable expense, and the quest to
put on more warheads with greater accuracy has increased that cost. A 1988 analysis
showed that the first U.S. ICBM, the Atlas, cost $8 million, while its successor, what is
now called the Minuteman I, cost $11 million per copy. The three-warhead Minuteman
III cost $13 million, while the purported cost of one MX missile was $63 million. (All
figures were adjusted to 1988 dollars.) Missiles, Accuracy and Several Kinds of Overkil,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 1, 1988, at C13. Whether or not these figures are accurate (cost
accounting, having a number of accepted methods, can give several "correct" answers),
it is clear that the total costs increased even though the cost per delivered warhead
decreased.
While constructing these advanced delivery systems and their warheads and keeping
them manned and operational are very expensive, it should be noted that strategic
systems have always been a fairly small fraction of total U.S. defense expenditures.
Some of the early fascination with nuclear weapons, particularly on the U.S. side, was
because they seemed to be much less expensive than maintaining sufficient conven-
tional forces to deter a Soviet attack in Europe. In the long term, however, it is doubt-
fil that nuclear weapons saved money. Once the Soviets had a large nuclear force
deliverable at intercontinental range, the threat of nuclear attack to counter Soviet con-
ventional capabilities lost most of its credibility. NATO was then forced to maintain a
vigorous conventional defense, in addition to the cost of the nuclear weapons, largely
negating any savings caused by the nuclear weapons themselves. Also, early on, little
thought was given to the eventual cost of environmental clean-up from the production
of the special nuclear materials and the weapons, which at Department of Energy facili-
ties alone could be as much as $155 billion according to the General Accounting
Office. Earl Lane, Cleanup Costs at Nuclear Sites Soar, NEwSDAY, June 24, 1990, at 13.
123. All nations of interest have fighter aircraft. Those especially appropriate for
ground attack are sometimes called fighter-bombers, attack aircraft, or strike aircraft. A
more militarily significant force can be achieved by increasing their numbers, range,
weight-carrying capability, penetration aids, and electronic optimization for nuclear
delivery.
124. Stealth is the capacity of certain design features, including the use of exotic
materials, to make an aircraft virtually undetectable by normal anti-aircraft radar. The
United States has a stealth bomber, the B-2, and a stealth fighter, the F-117. The latter
saw action during the Persian Gulf War.
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naval delivery systems (especially aircraft carriers carrying fighters or
attack aircraft and submarines or surface vessels carrying ballistic or cruise
missiles),126 cruise missiles employed as stand-alone, ground-based weap-
ons systems (especially those of considerable range, accuracy, and mobil-
ity), and ground-launched ballistic missiles.' 2 7
The enormous cost of developing, testing, deploying, and maintain-
ing advanced delivery systems is a major constraint on advanced prolifera-
tion. Indigenous development and manufacture of a delivery system is
nearly always more expensive and takes far longer than purchasing an
identical system from a nation which has already developed and deployed
it. 128 The delivery system problem is thus far more pressing if the coun-
tries already possessing them are prepared to sell whole delivery systems,
major components, or relevant technologies to the threshold states.
Although no current threshold state could match the United States or
Russia in expenditures for advanced delivery systems, there is conclusive
evidence that each of them is acquiring capabilities that cannot be fully
explained either in terms of peaceful programs for space research or for
125. A bomber attains stand-off capability if it carries nuclear-armed ballistic missiles
(such as the former U.S. "Skybolt" program) or cruise missiles (such as the air launched
cruise missle (ALCM) currently carried on many B-52s) such that it can attack a target
while remaining some distance from the target country's air defenses.
126. The military utility of both aircraft carriers and submarines is greatly enhanced
if they have nuclear propulsion, which increases their range. The utility of submarines
as a nuclear weapons carrier platform is also enhanced if they are very quiet and thus
hard to detect.
127. Ballistic missiles are the delivery system most sought by the nuclear threshold
nations. They can vary greatly in terms of their range, weight-carrying capability, and
accuracy. They may also differ in survivability, with the odds of the missile surviving a
preemptive conventional attack or nuclear near-miss improved by the use of solid pro-
pellants, by basing the missiles in hardened silos, or by making them mobile. Some
ballistic missiles also have the capability of launching multiple warheads at the same
general target. It is even possible for a missile to attack wholly separate targets
(MIRVs), though that is a very sophisticated technology not likely to be mastered
quickly by new nuclear powers. For example, the current French M-4 sea-launched
ballistic missile is a multiple warhead missile, but the different warheads cannot be sepa-
rately targeted. Only with the M-5 missile now coming on line will the French have
MIRV capabilities. No current state of proliferation concern could reach the level of
technical sophistication currently achieved by France for many years. Also, the Chinese
ICBMs are not believed to be MIRV-capable.
128. Indigenous development of delivery systems will nearly always be far more
expensive than purchase of the identical system because the selling state often wishes to
recover a portion of its sunk costs and, accordingly, is frequently willing to sell for a
figure above the marginal cost but below the fully amortized unit cost. In some cases,
countries will even sell below the marginal cost of the weapons. Countries may do so
for political reasons. Countries with inconvertible currencies may be willing to sell
below their marginal cost to earn hard currency. The Soviet Union and several of its
allied states apparently sold arms well below their marginal cost with the twin objectives
of gaining political influence and hard currency. Even if weapons are sold at or above
their full cost, economies of scale often make purchased systems cheaper and allow
them to be obtained far sooner than could be achieved with indigenous development,
testing, and production.
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the delivery of conventional weapons. 12 9 A number of other countries
also have such programs. 13 0
India has a substantial space program.' 3 ' In economic terms, the
considerable expenditures for that program are highly unlikely to provide
cost-effective benefits to India's development, because satellite launch
services can be purchased from others for as little as $20 million.' 3 2 This
suggests that there are other motives, such as domestic politics and inter-
national prestige. In addition, there are clearly nonpeaceful motivations
to aspects of the Indian space program, particularly the close connection
between its SLV-3 space-launch vehicle and its 2500 kilometer Agni IRBM
prototype, which India successfully test-fired in 1989.133 According to one
estimate, the program could give India an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) capability in less than twenty years.' 3 4 Also, India has shown a
129. Of course, some of these delivery systems may currently be intended for non-
nuclear weapons of mass destruction, i.e., chemical or biological weapons. That a coun-
try was acquiring bombers or IRBMs for that purpose, rather than for nuclear weapons,
would provide little comfort and would in no way preclude the nation from using those
delivery systems at a later date for nuclear weapons carriage.
130. Several other countries possess ballistic or cruise missiles or have active pro-
grams for their development, though most are thought to be less advanced in terms of
how soon they could have both a nuclear warhead and a functioning missile delivery
system, if they decided to build one, than the countries already discussed. These
include, roughly in decreasing order of current capability, South Africa, Brazil, North
Korea, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Libya.
Until recently, Argentina also had an active and disquieting ballistic missile program
until President Menem displayed both wisdom and domestic political courage by scrap-
ping its Condor 1I missile program. Argentina: Defence Minister Says Decision to Dismantle
Condor-2 is "Denitive, "BBC WoRLD BROADcAsTS MONrrORING REP., ME/1715/1 11,June
15, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. Argentina had been developing the
two-stage, 600 mile range Condor II in conjunction with Egypt and Iraq. Alan Fried-
man, US Failures Led to Missile Data Reaching Iraq, FIN. TMES, Nov. 21, 1989, at 1; Aharon
Levran, Iraq's Non-conventional Capabilities, JERusAL.EM Posr, Apr. 13, 1990, at 7, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. Another report stated that the range of the Condor II
varied from 600 to 750 km (about 375 to 465 miles) depending on the warhead, but
that it was more accurate than other third-world developed missiles in its class. Control
Efforts Fail To Prevent Ballistic Missle Prolferation, DEF. ELECTMONICS, Aug. 1988, at 17.
131. It is difficult to get a good estimate of total Indian space and missile expendi-
tures. In 1981, Indian officials stated that they had spent $664.5 million on their space
program. Stuart Auerbach, India Hitches its Future Development to a Homemade Satellite,
WASH. Posr, Dec. 4, 1981, at Cl. If so, and given the subsequent increase in the pace of
Indian space and missile activity, it seems likely that total expenditures to date in 1995
dollars could be several billion dollars. For a good overview of the program, see Indian
Missiles: Threat and Capability, RISK REP., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 3.
132. As of 1988, the Chinese offered satellite launch services at a cost of approxi-
mately $20 million per launch. Mark Clayton, Space-Launch Firms Come Down to Earth,
CHmRisrAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 22, 1988, at 1. In current dollars, the cost of Russian
space launch services could drop below that.
133. NuclearProliferation in Southeast Asia, NAT'L SECURrrv Rxc.,June 1989, at 3, avail-
able in LEXIS, Exec Library, Hfrpts File. The Agni reportedly has a range of greater
than 2500 km. (1500 mi.) with a 1000 kg. (2200 lb.) payload. LK. Chadha, India Joins a
Private Circle AEROSPAACE AM., Nov. 1989, at 6. The Agni's first stage is said to be similar
to, or even identical to, that of the SLV-3 space-launch vehicle. Id. at 7.
134. Mahnken, supra note 118, at 7. That estimate strikes the author as very con-
servative. India has a very large scientific, technical, and industrial base. It seems
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strong interest in other long range, nuclear-capable, delivery systems.'8 5
Pakistan's current delivery capabilities are more modest. It possesses
forty U.S.-supplied F-16 fighters, which provide a good regional nuclear
weapons delivery system.' 36 Indian officials profess not to be too con-
cerned over the F-16s, declaring that they are vulnerable to India's air
defense, at least for long range combat missions. 137 India has expressed
greater concern over Pakistan's efforts to acquire nuclear-capable mis-
siles.138 Evidently Pakistan's indigenous Hatf I and II ballistic missile
development plans have exceeded its technical and industrial capabilities
as it has turned to China for assistance, in the form of M-11 missiles and
related technology.' 3 9
improbable that it should take India far longer to go from a first IRBM to a first ICBM
than China did.
135. According to a Russian intelligence report, India is reportedly working on
cruise missiles. Russian Report Traces Missile Proliferation, 166:37 AEROSPACE DAILY 326
(1993). India already has two aircraft carriers and rented a Soviet-built "Charlie-I" class
nuclear-powered submarine for three years. The sub has since been returned. See infra
notes 313-318 and accompanying text for a discussion of nuclear submarines and the
need for their control. India also possesses more than one hundred advanced fighter
aircraft including Soviet-supplied MiG-27M and British-supplied Jaguar attack aircraft
capable of nuclear delivery roles. SeeJANE's, ALL THE WoRLD's AIRcRAFr 1992-93, at 83-
87 (Mark Lambert et al. eds., 1992). It also has British-supplied Canberra light bomb-
ers. These are now obsolete and would likely experience significant losses against heav-
ily defended targets. The Indians also have a limited number of Soviet-supplied Bear F
Tu-95 bombers outfitted for antisubmarine warfare duties. One report says three. Dilip
Mukerjee, India and the Soviet Union, WASH. Q., Spring 1986, at 109, 116. Another says
five. JamesJ. Coghlan, Jr., Soviet Air Forces: The Bombers, DFY. ELEcTRoics, Sept. 1989,
at 93, 98.
136. John Glenn, This Country Encouraged the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, WASH. Posr,
June 24, 1992, at A19 (John Glenn is a U.S. Senator from Ohio).
137. It is doubtful that this is really the Indian view, given the high caliber of Indian
military thinking and the tremendous Indian uproar when the United States supplied
F-16s to Pakistan. If they really are unconcerned, they are almost certainly wrong in
that perception. When all factors are considered, advanced fighter aircraft are excel-
lent tactical nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, virtually as good as ballistic missiles in a
regional context. High loss rates per sortie (i.e., per round trip) should not be
expected, and advanced fighter aircraft have reliability and accuracy advantages over
ballistic missiles which largely make up for the risk of being shot down. See generally
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SEcuRTY AND ARMs CoNTRoL, supra note 118, at 25-62
(comparing the military effectiveness of ballistic missiles and strike aircraft).
138. Raju Gopalakrishnan, Missiles Arms Race on Indian Subcontinent, REtrrmts, May 22,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
139. U.S. intelligence officials stated that the Pakistanis have already taken delivery
of up to two dozen missiles. The M-11 is credited with a range of 400 km. (240 mi.) and
a payload of 800 kg. (1763 lbs.). Id. An AFP report claims the range is 1080 km. (670
mi.). China Denies Allegations of Arms Sales, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, June 29, 1993, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Either range is well in excess of the MTCR
range limit of 300 km. However, the prestigious International Institute for Strategic
Studies claims the M-11 has a range between 120 and 150 km., well below the MTCR
limits. U.S. Protests Missile Exports Involving China, Russia, K ono NEws SERvicE, May 8,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Whatever the true facts on the M-
l1's range, U.S. officials have concluded that the M-11 exceeds the MTCR limits, thus
violating the MTCR. The President's report to the Congress accompanying his decision
to extend Most Favored Nation Status for China was somewhat circumspect, stating that
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Israel's U.S. supplied F-15 and F-16 aircraft are nuclear-capable and
are outfitted in ways which greatly increase their effective combat range
and/or weight-carrying capabilities, as demonstrated by the 1981 raid on
the Iraqi OSIRAQ reactor 40 and the 1985 raid on the PLO headquarters
in Tunisia.141 Israel has also developed the Jericho missile, version I of
which has a reported warhead capability of 1000-1500 pounds and a range
of 300 miles 14 2 and version II of which has been credited with a range of
more than 620 miles. 143 BothJericho I andJericho II missiles are believed
to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads.'4 Seymour Hersh, in his
book The Sampson Option, written before the demise of the Soviet Union,
credits Israel with a strong interest in ICBMs in order to threaten Soviet
territory with nuclear weapons. 14
5
Iraq had active ballistic missile programs, although they were far less
capable than those of Israel or India. Iraq concentrated on large-scale
[C] ertain sensitive Chinese exports raise questions about PRC compliance with
[its commitment to the MTCR]. At present, the greatest concern involves
reports that China, in November 1992, transferred MTCR-class M-1 1 missiles or
related equipment to Pakistan. Such a transfer would violate China's MTCR
commitment and trigger powerful sanctions under U.S. missile proliferation
law.
Executive Order Conditions for Renewal of Most Favored Nation Status for the People's Republic of
China in 1994, INTr'L TRADE REP.,June 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs
File [hereinafter Renewal of Most Favored Nation Status for China]. Later, however, the
State Department reportedly decided that China's export violated the MTCR and that
sanctions must be imposed accordingly under U.S. law. Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Deter-
mines China Violated Pact on Missiles, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 25, 1993, at Al.
140. Israeli fighter planes bombed the French-supplied Iraqi reactor at Tuwaitha,
over 600 miles from Israel onJune 7, 1981, destroying the $100 million facilityjust prior
to its scheduled start-up. See William Claiborne, Israeli Planes Bomb Major Iraqi Nuclear
Facility, WAsH. Pos-r, June 9, 1981, at Al; Thomas O'Toole, Plant Was to be Ready Within
Month, WAsH. PosT, June 9, 1981, at A12.
141. The attack on PLO headquarters, just south of the capital of Tunis, took place
on October 1, 1985. The raid was defended by Israeli officials as retaliation for the
murders of three Israelis. The attack entailed the longest air strike ever made by the
Israelis, taking the planes at least 1,300 miles to their target. The heaviest of the five
bombs dropped reportedly weighed 3,000 pounds. SeeFrankJ. Prial, Israeli Planes Attack
P.L.O. in Tunis, Killing At Least 30, N.Y. TIms, Oct. 2, 1985, at Al; George deLand &
Jonathan Broder, U.S. Backs Israeli Air Attack, CHi. TRIUB., Oct. 2, 1985, at 1; Stanley
Meisler & Dan Fisher, Israeli Jets attack P.LO.'s Headquarters in Tunis, LA TIMEs, Oct 2,
1985, at 1.
142. William Beecher, Israel Believed Producing Missile of Atom Capability, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 1971, at Al.
143. Israel Shrugs OffSoviet Charge overjericho Missile, LA TIMES, July 25, 1987, at A27;
Michael P. Gordon, U.S. Urges Talks on Missiles in Mideas N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1988, at
AS. One source estimates that if the Jericho II were outfitted with the same additional
stage Israel used to launch two space satellites, its range would increase to 7,500 kin.
Mahnken, supra note 118, at 7.
144. One survey of missile systems world-wide credits the Jericho I with having both
nuclear and high explosive (i.e., conventional) capabilities, while theJericho H is said to
have a 750 kg. nuclear warhead with a range in excess of 820 km. Curtis, supra note
115.
145. HERSH, supra note 100, at 174-81, 220-21.
Vol 28
1995 Law and the H-Bomb
importation of SCUDs' 46 and was working on a substantially extended
range version, which it tested in April 1988 to a range of 900 kilome-
ters.147 It was also participating, along with Egypt, in the development of
the more sophisticated-and potentially far more accurate-Argentine
Condor II missile.148 Iraq is credited with still having eight subsonic Tu-16
Badger/B-6D medium bombers and five supersonic Tu-22 Blinder light
bombers in its inventory.149 Finally, it had a "supergun" program whose
aim was to hurl a one-thousand plus pound shell several hundred miles.150
H. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and International Law
A. The Legality of Advanced Proliferation
The question of whether to undertake new and legally binding instru-
ments in order to reduce the risk of advanced proliferation would be par-
tially moot,'151 if, as some have argued, it were illegal for nations to possess
nuclear weapons. 15 2 The argument that nuclear weapons possession is
146. Iraq admitted to U.N. weapons inspectors that it had imported 800 SCUD mis-
siles. FrankJ. Prial, U.N. Says Iraq is Stalling on Arms Destruction, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1991, at A17; Stanley Meisler, 300 Iraq SCUDs Missing, U.N. Team Reports, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1991, at A10.
147. Control Efforts Fail to Prevent Ballistic Missile Proliferation, supra note 130.
148. See Nathaniel C. Nash, Argentina's President Battles his Own AirForce on Missile, N.Y.
TIMES, May 13, 1991, at Al.
149. Iraq-Air Forces, FcGnrr INV'L, Nov. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Arcnws File. Four of the Badgers may have been Chinese-made copies. The Badgers
are obsolete, and in the Gulf War the Iraqis never risked the more capable Tu-22s
against the U.N. Coalition. But against less capable foes, these bombers would have
given Iraq a capacity to deliver nuclear weapons on targets throughout the region.
Before the war Iraq also possessed modem fighters including F-1 Mirages, MiG-29 Ful-
crums, and possibly Su-24MKFencer strike aircraft. War in the Gulf The Balance of Power
in the Air, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 17, 1991, at A15.
150. The "supergun," a weapons concept developed by a Canadian, Gerald Bull,
could have been used to deliver a large shell as far as 400 miles. Five of the guns were
destroyed, under U.N. supervision, just north of Baghdad in October of 1991. Spiking
the Big Guns, supra note 105. Bull was later discovered murdered in Belgium, widely
rumored to be the victim of Israeli agents.
151. Even if possession of nuclear weapons were judged on balance to be illegal
under customary international law, a treaty to that effect might still be useful to elimi-
nate any doubt on the point and to make clear exactly what conduct is prohibited (e.g.,
if nuclear weapons are prohibited, what about "peaceful nuclear explosives?" Is only
the deployment prohibited or also the testing of devices? May a state possess delivery
systems which make sense only for nuclear weapons if they do not possess the nuclear
warheads themselves?). Additional purposes of such a treaty might be to set forth deci-
sion-making and dispute resolution procedures and to provide for mutual or interna-
tional inspection and other verification measures.
152. In contrast to the view that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, the view that
their mere possession violates international law is not common among international law
experts. The case for such per se illegality is put forth in Elliott L. Meyrowitz, The Laws
of War and Nuclear Weapons, 9 BRooK. J. INT'L L. 227 (1983). See also Arthur W. Camp-
bell, The Nuremberg Defense to Charges of Domestic Cimes: A Non-Traditional Approach for
Nuclear-Arms Protesters, 16 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 93 (1986); David M. Corwin, The Legality of
Nuclear Arrns Under International Law, 5 Dicm. J. INT'L. L. 271 (1987). But see Eric J.G.
McFadden, The Legality of Nuclear Weapons: A Response to Corwin, 6 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 313
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already illegal under international law usually starts by pointing out that a
multilateral treaty already prohibits military attacks which unnecessarily or
disproportionately harm civilians.' 5 3 Therefore, it is argued, any use of
nuclear weapons would be a violation of the convention. Thus, there is no
lawful object to their ownership.' 5 4 However, that reasoning will not with-
stand close scrutiny. If a party to Protocol I were to make civilians the
object of an attack using nuclear weapons (or any other weapons), it
would probably violate the terms of the treaty. 155 But it does not follow
(1988). For a treatment sensitive to the argument of per se illegality, but which recog-
nizes the potentially severe international relations consequences of acting unilaterally
on that view, see Francis A. Boyle, The Relevance of International Law to the Paradox of
NuclearDeterrence, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1407 (1986).
A more recent work is one of the few which recognized publicly the apparent role
reversal that had military planners who wanted large increases in nuclear weapons
stockpiles arguing for more emphasis on international law, while arms control advo-
cates favored Mutually Assured Destruction. See RicHARD FALIC, REVITALIZING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 114 (1989) ("The ironic result seems to be that taking international law
seriously, given the accompanying implausibility of getting rid of nuclear weapons or of
transforming international relations in a more pacific direction, may actually clear the
path for nuclear-war fighting doctrines, policies and capabilities."). For a compilation
of articles expressing various viewpoints on the legality of the possession and use of
nuclear weapons, see NuctL.AR WEAPoNs AND LAW (Arthur Selwyn Miller & Martin
Feinrider eds., 1984).
153. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, U.N. GAOR, 32d Sess., Agenda Item
115, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol 1]. Article
52 of this agreement (sometimes also called the "1977 Protocol I" or the "Additional
Protocol") forbids making "civilian objects" the object of attack and states that "attacks
shall be limited strictly to military objectives." Article 51 forbids attacks on the civilian
population as such, and it also bars indiscriminate attacks that would cause incidental
civilian losses that are excessive relative to the anticipated concrete military advantage.
154. A similar but even less convincing argument seeks to derive the illegality of the
possession of any nuclear weapons from the Nuremberg principles, defining "inchoate
crimes" as including preparations to commit a crime against humanity. See, e.g., Chris-
topher Phelps, NuclearArms Will Lead to War, Not Prevent It, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1987, at
A30 (letter to the editor) ("Associations of lawyers, legal scholars and judges find the
current preparation for nuclear war to be illegal under the provisions of the Nurem-
berg Judgments and other international accords."). Because, according to this view,
any use of nuclear weapons would be a crime against humanity, the acquisition of the
weapons would constitute such preparation. No doubt some possible uses of nuclear
weapons would constitute crimes against humanity but that would be true of chemical
weapons as well. It should follow, if this reasoning is correct, that possession of chemi-
cal weapons violates the Nuremberg principles. Yet no charges were brought against
German officials for acquiring the chemical weapons that Germany possessed but
decided not to use. The "Nuremberg defense" has been attempted in some criminal
cases brought against antinuclear protest actions. In United States v. Kabat, 797 F.2d
580, 590 (8th Cir. 1986), the court rejected the defense on the grounds that the defend-
ants at bar, in contrast to the defendants at Nuremberg, did not need to break domestic
law in order to avoid taking steps which would violate international law. Accordingly,
the court did not need to reach the argument that nuclear weapons were themselves
illegal. See id. at 590 n.11.
155. Of the nuclear weapons states, only China is a party to Protocol I, though the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the former U.S.S.R. are signatories. See Protocol
I supra note 153. At the time the United States signed Protocol I, it stated in part that
"[i] t is the understanding of the United States of America that the rules established by
this Protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit
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that the possession of nuclear weapons by a party also violates the Proto-
col.156 First, Protocol I does not, by its terms, make the possession of any
class of weapons illegal.157 Second, it does not follow that possession pre-
supposes use: a country could wish to maintain nuclear weapons for deter-
rence, hoping never to have to use them, while also believing, somewhat
less clearly, that it would have the right to use them if another state first
used nuclear weapons against it.158 Third, it is not the case that any use
would bring about the prohibited levels of civilian casualties. For exam-
ple, among the highest priority targets for U.S. military planners were
Soviet ballistic missile silos which, like U.S. silos, were often constructed in
extremely remote locations. Few civilian deaths would be expected from
attacking them.159 The same could be said for attacks on naval vessels at
sea. Fourth, the line of reasoning that possession of nuclear weapons is
illegal because their use would be illegal would apply with even greater
force to the possession of chemical weapons, the use of which is prohib-
the use of nuclear weapons." JOHN A. BoYD, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DIGEST OF U.S.
PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1977, at 919, 920 (1977). Of course, to a substantial
degree, Protocol I recodified existing treaty obligations, such as those in the Hague
Convention of 1910, and codified then-existing customary international law. Moreover,
to the extent that Protocol I broke new ground on this point, some of those principles
may well have become customary law with the passage of time.
156. John Norton Moore, Nuclear Weapons and the Law: Enhancing Strategic Stability, in
NucL.Ei WEAPONS AND Lw, supra note 152, at 51 (argument made in reply to Professor
Meyrowitz).
157. There is nothing approaching a political consensus that nuclear weapons may
never be used, let alone a legal prohibition on their possession Seventy-two nations voted
in favor of a U.N. General Assembly resolution that "solemnly declares ... the perma-
nent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons." GA Res. 2936, U.N. GAOR, 27th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). But the U.S.S.R. was the only
nuclear power which voted for it. China voted no, and the three Western nuclear pow-
ers,joined by virtually all other Western nations, abstained. This split vote was also seen
on a resolution a decade earlier which declared, inter alia, that "[a]ny state using
nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the
United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime
against mankind and civilization...." GA Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp.
No. 17, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). The vote on that resolution was 55 yes, 20 no,
and 26 abstentions. The Soviets voted for it; all the other nuclear powers, joined by
most NATO countries, voted against it. The European neutrals, often the strongest
proponents of nuclear arms control, abstained. Even strongly supported U.N. General
Assembly resolutions are generally not thought to create international legal obligations
(though they may be evidence of a consensus tending to support a claim that customary
international law exists on a matter), let alone one not supported by most of the rele-
vant states.
158. A party to Protocol I might further believe that so long as it did not attack first
with nuclear weapons, it would have a right to retaliate if nuclear weapons were used
against its civilian population, although the exercise of that right would be subject to a
requirement of proportionality and would have to be consistent with the Protocol's
terms. But see supra note 155.
159. Of course, the fallout from a large enough attack, even if limited to remote
military targets, may pose a serious radiological hazard if the civilian population is
downwind of the target. That consequence might be difficult to reconcile, in a proper
case, with Article 51 of Protocol I. See Protocol I, supra note 153. However, the proposi-
tion at issue here is that the possession of any such weapons is against international law,
irrespective of how many are possessed and how they might be used.
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ited under the 1925 Geneva Protocol 60 and customary international law.
Yet if mere possession of a weapons system whose use was barred by inter-
national law constituted a violation of international law, then the recent
conclusion of the new chemical weapons convention, to make possession
unlawful, was unnecessary.161 Fifth, the conduct and expressed views of
most of the major powers is inconsistent with the claim that Protocol I is
violated by a nation merely possessing nuclear weapons.162 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the Protocol is not binding as a matter of law
on nonparties, though as signatories, the United States, the United King-
dom, and Russia would be obliged not to take steps to defeat the object
and purpose of the Protocol.
It might alternatively be argued that the mere possession of nuclear
weapons is contrary to customary international law. However, this view is
even less likely to withstand close scrutiny. First, the steps necessary for
the development and recognition of customary international law cannot
be met when all the major powers possess nuclear weapons, claim to do so
as a matter of right, and are supported in that view by many other
nations.16 3 Indeed, the NPT, whose more than 170 parties make it one of
the most widely adhered-to treaties on any subject,'6 4 expressly grants
160. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
94 L.N.T.S. 65.
161. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800
(1993). However, see supra note 151 for some of the reasons why a convention might
be needed to better implement a prohibition on a class of weapons, even if the posses-
sion of those weapons is already contrary to international law.
162. It should be recalled that the United States, in signing Protocol I, took the posi-
tion that it did not preclude the use of nuclear weapons. Supra note 155. It did not,
apparently, even see a need to address the question of its right to possess them.
163. Customary international law generally has two elements: (i) there must be a
practice of states and (ii) states must believe that the practice is binding under interna-
tional law. ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-72
(1971). This is the view taken in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court
ofJustice: "The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply.., international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law." Statute of the International Court ofJustice, June
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, 1187. The conduct of most major
states, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, explicitly negates the existence of such a practice,
let alone one accepted as law.
164. Telephone Interview with John Zylman, Office of Treaty Affairs, U.S. Depart-
ment of State (Feb. 28, 1995). In keeping with the terms of NPT art. IX(2), supra note
2, the United States is one of the three depositary governments for the NPT, and there-
fore the Treaty Office at the Department of State keeps the official lists of NPT parties.
In the author's experience, it is virtually impossible to get a good count from published
sources, and in any event, it would not be as authoritative. An accurate count is ren-
dered yet more difficult because of the status of Taiwan and Yugoslavia. That said, Mr.
Zylman's best current count of parties is 171. Notable additions in the past few months
include Ukraine, Argentina, and Algeria. Except for certain "constitutional" treaties
such as those which established the United Nations, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund, neither Mr. Zylman
nor the author could think of a treaty with as many parties as the NPT, nor did a cur-
sory survey of Treaties in Force reveal any.
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nuclear weapons state status to five states.16 5 Second, even if there were
such a custom, the United States and the four other nuclear weapons
states would certainly fall under the "persistent objector" exception to the
applicability of customary international law.166
Whatever its abstract merits, the claim that the possession of nuclear
weapons is already illegal, and that accordingly no further steps are
needed to render advanced proliferation illegal, reflects a profoundly pes-
simistic vision. It would amount to a confession that international law is
both irrelevant and impotent when nations' central security interests are
at stake. Although the five nuclear weapons states have agreed to bar the
deployment of nuclear weapons in specific locations, 16 7 and in recent
years the two largest of them have made serious progress in reducing the
number of strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons, 168 they still
possess them. The three threshold states which are the primary focus of
165. Someone might argue that under the law of treaties, nations cannot create
rights by treaty which violate peremptory norms of international law, and therefore the
NPT's allowance of five states to possess nuclear weapons violates that norm. But a
bootstrap argument of that kind will not work. The relevant treaty provision of the
Vienna Convention declares a treaty "void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698 (1969) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] (emphasis added). It is difficult to find anything to point to that
would suggest that there was such a norm in 1968 when the NPT was opened for signa-
ture, i.e., nearly a decade before the conclusion of Protocol I. Of course, article 64 of
the Vienna Convention also declares that if a "new peremptory norm of general inter-
national law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes
void and terminates." This is one of the controversial provisions of the Treaty. Cf
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAV OF THE UNITED STATES § 331
reporters' note 4 (1987) (noting that the United States agreed to the inclusion of arts.
53 and 64, but insisted such claims be determined by the ICJ or arbitration, and noting
that the United States "is likely to take a particularly restrictive view of these doctrines
...."). Even today one cannot demonstrate that there is a norm against the possession
of nuclear weapons, let alone a peremptory norm. Moreover, it would not make for a
better world to declare the NPT void on any grounds, even on the theory that it lets
some natioris possess nuclear weapons in derogation of a peremptory norm of interna-
tional law.
166. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer The Principle of the Persistent
Objector in International Law, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 457 (1985) ("[A] state that has persist-
ently objected to a rule of customary international law during the course of the rule's
emergence is not bound by the rule.").
167. The nuclear weapons states and many other nations have agreed to treaties
under which nuclear weapons may not be placed or tested in Antarctica, The Antarctic
Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, arts. I, V, 402 U.N.T.S. 71, 76; on or under the seabed, Treaty on
the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass
Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, Feb. 11,
1971, art. I, 955 U.N.T.S. 115, 118; on the moon or other celestial bodies, in orbit, or
otherwise in space, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo-
ration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,Jan. 27,
1967, art. IV, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 209; or in Latin America, Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra
note 48, and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weap-
ons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 754, 634 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter
Treaty of Tlatelolco, Protocol II] (The United States is a party to Protocol II of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco but not the main treaty itself.)
168. See supra note 59.
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this article have some nuclear weapons capabilities and seem intent on
ultimately acquiring much larger and more sophisticated nuclear forces.
Perhaps five or six other states are taking steps to make it possible for
them to possess nuclear weapons in the future. Thus, if the mere posses-
sion of nuclear weapons is already illegal under international law, interna-
tional law is having no impact on the leaders of the nations which matter
most.
A far more hopeful view is that states, including the most powerful of
them, give weight to international law even in matters close to their funda-
mental security interests. For this reason the nuclear weapons states have
been extremely cautious in undertaking new obligations to restrict their
nuclear forces. This view of the relationship between international law
and nuclear weapons leaves open the possibility that these nations will
agree to ever-more stringent restrictions on nuclear weapons and will feel
bound to abide by those legal norms. Thus, although there is no prospect
that we will ban nuclear weapons in the near future,' 69 establishing new
treaty instruments by which the threshold states would not become full
169. The author is one who doubts the wisdom of reducing nuclear weapons levels to
zero under conditions of the current international order, even if an agreement to do so
could be reached. If all nuclear weapons are banned, the nation which clandestinely
preserves a handful, or subsequently acquires them, becomes extremely powerful rela-
tive to the unarmed states. No verification mechanism could be so effective that the
risk can be completely excluded. See Leonard S. Spector, Repentant Nuclear Proliferants,
FOREIGN PoL'y, Fall 1992, at 21 (An illuminating discussion of the difficulties of deter-
mining whether a state which had nuclear weapons, or at least weapons-usable materi-
als, has actually placed all of them under IAEA inspection.). Flawless verification has
been difficult for the IAEA in a state like South Africa, which had six fabricated nuclear
weapons and a few hundred kilograms of HEU. The exact amount of past production
of highly enriched uranium in South Africa is unknown, and one cannot state with
certainty that all HEU has been accounted for, even after dozens of IAEA visits. S.
Africa's Nuclear Cache Questioned, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 28, 1993, at 21A. Consider then
how much more severe the problem would be for the United States or Russia, each of
which had tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and inventories of special nuclear
material a thousand-fold or more greater than South Africa's (ie., in multi-hundred ton
quantities).
In contrast, at around 300-500 devices each in the United States and Russia, small
scale cheating or development of nuclear weapons by other states would not easily
destabilize the global power balance. SeeHARvARD NUCLEAR STUDY GROUP, LIVMiO WITH
NUcLEAR WEAPoNs (1983) (setting the safe level at 1,000 on each side). The author
believes that a lower figure is justified by the demise of the Soviet Union but that the
logic of the Harvard study is sound. A level of 300-500 on each side still requires dra-
matic reductions from presently agreed levels and would require agreement on the part
of the other three nuclear weapons states as well, something likely to be very difficult to
obtain. Reductions beyond that would have to await more fundamental changes in the
international order. Cf. Robert S. McNamara, Nobody Needs Nukes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1998, at A21:
It can be confidently predicted that the combination of human fallibility and
nuclear arms will inevitably lead to nuclear destruction. Therefore, insofar as it
is achievable, we should seek a return to a non-nuclear world. I say 'insofar as
achievable' because one or more declared nuclear powers-or an international
agency-would have to retain a small nuclear force, at most 100 to 200 war-
heads, as protection against blackmail by nations that would develop such weap-
ons in secret.
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fledged nuclear weapons states would be highly beneficial in moving the
world, perhaps asymptotically, toward that goal.
Although there is no bar to the possession of nuclear weapons by the
five declared nuclear powers, it might be argued that there is already an
international norm against the spread of nuclear weapons. 170 If that view
were correct, one could perhaps argue a fortiori that the further develop-
ment of nuclear weapons by states at the threshold would violate existing
nonproliferation norms. Whether such a norm already exists is a close
call. The NPT now has more than 170 adherents,' 7 1 including all the
nuclear weapons states and the vast majority of the non-nuclear weapons
states with peaceful nuclear power programs. 172 Furthermore, two addi-
tional states of potential proliferation concern, Brazil and Argentina, have
entered into binding treaty arrangements with each other and the IAEA
that bar them from having nuclear weapons and require them to place all
their nuclear materials and equipment under IAEA safeguards. 173 In
addition, they have become full parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which
for all practical purposes imposes the same or stronger obligations on par-
ties than the NPT.174 Nevertheless, few nations would affirmatively assert
170. Anthony D'Amato takes this one step further and asks whether the harm caused
by proliferation creates rights at international law enforceable by other states. He sees
this as a possible justification for Israel's bombing of the OSIRAK reactor, which was
difficult to justify at the time as a legitimate act of self-defense under article 51 of the
U.N. Charter (though there was no question that the Iraqis were laying the groundwork
for nuclear weapons). Anthony D'Amato, Israels Attack upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77
A .J. INT'L L. 584 (1983); ANTHONY D'AmATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROS-
PEcr 83-87 (1987).
It would be difficult to see how the international community could accept the notion
that such a norm exists and then agree that one of the few unambiguous norm breakers
should be allowed to enforce the norm by unilateral decision and action against a state
which at that time had not yet violated international safeguards or produced any
nuclear material for weapons purposes. The widespread condemnation of the attack
even by countries who knew there were reasons to distrust Iraq's nuclear intentions
seems to suggest that at that time there was no such legal norm, or alternatively that
there was such a norm, but that only those nations who then were upholding the norm
had the right to enforce it.
171. See supra note 164.
172. India has the largest nuclear power program of any state not a party to the NPT.
See LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NucLEAR PROuFERATION TODAY 65-67 (1984). India now has
10 operating power reactors that have 1940 MW of installed capacity. KAPS-2 Unit Goes
Critical, POWER AsIA, Jan. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File. Paki-
stan has a small heavy water power reactor, KANUPP, which is under TAEA safeguards.
See SPECTOR, supra, at 108-09. No other non-nuclear weapons state as defined in the
NPT operates a nuclear power plant without an obligation to have all its nuclear facili-
ties under IAEA safeguards.
173. For a discussion of these treaties, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
174. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is superior to the NPT in that it wholly prevents
nuclear weapons in a country, notjust those weapons under national control. See infra
note 188 for an explanation of why that distinction can be important. It also provides
for a system of challenge inspections. See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text
(discussion of such challenge inspections and their potential utility in prohibiting and
detecting advanced nuclear weapons design). The Tlatelolco treaty was inferior to the
NPT because it was ambiguous as to whether states could develop "peaceful nuclear
explosions" (PNEs). Because both the materials and the design technology for such
PNEs are the same as for nuclear weapons, ambiguity on this point would leave a seri-
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that states not party to these treaties have already violated an international
legal norm if they acquire nuclear weapons or take steps to advance that
option. 175 Of course, a treaty norm can eventually become a rule of cus-
tomary international law, binding even on non-parties. 176 One would
hope that increasingly universal NPT adherence, the passage of time, and
further strengthening of the nonproliferation regime would some day
allow the international community to declare that such a norm truly exists
and that states which have not accepted the norm by treaty are nonethe-
less bound to adhere to it. In the author's view, this point has not yet been
reached.
Alternatively, as the norm becomes more nearly universal, it may
become progressively less acceptable politically for a state to acquire
nuclear weapons or to enhance existing nuclear capabilities, and it may
become more likely that such action will be viewed as a threat to interna-
tional peace and security. The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) could make
that judgment at any time; it would not be a legal decision, in the sense of
judging whether a particular course of conduct is legal under existing
international law. However, once decided, the Council would then have
the legal authority to enforce its decision under chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter. We may get to the point where the UNSC becomes an effective
enforcement mechanism against further proliferation, 177 but we are not
ous loophole. This has been resolved by the safeguards agreements which have been
entered into pursuant to the Tatelolco treaty and the Guadalajara agreement between
Argentina and Brazil, see supra note 48, which do not allow nuclear materials to be used
for any explosive purpose.
175. This assertion is difficult to prove. The consideration of U.N. Security Council
Resolutions 687 and 715-requiring the destruction of facilities and equipment which
contributed to Iraq's nuclear weapons program and establishment of a comprehensive
long-term intrusive monitoring program thereafter-would have been an opportune
time to assert such a general legal obligation, if nations thought there was one. S.C.
Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991); S.C. Res. 715, U.N.
SCOR, 3012th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/715 (1991). The resolutions were instead based
on the politicaljudgment that the continued possession of weapons of mass destruction
by Iraq, or the means for their construction in Iraq's hands, represented a threat to
international peace and security, and were not based on a legal detemination that posses-
sion of them was illegal for all nations and therefore illegal for Iraq.
176. Such a customary rule would be subject to the persistent objector exception,
unless, perhaps, the customary rule had also become a peremptory norm. Interestingly,
the three threshold states might have difficulty qualifying for that exception, as they
have not generally argued that they have the right to acquire nuclear arms but rather
that the NPT is unacceptable because it is discriminatory. For a discussion of some of
the complexities of the persistent objector doctrine, see Stein, supra note 166, and
David A. Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Otjector Be?, 61 WASH. L. REv. 957
(1986).
177. The Council has taken halting steps in that direction. Among those steps are
Resolutions 687 and 715 on Iraq. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687 (Apr. 3, 1991)
was the basic cease fire resolution, accepted by Iraq, which required the destruction of
its nuclear, chemical, biological, and ballistic missile programs and required special
IAEA inspections to be carried out as part of the work of the Special Commission also
established by the Resolution. United Nations Security Council Resolution 715 (Oct.
11, 1991) has not been accepted by Iraq, but it is binding on it, having been adopted
under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. It establishes a permanent system of monitor-
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there yet. The difficulties are likely to be far greater for advanced prolifer-
ation than for the nascent variety.178
B. Nature of the Existing Nonproliferation Regime
The nuclear nonproliferation regime 179 is a complex one.' 80 Its center-
ing, in part by the IAEA, to ensure that Iraq continues to live up to the requirements of
Resolution 687.
Another important Security Council step was the call on North Korea to reverse its
decision to pull out of the NPT. See supra note 38. A third Security Council step was the
Summit Declaration of the Council (with 13 members of the Council represented by
heads-of-government) that additional proliferation would be threatening and pledging
that the Council would take "appropriate action" to prevent it. But that declaration
does not constitute a binding decision of the Security Council to take strong action
against additional proliferation.
178. For example, it is hard to imagine the Council taking vigorous action in the
near future against India for continuing to add to its nuclear capabilities (particularly if
it does nothing dramatic like test a thermonuclear device or announce that it had
deployed nuclear weapons to its forces). Security Council action against India would be
a major political battle given that it is a leader of the third world and that the Soviet
Union, France, and the United Kingdom at times have had close relations with India.
One would not expect countries to volunteer to carry out military sanctions against
India, given that it is a country with considerable military capabilities. Even less likely
would be chapter VII sanctions against Israel, given its political relations with the
United States, absent some egregious act. China can be expected to block vigorous
action against its ally Pakistan.
Of course, the Council might take less drastic steps someday. For example, the
Security Council could give all states with nuclear facilities not under IAEA safeguards a
reasonable time to enter into arrangements with the JAFA for safeguards, after which, if
there was not compliance, the international financial institutions (the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, for example) would no longer be permit-
ted to make certain classes of loans to them. Such a measure would be politically far
more acceptable if the nuclear states had already placed all their nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards. See infra part III.C.1.
179. Regime theory is a key component of current international relations scholar-
ship with significant implications for our understanding of international law and its role
in the international system. In the past two decades, international relations scholars
have spent considerable efforts seeking to explain international cooperation in a world
order which earlier Realpolitik theory portrayed as Hobbesian at best. The realist school
held that the conduct of states is dictated solely by their perceptions of their immediate
national interest, usually construed largely in terms of their physical security. Yet across
apparently insurmountable gulfs of superpower rivalry, ideology, nationalism, and com-
petition for influence, resources, and markets (in such diverse areas as telecommunica-
tions, international trade, and multilateral arms control) states would often act (or
refrain from acting) in ways which were the opposite of what one would expect of them
in the narrowest definition of their national interest. The response to this puzzle which
gained the greatest attention was the theory of "regimes." A detailed discussion of the
early literature on regimes is beyond the purposes of this article. The concept appar-
ently arose first in international law, where it was used to describe particular legal
arrangements for special geographic areas or features, as in the "regime" for Danzig or
the "regime" for navigation on the Rhine. It was further elaborated by L.F.E Goldie,
Special Regimes and Pre-emptive Activities in International Law, 11 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 670
(1962). The most commonly quoted definition in international relations theory is Kras-
ner's: "[r]egimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Conse-
quences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in INTERNATiONAL REGImEs 1, 2 (S.D. Krasner
ed., 1983). For one analysis of the nonproliferation regime in theoretical terms, see
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piece is a major legally binding instrument, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty. The NPT obliges the five nuclear weapons states not to transfer
nuclear weapons to states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of the
effective date of the treaty, and it also obliges them not to assist or
encourage states to acquire nuclear weapons. 181 Non-nuclear weapons
states agree not to acquire them,1 8 2 and they agree to allow the verifica-
tion of that pledge by placing all of their nuclear materials and equipment
under the safeguards system of the IAEA. 183 This is bolstered by an obli-
gation placed on all parties not to provide nuclear materials and equip-
ment for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear weapons state, including
nonparties, unless safeguards will be applied. 184 State parties have a right
to utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and parties in a position to
do so pledge to assist non-nuclear weapons states, especially the develop-
ing countries, in peaceful uses.18 5 In exchange for the non-nuclear weap-
ons states' pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons, the nuclear weapons
states promise to pursue good faith negotiations toward halting the arms
race and pursuing disarmament.' 8 6
There are several other bilateral or regional treaty arrangements
which support the same general norms. The most significant is the Treaty
Roger K. Smith, Explaining the Non-poliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary Interna-
tional Relations Theory, 41 INT'L ORG. 253 (1987).
180. Classic regime theory appears to assume that the fundamental features of
regimes are the same irrespective of subject matter. In contrast, the author has previ-
ously speculated that certain regimes, those which could be designated as "complex,"
have major differences in kind from "simple" regimes. Richard L Williamson, Jr.,
Building the International Environmental Regime: A Status Repori, 21 U. MmAMi INTER-AM. L.
REv. 679, 740-43 (1990). In brief, complex international regimes frequently deal with
topics that have far greater potential for conflict, including those which deal with vital
international security or core economic interests. They generally cover a number of
inter-related problems, unlike simple regimes which usually deal with a single issue
area. Complex regimes are often highly controversial. The parties to such a regime
may well have a common set of values or interests. Yet unlike simple regimes, where the
problems are usually extrinsic to the governments of the various participating states, the
problem to be dealt with by complex regimes is often the behavior of the holdouts, the
countries which have notjoined the regime. Building a consensus which will make the
regime more nearly universal and restraining or at least influencing the behavior of the
nonparticipants are often self-conscious objectives of the regime participants.
In complex regimes, the legal arrangements may be far more detailed than in simple
regimes. Complex regimes often involve the use of several treaty instruments and/or
established bodies of customary international law. Often, one or more international
organizations play an important role. They are sometimes given decision-making pow-
ers in areas otherwise thought to be matters of national sovereignty. In furthering the
norms of the regime, major actions may sometimes be taken by the participant states
which they have no legal duty to perform. These nonlegal mechanisms may include the
provision of financial or other practical assistance, diplomatic coordination, intelli-
gence sharing, the imposition of export controls, discretionary sanctions, or even mili-
tary force.
181. NPT, supra note 2, art. I.
182. Id. art. II
183. Id. art. I(l) & (4).
184. Id. art. 11 (2).
185. Id. art. IV.
186. Id. art. VI.
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of Tlatelolco,' 8 7 the goal of which is the creation of a nuclear weapons
free zone in Latin America.' 88 Under this Treaty, the parties agree, inter
alia, not to receive or acquire nuclear weapons,' 8 9 not to allow nuclear
weapons belonging to other states on their territory,190 and to place their
nuclear materials and equipment under IAEA safeguards. 191 Protocol I of
the Treaty obliges the states with dependent territory in the zone to apply
the Treaty's denuclearization provisions in those territories.'9 2 Protocol
II, the first nuclear arms control agreement entered into by all five nuclear
weapons states, obliges those states to respect and not undermine the pur-
poses of the Treaty and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against the parties to the Treaty.19 3 A somewhat similar nuclear weapons
free zone agreement has been established for the South Pacific,' 9 4 and
serious discussions are being held to establish such a zone for Africa. 195
There is also an international convention on the physical protection of
187. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 48.
188. Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NFZs) can potentially support the nonprolifera-
don regime in several ways. First, in contrast to the NPT, parties to such a zone agree
not to allow any other nation to position nuclear weapons on their territories. From
the perspective of mutual confidence in certain regions, that may be preferable because
country A may not find a situation acceptable if its neighbor, country B, remains true to
its NPT obligations and acquires no nuclear weapons but B's ally, C, stations nuclear
weapons on B's territory that are aimed at A. Second, NFZs can contain specific fea-
tures which go beyond those of the NPT, such as supplemental inspection rights or
assurances by the nuclear powers that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weap-
ons against the states in the zone. Third, the NFZ provides supplemental assurance of
nonproliferation in a particular region in the event the global NPT were to collapse.
While this proposition remains to be tested, it seems likely that compliance with the
overall nonproliferation regime will be enhanced when there is a web of legal obliga-
tions and relationships at various levels-global, regional, and bilateral-all supporting
the same norm. A state which has bilateral arrangements with its neighbors by which it
gives up nuclear weapons, is a party to an NFZ, and is a party to the NPT might con-
clude that it risked offending too many countries in too many different ways if, for
example, it violated or abrogated IAEA safeguards.
189. Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 48, art. 1.
190. Id.
191. Id. art. 13.
192. Under Protocol I of the Treaty, the United States is obliged to keep nuclear
weapons out of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands and to apply IAEA safeguards to any
nuclear facilities which may someday be located in those territories. Id. Protocol I.
193. Treaty of Tlatelolco, Protocol II, supra note 167.
194. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, Aug. 6, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1440, 1442
(entered into force Dec. 11, 1986); Status of South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty
(SPNFZ) and Final Text of the Three Protocols to the SPNFZ Treaty, openedfor signature
Aug. 6, 1985, 28 I.L.M. 1599 (1989) (entered into force Dec. 11, 1986) [hereinafter
Treaty of Rarotonga]. Although the Treaty of Rarotonga is in effect, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France have not ratified any of the Protocols which serve to
apply the zone to dependent territories and oblige the nuclear weapons states to
respect the zone (analogous to the two Tlatelolco Protocols) as well as forbid the
nuclear weapons states from testing nuclear weapons in the zone. Id. Obtaining the
agreement of the nuclear weapons states to these provisions, especially French agree-
ment to cease nuclear testing at its Pacific test site, was a substantial part of the motiva-
tion for establishing the zone.
195. Interviews with ACDA and Department of State officials, in Washington, D.C.
(June 3, 1994).
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nuclear materials. 196
The International Atomic Energy Agency plays a critical role under all
of these treaties. Various treaty arrangements grant it the right to carry
out nuclear safeguards, i.e., to inspect nuclear facilities and account for
nuclear materials. 19 7 These are activities otherwise thought to be a matter
of national sovereignty. Regional organizations also play a role. 198 In the
event of a violation of IAEA safeguards, the U.N. Security Council will
become involved because the IAEA Statute requires the organization to
report safeguards violations to the Security Council, as was done in the
North Korean case. 199 These features of the regime meet most sensible
definitions of international law. In addition, as a discretionary matter, the
U.N. Security Council could determine that certain proliferating activities
constitute a threat to international peace and security, thereby requiring
mandatory enforcement actions under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.20 0
These primary features of the nonproliferation regime are supple-
mented by a series of subordinate implementing measures which are
legally binding in various ways. One is the safeguards agreements negoti-
196. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signature
Mar. 3, 1980, 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1979) [hereinafter Physical Protection Convention]. This
convention requires states to assure that nuclear materials are given effective physical
protection (i.e., locks, guards, and alarms). This differs from international safeguards,
which focus on attempts by the state to divert nuclear materials from peaceful to
nonpeaceful purposes. With respect to the physical protection of the materials, in con-
trast, the concern is that other persons, for gain or political reasons, might seek to
divert, steal, or seize the materials. Effective physical protection is essential to the pre-
vention of nuclear terrorism. In addition, it can be important to nonproliferation in
three ways. First, military forces or other agents of a state (possibly posing as terrorists)
might seize materials from another state and use the seized materials for a nuclear
weapons program. Second, terrorists or embezzlers could obtain inadequately pro-
tected materials and sell them on the black market. Third, a state with allegedly sloppy
physical protection measures might try to claim that nuclear materials had been stolen,
when in fact they were diverted by the state itself.
197. See LAwRENCE SCHErNMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND
WORLD NuCLEAR ORDER (1987); Lawrence Scheinman, Nonproliferation Regime: Safe-
guards, Controls and Sanctions, in THE NucLEAR CONNECTION, 177 (Alvin Weinberg et al.
eds., 1985); D.A.V. FISCHER, NucLEAR IssuEs: INTERNATIONAL CONTROL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL CO-OPERATION (Canberra Studies in World Affairs No. 5, 1981).
198. Perhaps the most significant of these is EURATOM, the atomic authority cre-
ated prior to the NPT, which promotes nuclear cooperation and carries out inspections
in EU member states. EURATOM, in turn, has a safeguards agreement in effect with
the IAEA, pursuant to the provision of article 111 (4) of the NPT, which allows states that
are required to enter into safeguards agreements with the TAEA to do so individually or
together with other states. UNrrED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DIsARMAMENT AGENCY,
ARMs CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 85 (1980) [hereinafter ACDA].
Other relevant regional organizations include OPANAL, the organization created by
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supra note 48, the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-
operation and the Consultative Committee under the Treaty of Rarotonga, supra note
194, and the joint Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Material (ABACC), supra note 48. Brazil, Argentina, ABACC, and the LAEA entered
into a safeguards agreement on December 13, 1991. IAEA: Argentina and Brazil Sign
Safeguards Agreement, supra note 48.
199. See supra notes 38-39.
200. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51.
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ated with the IAEA. Although their negotiation is often required by other
treaties, they have the status of international agreements in their own
right.20 1 "These safeguards agreements are supplemented by subsidiary
arrangements and facility attachments which draw their legal authority
from the safeguards agreement itself. Also implementing the regime's pri-
mary treaties are certain decisions of the IAEA Board of Governors, which
do not take the form of international agreements but sometimes have
binding effect as a practical matter.2 0 2 These implementing measures are
further supplemented by commonly accepted interpretations of certain
treaty provisions. Again, these are not in the form of treaty instruments,
but they are agreed to by member nations and derive their authority from
the treaty, as they involve an elaboration of an important treaty term.
203
Although much of the regime rests on legally binding measures or
instruments which derive their legal force from legally binding docu-
201. Many safeguards agreements, particularly in recent years, have been entered
into pursuant to the NPT. See infra note 202. Some others were entered into pursuant
to the Treaty of Tlatelolco by those states that were parties to that treaty but not yet
parties to the NPT. Recently, the IAEA, Brazil, Argentina, and a control authority cre-
ated by those two nations entered into a safeguards agreement similar in concept to
those under the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. See supra note 48. Many earlier
agreements were entered into by non-nuclear weapons states that were not parties to
the NPT, to meet conditions imposed by a supplier of nuclear materials or equipment
because of the NPT safeguards obligation on the export of nuclear material, see infra
note 203, or because of a supplier's unilateral policy. These agreements were entered
into pursuant to a decision of the Board of Governors commonly referred to as
INFCIRC/66. The Agency's Safeguards System (1965, As Provitionally Extended in 1966 and
1968), IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (Sept 16, 1968). Another class of safeguards
agreements are those entered into between the IAEA and the nuclear weapons states to
place certain of their facilities, or in the case of the United States, all of their civil
nuclear facilities, under IAEA safeguards. See infra note 328. These serve to reduce
claims of discrimination while also giving the IAEA inspectorate experience in applying
safeguards to larger or more exotic nuclear facilities.
202. See The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/
153 (May 1971) [hereinafter INFCIRC/153]. A party to the NPT with nuclear materials
on its territory must place them under the safeguards system. Id. at 1. INFCIRC/153
tells the IAEA staff the terms which must be contained in such agreements. A country
cannot effectively meet its NPT obligations except by following the terms of INFIRC/
153. On the other hand, if the Board of Governors were to change INFIRC/153, the
changes would not automatically apply to existing agreements.
203. Following the entry into force of the NPT, the NPT Exporters Committee was
established under IAEA auspices and chaired by Professor Claude Zangger of Switzer-
land. (The committee was always informally called the Zangger Committee. In a rare
display of sentiment, the official name was recently changed to the Zangger Committee
in his honor.) The purpose of the committee was to establish a list of materials and
equipment which could not be exported by an NPT party without LA safeguards,
consistent with the terms of article MI (2) (b) of the NPT. The Zangger list was derived
in part from a list which had been used quietly by some Western nations. See Gary L
Bertsch et al., Multilateral Export Control Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
ON NONPROLIFERATION ExPORT CoNTROLs 41, 41-44 (Gary K. Bertsch et al. eds., 1994).
The Zangger list later served as the nucleus for the Suppliers' Guidelines, see infra note
204.
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ments, other aspects of the regime depend on nonbinding agreements. 20 4
Finally, there are critical elements of the regime which are not interna-
tional agreements at all. Among these elements are cooperation in export
control matters, diplomatic pressure, military or covert action, interna-
tional studies (to change countries' perceptions and broaden consensus),
and intelligence sharing arrangements. Other efforts include material
assistance to the peaceful nuclear programs of developing countries which
are parties to the NPT, cooperation in finding safe repositories for excess
special nuclear material,205 and unilateral export limitations. All of these
measures have been used or are currently under active consideration to
bolster the nonproliferation regime.
C. Vitality of the Nonproliferation Regime
The existing nonproliferation regime is alive and well, even though it has
been declared dead or certain to fail on numerous occasions. A quarter of
a century after the NPT entered into force, no nation has yet declared
itself to possess nuclear weapons beyond the five nuclear weapons states,
although prior to the NPT (and even since that time) many experts pre-
dicted that there would be dozens of nuclear powers. More than 170
countries are now party to the NpT, 206 making it one of the most widely
adhered to treaties on any subject. Early adherents included several states
which could have readily acquired a nuclear weapons arsenal if they had
chosen to do so, including Sweden, 20 7 Canada, 208 several EC member
204. See Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelines for the
Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/
Part I (July 1992), 31 I.L.M. 1232 (1992) [hereinafter Suppliers'Guidelines]. These are in
the form of a series of identical letters to the Director General of the IAEA and purport
to be unilateral statements of national policy. They are not thought to be an interna-
tional agreement in a legally binding sense, though they have some of the features of an
international agreement.
205. From time to time, there has been considerable interest in establishing some
kind of international storage repository for surplus separated plutonium. Recently,
there has been interest in finding a safe storage site for spent research reactor fuel,
which still contains considerable FIEU even though it is no longer usable in the reactor.
Interview with a Department of Energy official, in Washington, D.C. (June 6, 1994).
206. See supra note 164.
207. Sweden ratified the NPT in 1970. ACDA, supra note 198, at 97. However, Swe-
den had an active nuclear weapons program until 1968, the last aspects of which were
finally terminated in 1972. The following account is based on conversations the author
had with Swedish defense officials while he was in government and on the account in
SPECrOR, supra note 116, at 65-79 (which Spector said he based in good part on an
expose in a Swedish technical journal by Christen Larssen. Build a Bomb, Nv TE , NiK,
Apr. 25, 1985).
Sweden could readily have had several nuclear weapons by the mid-1960s, had it
decided to do so openly. It had completed a design substantially more sophisticated
than the Nagasaki device by 1958, and in 1963, the Agesta reactor, which could produce
enough plutonium for about three weapons per year, began operations. SPECTOR, supra
note 116, at 66-71. However, after years of contentious debate, in 1958 the Parliament
decided to postpone the decision on whether to acquire nuclear weapons and in the
meantime ordered a halt to further nuclear weapons research except for "protective
research." Id. at 68. This drove the program underground, but the Defense Ministry
made considerable progress on further refinements in weapons design under the pro-
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states,20 9 and Japan.210 Some of the adherents that have joined more
recently are states whose financial and/or technical resources would give
them the wherewithal to acquire nuclear weapons given enough time and
whose security concerns or regional aspirations led some observers to sus-
pect they had an interest in the ultimate acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Spain, Turkey, Egypt, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and several
others fall into this category. By far the most notable of the recent addi-
tions to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state is South Africa.2 11 It is
tective research rubric, apparently without the knowledge of the public or the Parlia-
ment. Id. at 69. The immediate goal of the program was probably modest, a handful of
devices. But the Marviken reactor, which was completed but never operated, was
designed with the specific goal in mind of producing enough plutonium for 10 nuclear
weapons per year. Id. at 71. Had it operated at design capacity (something reactors
generally do not accomplish), the Swedes would have had enough plutonium by now
from that reactor for about 250 nuclear weapons, a weapons force roughly comparable
with that of China. Instead, for the past two decades, the Swedes have been among the
strongest nonproliferation advocates.
208. Canada deposited its instrument of ratification of the NPT in 1969, ACDA, supra
note 198, at 95, being one of the first Western democracies to do so. The Canadians
had been participants, along with the United States and the Unitied Kingdom, in the
wartime Manhattan Project to produce nuclear weapons. Possessing vast quantities of
natural uranium and excellent scientists, and having focused on heavy-water moderated
reactors which can be superior plutonium producers, the Canadians could have had
nuclear weapons, had they chosen to do so and made it a high priority, by the early
1950s. Fortunately, they had better sense and have gone on to be among the most
effective advocates for nonproliferation, often serving as the conscience of the interna-
tional community on nuclear export matters.
209. The non-nuclear weapons states which were members of the European Commu-
nity at the time, Germany, Italy, and the BENELUX countries, all deposited their instru-
ment of ratification on the same date in 1975. Id. at 95-97.
210. Japan deposited its instrument of ratification in 1976, id. at 96, after nearly all
the other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) coun-
tries had done so. Japan's U.S.-written constitution forbids the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, and as a result of its experience with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weap-
ons are profoundly disturbing to mostJapanese. However, it took some time for a con-
sensus to build in favor of the NPT, particularly given concerns that NPT adherence
and the associated IAEA safeguards would interfere with Japan's ambitious nuclear
power program. In any case, as is typical of that society, once Japan ratified the treaty, it
took the obligation very seriously. In the author's experience, Japan was the only coun-
try (excepting the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, with which the United
States has special standing arrangements for intelligence sharing) which could be
counted on without exception to act with dispatch to block exports of items sought by
known or suspected nuclear weapons programs, once the United States told Japanese
officials about the export and its significance.
211. South Africa had always been a state of proliferation concern. It possessed vast
supplies of natural uranium and a largely indigenously developed enrichment technol-
ogy. It had completed a pilot plant using that technology, which was capable of produc-
ing enough highly enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons per year if it ran in
that mode at full capacity. In 1981, South Africa announced the successful production
of highly enriched uranium. Kurt M. Campbell, What About South Africa's Bomb, CHRIS-
TLAN Sch MONrrOR, Jan. 22, 1987, at 13; Paul Lewis, Pretoria Wlling to Discuss Atom Ban,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1988, at A3.
South Africa also had a substantial scientific research base. It possessed much of the
equipment for nuclear weapons development and engaged in experiments in relevant
physics which had no peaceful applications. In 1977, a Soviet satellite detected what
appeared to be a nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert. The U.S.S.R. told U.S. authori-
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the only country that previously possessed nuclear weapons under its sole
control but stepped back from that posture and established itself as a non-
nuclear weapons state.2 1 2 South Africa's adherence to the NPT is impor-
tant because many observers assume proliferation is a one-way street: that
once a state acquires nuclear weapons, it will never reverse course. More-
over, because of its considerable resources in the nuclear field, South
Africa would have been a prime example of a state with a nascent program
poised to become an advanced proliferator if it chose to do so.
Another important development was the decision by China2 13 and
France 21 4 to join the NPT. Thus, all five nuclear weapons states are now
parties to the treaty. Before becoming a signatory France declared in
recent years that it would behave as if it were a party despite its earlier
resistance, and China abandoned its former open hostility toward the con-
cept of nonproliferation. Nevertheless, in the absence of a legally binding
obligation, the possibility always existed that France or China could
reverse their unilaterally declared policies. The nonproliferation regime
could quickly unravel if an existing nuclear weapons state were to transfer
nuclear weapons, or the expertise for their design and construction, or to
begin selling HEU, plutonium, or facilities and technology for their pro-
duction or separation without international safeguards.
One other important consequence of near-universal NPT member-
ship is that all potential "turn-key" suppliers of power reactors, enriched
ties that South Africa was preparing to test a nuclear device. After confirming the infor-
mation, the U.S. and other Western governments warned Pretoria of the severe
repercussions which would follow such a test. The site was abandoned shortly thereaf-
ter. Murray Marder, Carter Says S. Africa Denies Intent to Develop Any Nuclear Explosives,
WASH. Posr, Aug. 24, 1977, at Al.
South Africa was also widely, though not universally, accused of setting off a very low
yield nuclear device somewhere over the South Atlantic, either on its own, or in con-
junction with Israel. Nordland, supra note 23. For these reasons, it was generally
assumed either to have several nuclear weapons, or to have the components readily
available to fabricate nuclear weapons on short notice. Bill Keller, South Africa Says it
Built 6 Atom Bombs, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 25, 1993, at Al. Indeed, subsequently, South Afri-
can President De Klerk revealed that South Africa had six fully fabricated nuclear weap-
ons which it could deliver with its British-supplied Buccaneer bombers and was working
on a seventh. The full text of De Klerk's March 24, 1993, statement to the South Afri-
can parliament can be found in De Klek Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six
Nuclear Weapons, NucLtAR FuEL, Mar. 29, 1993, at 6.
A fascinating account of the South African bomb program, including details on weap-
ons type, the nature of the development program, the reasons for its creation, the rea-
sons why it was abandoned, and some lingering questions can be found in a two-part
series: Mark Hibbs, South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent,
NucAtR FUEL, May 10, 1993, at 3; Mark Hibbs, South Afria's Secret Nuclear Program: The
Dismantling, NucLEAR FuE., May 24, 1993, at 9.
212. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which recently joined the NPT as non-
nuclear weapons states, see supra note 41 and accompanying text, have nuclear weapons
on their territory, but those weapons are actually under Russian control pending their
dismantlement and/or transfer to Russia.
213. See supra note 47.
214. See supra note 46.
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uranium fuel, and commercial-scale sensitive nuclear technology215 now
have a treaty obligation not to transfer nuclear materials or equipment
unless the facilities and materials will be under IAEA safeguards.2 16 Most
of the major nuclear suppliers have taken an even more significant step
and declared a policy of full-scope safeguards, i.e., a requirement that as a
condition of supply of nuclear materials, reactors or sensitive nuclear tech-
nology, the recipient country must have all its nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards.2 17 Closely related to this development has been the
215. As the term is generally understood and as used in the Suppliers' Guidelines,
supra note 204, "sensitive nuclear technology" is equipment, material or technology for
nuclear fuel reprocessing, for uranium enrichment or for the production of heavy
water. Extra restraint in the supply of reprocessing and enrichment technology must
be exercised because it gives a state direct access to weapons-usable materials. The
rationale for inclusion of heavy water production technology within that term is that it
is comparatively easy to make reactors which are excellent producers of plutonium and
which are not likely to be subject to the sanction of a fuel cutoff, see supra note 28, if a
state has access to heavy water not subject to IAEA safeguards.
216. India, Israel, and Pakistan possess sensitive nuclear technologies but not on a
commercially useful scale. India has "indigenous" power reactors (largely modifica-
tions of early Canadian CANDU reactor designs), see supra note 172, but it is not mar-
keting them for sale. Even if it did, it is questionable whether a state seeking nuclear
weapons could obtain enough heavy water to charge an Indian-made reactor without
having to agree to an IAEA safeguards obligation. India has been a significant net
importer of heavy water, much of it from the Soviet Union. Mark Hibbs, Nonproliferation
Policy on Hold, Kiev's Heavy Water Is atlssue, NUCLEAR FUEL, Aug. 17, 1992, at 8, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File. Recently, India sold 100 MT of heavy water to
South Korea, suggesting that in the future, it may be able to provide enough for a
reactor's initial charge. Shekhar Hattangadi, KEPCO and DAE Sign Deal for Wolsung
Heavy Water Supply, NucLEoNics Wit, Apr. 14, 1994, at 5, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Nwltrs File.
217. The primary advantage of a full-scope safeguards policy is its ability to force
recipient nations to choose between having nuclear power programs and nuclear weap-
ons programs. As long as countries could continue to obtain nuclear materials, equip-
ment, and technology from more advanced suppliers subject to safeguards, they did not
need to abandon the possibility of constructing a parallel program free from safe-
guards. Over the years, despite the free rider problem (countries such as Germany and
Switzerland taking commercial advantage of the market created for them by the full-
scope safeguards policies of others), the United States, Canada, Sweden, Japan and a
number of the smaller nuclear suppliers in both Eastern and Western Europe had
adopted some form of full-scope safeguards policies. A substantial breakthrough
toward a more nearly universal policy was finally achieved at the 1990 NPT Review Con-
ference. In what has been described as a dramatic gesture, German Foreign Minister
Gencher personally announced that the German government was reversing its prior
stance and would henceforth require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply for
all new contracts. See Leonard Spector &Jacqueline Smith, Treaty Review: Deadlock Dam-
ages Nonproliferation, 46 BuLL. ATOM. Sci. 39, 41 (1990). In less than a year, the United
Kingdom and France followed suit. Ann Macachlan & Ralf Seiddiqui, France, U.K.
Launch Full-Scope Safeguards on Nuclear Exports, NuCLEONICS Wit, OCt. 1991, at 5; France
Pledges to Respect Full-Scope Safeguards of its Nuclear Exports, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Sept.
24, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; David White, Nuclear Safeguards
Shaken: Iraq Reveals Revelations Expose Weaknesses, FIN. POST, Oct 8, 1991, at 47. A con-
sensus on full-scope safeguards by all the states adhering to the Suppliers' Guidelines
was reached at the Warsaw meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, which brought the
Swiss, Russians, and several minor suppliers fully into the full-scope fold. The policy is
contained in Part I to the Suppliers' Guidelines, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.1/Part
2 (July 1992), 31 I.L.M. 1094 (1992) [hereinafter Suppliers" Guidelines, Part 11].
Cornell International Law Journal
decision of the same suppliers not to supply certain dual-use items 218
unless the recipient nation has such a full-scope safeguards obligation. 219
A final major development has been the mutual decision of Argentina
and Brazil to renounce nuclear weapons, place all of their nuclear facili-
ties under IAEA safeguards, and bring the Tlatelolco Treaty into effect.220
Argentina and Brazil took these steps outside the NPT but within the con-
fines of the nonproliferation regime.2 2 1
These examples do not suggest that all motion has been forward.
First, as noted, Iraq has exposed to public view how far a determined state
could progress toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons production
capabilities while seeming to abide by its NPT obligations. Clearly, the
NPT is a necessary but far from sufficient answer to the nascent prolifera-
tion problem, and the IAEA safeguards system can, at best, only make a
partial contribution to the resolution of the clandestine nuclear facility
problem.222 More generally, several of the states of current proliferation
218. The concept of dual-use technologies is explained in greater detail infra note
245.
219. The new list, Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,
Material and Related Technology, was adopted on April 3, 1992 in Warsaw by 27 states
(the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, and nearly all of Europe). It was derived
in good part from the nuclear items on the U.S. commodity control list administered
(with interagency input) by the Department of Commerce under the Export Adminis-
tration Act. The new list is contained in Part II of the Suppliers' Guidelines. See supra
note 217.
220. See supra note 48 for a more thorough discussion of this development Very
recently, Argentina adhered to the NPT. See supra note 164.
221. In addition to the changes noted in text, some of the most important positive
developments include: (a) further improvements in the technical efficacy of IAEA safe-
guards, (b) submission of all known nuclear facilities in all the non-nuclear weapons
states, other than Israel, Pakistan, India, and apparently North Korea, to those safe-
guards, (c) improvements in the international "trigger lists" of items which require
IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply, (d) voluntary offers of varying kinds by which
each of the existing nuclear weapons states have placed certain of their peaceful
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, (e) improvements in the physical protection
of nuclear facilities and materials, including progress in lowering the enrichment level
of fuel used in research reactors, (f) improvements in intelligence-sharing and techni-
cal means of intelligence collection on nonproliferation matters, (g) a reduction
(though hardly the elimination) of the over-politicization of the IAEA on North-South
lines, which has hobbled some other international organizations, and (h) very recently,
the IAEA's use of sophisticated means of environmental sampling to assist the detection
of undeclared facilities and nuclear materials. A full listing of the improvements in the
nonproliferation regime since its establishment is beyond the purposes of this paper.
222. Some observers, including the author, believe the IAEA has always had a right
to inspect undeclared nuclear facilities in NPT member states if necessary to verify that
all nuclear material in the state complies with IAEA safeguards. See Lawrence Schein-
man, The Current Status of IAEA Safeguards, in A NEw NucLa TRiAD 17 (David Fischer
et al. eds., PPNN Study Three, 1992); George Bunn, Does the NPTRequire its Non-Nuclear
Weapon Parties to Permit its Inspection by the IAEA of Nuclear Activities that Have Not Been
Reported to the IAEA?, in A Nrw NucLtA TRLan, supra, at 47-49. The issue was largely a
theoretical one until the Iraq case. In practice, the IAEA never concerned itself with
undeclared nuclear facilities. However, the draft final declaration of the 1990 NPT
Review Conference noted the existence of rights to carry out special inspections in
INFCIRC/153, supra note 202, and called on the Agency to study "the possible scope,
applications and procedures of such inspections." See Spector & Smith, supra note 217.
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concern in addition to Iraq are parties to the NPT, including North Korea,
Libya, and Iran. Some would add Algeria and Taiwan. Furthermore,
while the status of several countries of the former Soviet Union as non-
nuclear weapons states under the NPT has finally been resolved, the actual
elimination of all nuclear weapons from their territory will take considera-
ble time.2 23
In sum, while many problems remain,224 and new ones have arisen,
The IAEA Board of Governors recently endorsed a declaration by the Director Gen-
eral that the Agency has the legal authority to undertake special inspections anywhere
in an NPT state if reasonably necessary to verify that all nuclear material is under safe-
guards. IAEA Board of Governors Strengthens Nuclear Safeguards Inspection Regime, IAEA
Doc. No. PR 92/12 (Feb. 26, 1992) (press release); IAEA Board of Governors Reviews
Agency s Inspections in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), IAEA Doc. No. PR
93/5 (Feb. 25, 1993) (press release). The Board of Governors' resolution is somewhat
vague as to the kind of information the Director General may consider sufficiently relia-
ble to trigger the right, but apparently intelligence information unilaterally supplied by
a member state would suffice. This authority was severely tested in the North Korean
case, where much of the initial dispute was over the IAEA's right to carry out special
inspections of two suspected nuclear waste disposal sites. At least on this score, the
North Koreans won a partial victory, as the agreement with the United States does not
require it to allow access to those sites until most of the benefits to North Korea under
that agreement have already occurred, ie., several years from now. In any event, the
IAEA does not have a clear mandate in the text of the NPT or subsidiary documents to
search out clandestine nuclear weapons-related activities or facilities unless there is rea-
son to suspect a diversion of nuclear material or unless the facility in question is one
where nuclear materials are customarily located. Thus, the Board of Governors' resolu-
tion would not cover factories for the production of enrichment equipment (which
have been much at issue in Iraq) or design and test facilities for the development of
nuclear weapons per se, so long as they contain no nuclear materials. Furthermore, if a
country allegedly obtains fully fabricated nuclear weapons by clandestine purchase or
theft, the IAEA has no authority to investigate under the NPT, though it does have that
authority in states that are party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. See Treaty of Tlatelolco,
supra note 48.
The clandestine nuclear facility problem affects the entire nonproliferation regime,
but it is comparatively less important for some aspects of advanced proliferation. The
facilities needed for the large-scale production of special nuclear material are harder to
hide from foreign intelligence services than are smaller facilities which might suffice for
nascent proliferation. The same could be said for the possession (though not necessar-
ily the precise location) of long-range delivery systems. Finally, the development of
IGBMs, SLBMs and IRBMs cannot be accomplished (except by outright purchase) with-
out flight-testing. Development of true thermonuclear devices requires extensive assist-
ance or nuclear testing.
223. See supra note 41. The prolonged uncertainties caused by the breakup of the
Soviet Union were not a shortcoming of the NPT itself so much as an illustration of the
severe weakness of the current successor state doctrine. See supra note 3. However, the
situation has certainly posed a major set of challenges to the nonproliferation regime
which no one foresaw a decade ago.
224. The adverse developments listed in the text are not intended to be a full listing
of the steps backward which have occurred over the past two decades in dealing with
proliferation. Among the others are: (a) increasing commerce in weapons-usable
nuclear materials, especially plutonium, without anything approaching adequate pro-
tection against seizure by an aggressive country (virtually all the protective measures
required by the Physical Protection Convention, see supra note 196, and nearly all steps
currently taken are aimed at avoiding environmental contamination and prevention of
seizure by terrorists, not seizure by a substantial military force), (b) the continued lacka-
daisical attitude of certain nuclear supplier states toward implementation and enforce-
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the nonproliferation regime is a considerable success, not only because of
the wide-spread adherence to the legal instruments of the regime but
because the regime itself has gradually transformed perceptions of legiti-
macy and made possible concerted actions that were barely conceivable
when the NPT was first negotiated.
I. Legal Instruments To Restrain Advanced Proliferation
Some observers have argued that the international community is helpless
to deal with the spread of any technology, even where that spread can
greatly decrease international peace and security. Certainly, the technol-
ogy for producing special nuclear material and fashioning it into devices
like those dropped overJapan is now a half-century old, and it has become
easier to master. Every year, the list of countries which could have a few
simple nuclear weapons within five years of a decision to do so becomes
longer. Yet the history of the existing nonproliferation regime to date
does not support so pessimistic a view. As explained above, although there
continues to be a long list of problems, far fewer states currently possess
nuclear weapons than would have if the international community had
decided thirty years ago that the situation was hopeless and had done
nothing. The reason is that a complex regime like the nonproliferation
regime can help to transform international society and gradually change
perceptions of legitimacy, at least within its sphere.
22 5
The international community has not yet taken all of the steps it
could within the framework of the existing international order to reduce
the advanced proliferation problem. First, as explained infra in section A,
additional features can be added to the nonproliferation regime itself to
deal with advanced proliferation, most notably in staunching and deter-
ring the flow of nuclear weapons design information and relevant technol-
ogy, equipment and materials. Second, as outlined in section B, access to
long-range delivery systems can be impeded by new multilateral arms con-
trol limits on ballistic missiles, by strengthening the existing MTCR, and by
entering into new agreements to prevent the sale of other strategic deliv-
ery systems. Third, threshold states need to be offered politically attractive
means to keep their existing capabilities "in the basement." Those meas-
ment of the export control policies they have announced, including substantial back-
sliding by the United States, (c) weak punishments for violators of domestic export
control regulations, not only in the countries with poor attitudes towards export con-
trol, but also in countries such as the United States which purport to care about the
problem, and (d) the possible availability of enriched uranium, plutonium, and other
nuclear-related materials on the black market, reportedly coming from sources in the
former Soviet Union. See, e.g., Marc Fisher, Gemany Reports Upsurge in Nuclear Smuggling
Cases, WASH. Posr, Oct. 20, 1992, at A27.
225. It should be noted that something less than 100% success can be a great deal of
success in this field. To the extent that there may be additional proliferation, we can
probably cope better with less of it. Those who advocate aggressive "counter-prolifera-
tion" postures rather than vigorous efforts to prevent proliferation are also unlikely to
be 100% effective, but again, that is not a reasonable standard by which to measure
their proposals.
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ures would not require the threshold states to abandon their nuclear capa-
bilities at this time, but they would assure that those states cannot continue
adding to the size of their arsenals or significantly improving their nuclear
weapons design sophistication. Two arms control measures which would
assist in that regard, while having broader utility for international security,
are discussed in section C.
Finally, although beyond the purposes of this article, efforts must con-
tinue to deal with regional problems and underlying causes of tension,2 2
6
to improve the existing regime to deal with nascent proliferation
problems, 22 7 to make it politically more attractive to join and remain in
226. Proliferation motives, especially those which provide an impetus for advanced
proliferation, often arise out of regional rivalries and other security concerns, though
considerations of prestige and influence can be important as well (as they were with the
United Kingdom and France in acquiring nuclear weapons and Brazil and Argentina in
coming to the brink of doing so). Cf. Gerard Smith & George Rathjens, Reassessing
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy, 59 FoREIGN Arr. 875, 888 (1981) ("[T]he best hope of
stemming nuclear proliferation lies in dealing effectively with the motives that lead
nations to want to have nuclear weapons."). For example, nuclear issues will probably
be resolved in the Middle East only when other security concerns in the region are
resolved. A full discussion of regional security measures which might help reduce the
threat of advanced proliferation is well beyond the scope of this paper. However,
advanced proliferation cannot be dealt with in a political and security vacuum or
treated as largely a technical problem of the nuclear fuel cycle.
States may be wholly mistaken in believing that nuclear weapons will increase their
security. North Korea's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons is a good example of a fool-
ish quest. In the long run, if sustained, these efforts would probably lead to a nuclear
weapons race on the Peninsula which no one would really win, because it would dimin-
ish the real security of both states. Yet South Korea, with its larger population, vastly
greater financial resources, larger and far more advanced technology base, and a very
large and efficient natural uranium fueled nuclear power reactor at Wolsung, would
hold all the high cards. (For now the Wolsung reactor is under IAEA safeguards both
by virtue of South Korea's NFT status and as a condition of its supply by Canada, but it
is technically capable of producing many scores of nuclear weapons' worth of pluto-
nium for every one weapon's worth of plutonium produced in the North.) Such factors
have not kept North Korea from playing a very dangerous game.
227. In order to deal with proliferation generally and incidentally improve prospects
for reducing the risks of advanced proliferation, we need to continue to strengthen the
existing nonproliferation regime, including efforts to make the NPT virtually universal,
thereby isolating the hold-out nations. Doing so will contribute to non-acquisition
becoming a norm of international behavior. Numerous other steps are needed to
strengthen the existing regime. Among the most important of these are: (a) the nego-
tiation of an African nuclear weapons free zone, providing a fallback in the event that
the NPT itself unravels, or key Arab states pull out over the Israeli nuclear weapons
issue, (b) the agreement of China and the few remaining other hold-outs among the
current nuclear suppliers to require full-scope safeguards, (c) the expansion of efforts
to involve emerging suppliers in the growing consensus on conditions which should
apply to nuclear commerce and to dual-use items, and (d) further improvements in the
existing nuclear export controls, including further elaboration of existing controls on
less common enrichment technologies such as calutrons and nozzle processes, strong
encouragement of end-use controls, and a clearinghouse of information on the supply
of nuclear and dual-use items to states of concern. These measures would help with
both the nascent proliferation and the advanced proliferation problem. It is easy to
state such objectives, but they are in actuality far harder to accomplish. Work has con-
tinued on them, generally out of the public eye, and in some cases literally for decades.
Further progress can be expected, but not overnight.
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the treaty,2 28 and to take no steps in the name of "counter-proliferation"
to weaken it.2 2 9
A. Strengthening the Existing Nonproliferation Regime To Deal with
Advanced Proliferation
Most measures taken by the nonproliferation regime to deal with the nas-
cent proliferation problem are also helpful on the advanced proliferation
228. In the context of the 1995 NPT renewal conference, new political initiatives to
strengthen the existing regime should be explored. One step might be for the five
declared nuclear weapons states to provide a qualified non-use guarantee to the non-
nuclear weapons states which are parties to the NPT. Such a "negative security assur-
ance" would guarantee as a matter of international law that nuclear weapons would not
be used or threatened against the non-nuclear weapon states so long as they remained
in compliance with their obligations under that treaty and undertook no military
actions in concert with a nuclear power. Such a pledge would not apply to: (i) nuclear
weapons states, (ii) states which are outside the NPT and would thus not qualify for the
pledge, e.g., India or Pakistan, and/or (iii) states that would not qualify because they
are seeking nuclear weapons, such as North Korea.
From time to time, the United States and other countries have made highly qualified
unilateral and nonbinding non-use pledges. The United States made such a pledge
during the 1978 U.N. General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament. ACDA,
ARMs CONTROL AND DIsARMAMENT AGREEMENTS: TExTS AND HIsTORIEs OF THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS 94 (1990). This issue received much attention at the 1990 NPT Review Confer-
ence. Spector & Smith, supra note 217, at 42. Converting such unilateral statements
into treaty obligations would give them far greater appeal and legal force. Doing so in
the context of the 25 year review required by the treaty would be far more meaningful
now that all five nuclear weapons states are parties to the NPT. Of course, no vast
changes in eliminating the risks of further proliferation should be expected from such
a measure. It might, however, give additional incentives for some states to remain
within the NPT and would indicate to the non-nuclear weapons states that their long-
standing concerns about the fairness of the NPT are finally being addressed. It would
also weaken an Indian argument against adherence to the treaty or to other non-
proliferation agreements if China were to make such a pledge in legally binding form.
India has recently reiterated that it supports a global agreement barring the first use
of nuclear weapons. India Calls for Global Ban on Nuclear Testin& UPI, Jan. 12, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Doing so in the NPT context would tell
India, in effect, that obtaining its rights to the benefits of such a pledge rests in its own
hands.
229. For a list of such measures, see supra note 5. While no one would suggest that
the U.S. government take no steps to plan for the contingency that additional nations
will acquire nuclear weapons in the future, some of what is being considered will seri-
ously exacerbate the advanced proliferation problem. For example, the international
community has some interest in assuring that if additional countries acquire nuclear
weapons, such weapons cannot be seized and used by terrorists or by other countries.
Thus it might be in our national security interest to provide carefully selected informa-
tion (based on our own experience with PAL devices), which countries could use to
construct devices which will prevent or at least delay unauthorized use of any class of
weapons, conventional or nuclear. But to go further than that and help countries make
their devices not only secure but also safe would severely damage the nonproliferation
regime by legitimizing the acquisition of the weapons. Worse yet, virtually everything
one does to make nuclear weapons "one-point" safe also makes them more rugged and
less susceptible to failure or to being destroyed by conventional or nuclear attack. The
United States has no incentive to make would-be proliferators safer from their own
poorly designed devices. The risks of accidents and preemption are among the con-
straints against proliferation. Help with weapons design would make acquisition of
nuclear weapons more attractive by minimizing those risks.
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issue. Nevertheless, some targeted measures aimed more specifically at
the advanced proliferation problem are essential.
1. Obliging All States Not To Assist the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
To deal with the advanced proliferation problem, the obligations under
article I of the NPT should bind all NPT parties, notjust the nuclear weap-
ons states. Article I as currently worded precludes nuclear weapons states
from transferring nuclear weapons, or "in any way" assisting, encouraging
or inducing the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explo-
sive devices by any non-nuclear weapons state.2 30 The NPT placed no
such obligation on the non-nuclear weapons states. The drafters assumed
only the nuclear weapons states knew how to design and manufacture
nuclear weapons, so they imposed a general nonassistance obligation only
on the nuclear-weapons states.23 1 The drafters assumed everyone else
knew nothing about nuclear weapons, per se. 23 2 Moreover, imposing that
230. Article I of the NPT provides:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
NPT, supra note 2, art. I.
231. See George Bunn, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Wis. L. RE,. 766, 779 (1968)
("The treaty draft prohibits nuclear parties from helping any non-nuclear country, party
or not. But an express prohibition on assistance by non-nuclear parties was thought
unnecessary.") Bunn, who was General Counsel of ACDA during the negotiation of the
NPT and Deputy Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Conference (ENDC) (the forum where the NPT was being negotiated), has remained
one of the most respected lawyers in the arms control field. His article continues:
a non-nuclear-weapon state which accepts the treaty's restrictions on itself
would have no reason to assist another country not accepting the same restric-
tions to gain advantage from that fact in the field of nuclear-weapon develop-
ment. If a non-nuclear-weapon party did nevertheless attempt to provide such
assistance in the territory of a non-party, the presumption would immediately
arise that-these acts had the purpose of developing nuclear weapons itself, in
violation of the treaty.
Id. (quoting ENDC statement of ACDA Director Foster, in ENDC/PV.370, at 51, 56
(Provisional, Feb. 27, 1968)) (emphasis added).
The Soviet reply, in contrast, said that assistance by one non-nuclear weapons state to
another in acquisition of nuclear weapons would be a blatant violation of the treaty.
Id.; see also ACDA, INTERNAIoNAL NEGOTIATrONS ON THE TREATr" ON THE NONPROLIFERA-
TION OF NucLEAR WEAPONs 101 (1969). The Canadian representative in an earlier
debate had labeled the United Arab Republic (UAR) concerns as a "theoretical loop-
hole" but doubted that the situation would actually arise. Id. at 81.
232. In contrast, many of the non-nuclear weapons states possessed nuclear materials
and technology for peaceful purposes. It was accordingly considered necessary under
article III, paragraph 2 of the NPT for both the non-nuclear weapons states and the
nuclear weapons states to agree not to transfer nuclear materials or equipment espe-
cially designed or prepared for the production of nuclear materials to any non-nuclear
weapons state, unless the nuclear material so supplied or produced would be placed
under the IAEA safeguards system. The Soviet Representative at ENDC thought incor-
rectly that the UAR concerns were met by this provision. SeeACDA, supra note 231, at
101.
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obligation on all states seemed unverifiable and thus unenforceable.
That line of reasoning was probably correct when applied to the
world as it existed at the time the NPT was being negotiated, but the world
has changed. 23 3 Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Germany, Italy, and several
other non-nuclear weapons states have reached such a high level of techni-
cal development that their scientists and advanced technology firms could
readily assist less advanced countries in many of the technologies relevant
to advanced proliferation, despite their governments' lack of experience
in the design of nuclear weapons. The same would also apply to technolo-
gies directly relevant to more sophisticated nuclear weapons such as
boosted devices and aspects of thermonuclear weapons development.23 4
The twenty-fifth anniversary review conference of the NPT, scheduled
to take place in New York beginning in April 1995, presents the best
opportunity to bring about this change23 5 through the adoption of a sepa-
233. At the time of the Foster statement, Bunn, supra note 231, no one (except per-
haps the UAR's representative) had contemplated the current situation, where individ-
uals or firms provide the assistance, not the governments. The presumption Foster
stated-that a government which assists nuclear weapons development in another state
is itself developing nuclear weapons and thus violating the NPT-should also arise even
where such assistance is being provided by private entities rather than the government.
However, in that case, it should be understood that it would be a rebuttable presump-
tion. No one could reasonably argue that Germany was acquiring nuclear weapons
itself because of the extensive assistance its firms provided Iraq's nuclear weapons pro-
grams. The author believes that some kinds of assistance by a non-nuclear weapon state
would violate article II of the treaty, see infra note 234 and accompanying text, and that
the Soviet interpretation of that article may have been the better one. But it is obvious
that the matter is not clear enough from the negotiating record that one can say with
certainty that the kind of assistance we have seen to date is a violation of the NPT.
Greater clarity would be helpful to the purposes of the treaty.
234. Flagrant, large-scale assistance to the nuclear weapons program of a non-
nuclear weapons state by another non-nuclear weapons state might be so clearly con-
trary to the object and purpose of the NPT as to render the conduct illegal under
international law, even in the absence of textual support forbidding the particular acts
done by the offending country. For a more detailed analysis using this line of reasoning
in a different context, see infra notes 296-99 and accompanying text. Thus, if the gov-
ernment of Switzerland were to assume the sole responsibility for designing nuclear
weapons for Libya or Iran, in the author's view, Switzerland's action would be incom-
patible with the NFT, even if the Swiss themselves thereby never acquired nuclear weap-
ons in violation of article II of the NPT and never supplied anything which would
violate article II (2). An article I-like obligation for non-nuclear weapons states would
eliminate any ambiguity on the point. But more importantly, expanding the obliga-
tions of article I to cover the non-nuclear weapons states would also preclude far less
significant forms of assistance, e.g., where the government of Switzerland turns a blind
eye, as it often does, to what its companies are doing.
235. See supra note 44. The proposed change could be achieved by a protocol. In
the past, the United States has strongly resisted protocols to the NPT, fearing that
reopening the treaty, even for purposes the United States might support, could result in
a process which could weaken the treaty. See, e.g., Lewis Dunn, It Ain't Broke-Don't Fix
1t 46 Buti. ATOM. Sci. 19 (1990) (arguing that the treaty contains a careful balance of
obligations between nuclear and non-nuclear states, suppliers and recipients, etc., and
that attempting a new balance would undermine support for the existing treaty without
much prospect of reaching consensus on a new one). A separate treaty would be easier
to accomplish, because the only necessary parties would be non-nuclear weapons states.
They could negotiate and enter into such an agreement without the involvement of the
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rate but parallel treaty.2 36 A treaty undertaking which broadened article I
to all NPT parties would greatly facilitate subsidiary agreements and insti-
tutional arrangements to give the provision more "teeth." The export con-
trols and information controls discussed below would thus become a
logical derivative of the treaty obligation. Irrespective of whether a proto-
col or separate agreement is used, widespread adherence to the agree-
ment is not essential for it to be effective. The important element is that
many of the most advanced non-nuclear weapons states-those whose
scientists and industry are in the strongest position to assist in the develop-
ment of more sophisticated nuclear weapons-become parties to the
agreement.
2. Information Controls for Boosted and Thermonuclear Weapons
We need to develop a consensus on the control of certain information
relevant to advanced weapons. Publication of detailed information on any
kind of nuclear weapon, such as blueprints of simple fission weapons,
would prove harmful as that would be of considerable assistance to nas-
cent proliferators. However, information controls are far more important
in the case of advanced proliferation. Some basic physics, such as detailed
equation-of-state data on nuclear and other materials used in advanced
nuclear weapons designs, computer codes on implosion hydrodynamics
and neutronics, other computational aspects of weapons modeling, and
aspects of inertial confinement fusion (ICF or laser fusion), could be inval-
uable to a rapidly advancing nuclear weapons design program.
2 37
nuclear weapons states. On the other hand, consistency with the language of the two
instruments might be better fostered by use of a protocol. Of course, a protocol is a
new treaty, and as such it is only binding on those states which separately adhere to it.
But the same result is obtained with respect to a separate treaty or a treaty amendment,
as the amendment only becomes binding on those states which indicate their adher-
ence to it. Vienna Convention, supra note 165, art. 40, § 4. If a separate treaty is used,
there is no problem with inconsistency of purpose; the willing non-nuclear weapons
states would simply assume an additional obligation (or clarify an existing obligation, see
supra note 234) which the nuclear weapons states had already accepted. Their doing so
would be entirely in keeping with the object and purpose of the original treaty.
236. In theory, this goal could be achieved by a change to the text of the NPT itself.
However, the treaty's amendment provisions were drafted so that it is exceedingly diffi-
cult to make amendments as a practical matter. Article VIII of the NPT requires the
submission of proposed amendments to the Depository Governments for circulation to
all parties to the treaty. At least one-third of the parties must request a conference for
consideration of the amendment. A majority of the parties, including all the nuclear
weapons states and members of the IAEA Board of Governors, must then approve the
amendment, which can only enter into effect once the approving states have deposited
their instruments of ratification of the amendment. NPT, supra note 2, art. VIII.
237. The National Academy of Sciences has reviewed the Department of Energy's
inertial confinement fusion (ICF) program and labeled it "an extraordinary tool for
exploring the physics of thermonuclear weapons." Dan Fenstermacher, Arms Race: The
Next Generation, BuLL. ATOM. Sci., Mar. 1991, at 29, 31 (quoting National Academy of
Sciences, Review of the Department of Energy's Inertial Confinement Fusion Program
(1986)). ICF differs from the magnetic confinement fusion being explored in many
countries. In ICF, energy from very large lasers or electron beams is directed at a pellet,
which implodes. The simplest kind of pellet contains a mixture of deuterium and tri-
tium, which if compressed and heated enough, will fuse, releasing energy. In theory, it
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The international development and implementation of this consen-
sus probably cannot be achieved by ad hoc means. These have been tried,
with only modest success.23 8 Of course, the nuclear weapons states are
already under such an obligation because of article I of the NPT, and pre-
sumably they already possess the legal authorities to uphold that obliga-
tion.25 9 In some of the non-nuclear weapon states, the only individuals or
entities likely to possess such information are government employees or
laboratories. In other countries the government uses legal sanctions or
informal means to keep such information in private hands under ade-
quate control.24 ° Nevertheless, countries exist that are reluctant to restrict
the free flow of scientific information, 24 1 no matter how dangerous,
except pursuant to some kind of international agreement. The expansion
of NPT article I to non-nuclear weapons states willing to undertake the
obligation would provide the needed legal framework, and it would greatly
could create a useful form of energy, with only modest radiation problems, for which
we have virtually unlimited fuel. Unfortunately, such simple pellets have one defect:
they do not work. Pellets which work better are classified. They involve many of the
same concepts, utilize the same processes, and generally require the same materials as
multi-staged thermonuclear weapons.
238. The author participated in bilateral and trilateral consultations with the British
and French governments on ways to allow ICF research to go forward without the rele-
vant information becoming a proliferation hazard. Some consultations on the subject
have resumed between American officials and their counterparts in certain allied coun-
tries, but they appear to be more oriented toward declassification than toward better
controls. See David Kramer, Watkins Says He Hopes To Approve Deciassification of Fusion
Program, INSIDE ENERGY, Dec. 21, 1992, at 6.
239. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 the United States may classify informa-
tion concerning nuclear energy, including nuclear weapons design and production
information, as "restricted data," a category of classified information which cannot be
revealed to other nations except pursuant to an agreement for cooperation and which
subjects individuals to punishment if revealed. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2014(y), 2161, 2162, 2164,
2168 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
240. Japan, for example, has no statutory authority to control information flows but
has been generally circumspect about publishing certain data after the sensitivities were
explained in general terms to Japanese officials. Unfortunately, one Japanese
researcher continues to publish quite harmful details on inertial confinement fusion.
Interviews with Department of State and Department of Defense officials, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Nov. 1992). Legal controls imposed domestically to uphold an international
treaty obligation may prove to be the only effective solution, even in as tightly homoge-
nous a society as Japan.
241. The United States is not the only country with a heavy bias in favor of free
speech, academic freedom, and the free flow of ideas. That bias is particularly strong
among scientists, even those from countries without a strong free speech tradition. But
most of the information of the types listed in the text are not useful for anything except
boosted and thermonuclear weapons. As the information is genuinely dangerous, it
should be restricted in the common interest. To the extent that such work has some
useful purpose, or might have at some time in the future, e.g., for ICF, the work can still
continue, and most aspects can still be published. Exchanges of information and joint
projects should actually be encouraged but only with those states that provide the sensi-
tive information with adequate control. Unfortunately, we seem to be headed in the
opposite direction. Energy Secretary O'Leary recently announced a major declassifica-
tion of ICF materials, reportedly allowing 80% of all ICF work to be unclassified, in
contrast to 30% before the change. David Krauer, DOEAnnounces Major Deassification;
Suggests More Wil Follow, INSIDE ENERGY, Dec. 13, 1993, at 5.
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assist negotiation of an agreement on such controls.2 42 Of course, a fair
amount of that information has already been leaked or released in the
past fifteen years. 243 But a great deal of detailed information still exists
that continues to warrant protection.
3. Special Export Controls for Advanced Proliferation
The existing international nonproliferation export controls are aimed pri-
marily at assuring that nuclear materials, and equipment and technology
especially designed or prepared for the production of special nuclear
material, are not exported unless the nuclear material in question is under
242. It will be difficult for the international community to reach a consensus as to
what information it should conceal from would-be advanced proliferators, without
thereby revealing important information to them, but it will not be impossible. Compa-
rable concerns were expressed with each major improvement of the U.S. export control
lists, as many of the technical details and the purposes to which such equipment could
be put were sensitive. However, in each case, nonclassified ways were found to describe
the equipment well enough that manufacturers, exporters, and customs officials could
identify it, without revealing sensitive information.
243. The most serious release of information to the public which could aid advanced
proliferators transpired in The Progressive affair. Howard Morland, an investigative jour-
nalist, planned to publish an article entitled The H-Bomb Secret; How We Got It, Why We're
Telling It. When this came to the attention of the U.S. government, the executive
branch sought to have the publication restrained. In a case which pitted vital arms
control interests against the longstanding free press objection to any prior restraint of
publication, a federal judge ruled in the government's favor, issuing a preliminary
injunction against the publication of portions of the article. United States v. Progres-
sive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wisc. 1979), mot. denied sub nom. Morland v. Sprecher,
443 U.S. 709 (1979). However, before the government could obtain a permanent
injunction or the defendants could get the preliminary injunction vacated by the Sev-
enth Circuit, some of the same information was published in a letter to Senator Percy
(the Hanson letter), and other portions of the information were found sitting on a shelf
in the unclassified library at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (one of the two pri-
mary locations where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed). The Seventh Circuit then
dismissed the matter with the consent of both sides. 610 F.2d 819 (Oct. 1, 1979) (deci-
sion without reported opinion). Considerable information concerning the case was
published by The Progressive in its May and November 1979 editions. See Samuel H. Day,
Jr., The Other Nuclear Weapons Club, THE PROGRESSIVE, Nov. 1979, at 32 (explaining the
view of the magazine as to why publication was beneficial). Morland's original piece
finally appeared in the November edition. Howard Morland, The H-Bomb Secret, THE
PRoGREssIVE, Nov. 1979, at 14. Morland and his supporters believed that once the H-
bomb's secret was revealed, there would be more public scrutiny of nuclear weapons
and of the government's claimed need to keep producing them. If so, it would be hard
to document success. Heightened domestic scrutiny did not come until the demise of
the Cold War and growing awareness of the severe environmental mess nuclear weap-
ons production had caused. Morland and his supporters may also have believed that
elimination of the secrecy would lead to greater international pressure for disarma-
ment. It did not. Within government, we perceived literally no increased pressure for
more vigorous arms control in the wake of the article. When that pressure finally did
come, it was instead the consequence of the 1980 election results and the push that
gave the "Freeze" movement. In the meantime, the British and French governments
broke off useful consultations we had been holding (in which the author was a partici-
pant) on preventing critical information on thermonuclear weapons from falling into
the hands of threshold states.
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IAEA safeguards.2 a4 Recently, this has been supplemented with controls
on "dual-use" items relevant to nascent nuclear weapons design and manu-
facturing efforts.2 4 5 The new list contains a few items relevant primarily or
exclusively to more advanced nuclear weapons.2 4 6 The United States con-
trols several additional items and technologies solely because they are use-
ful to advanced proliferation. The following provides illustrations of what
can be done and what still needs to be done.2 4 7
A state seeking more advanced nuclear weapons would make "boost-
ing"2 4 8 a likely objective. Boosting requires tritium, a radioactive isotope
244. North-South hostility is still common in the international community. Many are
concerned that protective measures desired by some in the international community
might harm development efforts (e.g., exploitation of Amazonian resources versus the
impact such exploitation may have on unique habitats and/or its impact on global
warming). One accordingly might ask whether measures to keep "dual-use" items(defined in the next foomote) out of the hands of threshold states will interfere with
economic growth in developing countries. With respect to dual-use items relevant to
nuclear weapons, such measures might have some impact on the handful of threshold
states but not on any other developing countries. From the author's perspective, if the
two developing countries which are currently advanced proliferation threats have their
development impeded because they will notjoin treaties serving the common interest,
then that is a choice they made, and they should live with any adverse consequences for
their development.
One should also note that existing export control measures have had an impact on
threshold countries which are not developing countries. South Africa's power costs
were increased because the owner of its power reactors had to pay more for indige-
nously-produced enriched uranium power reactor fuel than would have been the case if
it had been an NPT party. The Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa, the
owner of South Africa's two power reactors, felt that continuing to receive indigenously
enriched fuel from the Z-Plant at Valindaba was unattractive because the costs for
"separative work" were high by international standards, and it thus preferred enrich-
ment abroad, something it could not obtain without South Africa first putting all its
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Mark Hibbs, Centrifuges or Lasers May Replace
South Africa's Present SWU Plant, NucLEAR FUEL., Jan. 7, 1991, at 4.
245. The concept of dual-use equipment and technology is highly useful, if some-
times amorphous. For nuclear, ballistic missile, and chemical technologies, the term is
sometimes used in two quite different senses, which complicates the issue. Most
nuclear items have an inherent duality, in that nuclear materials can be used either for
nuclear power or nuclear weapons. A similar duality exists for ballistic missiles, the
technology for which largely overlaps the technology for space launch vehicles. An
analogous duality also exists in aspects of chemical weapons production, which uses
some of the same equipment and raw materials as pesticide manufacture and other
peaceful uses of organic chemical synthesis. Equipment and materials useful for either
the peaceful or the non-peaceful nuclear, missile, or chemical purpose could be said to
be "dual-use." However, the term "dual-use" is more commonly applied to items which
have uses in wholly different applications, i.e., outside either the peaceful or the non-
peaceful applications in a particular field. Thus, a high speed camera normally associ-
ated with nuclear weapons design and testing could be used for a few wholly non-
nuclear uses. Supercomputers have many peaceful applications but are particularly
important to the design of the most sophisticated thermonuclear weapons. Indeed,
some items might be considered "treble-use" or even "quadruple-use," but fortunately
that terminology has not caught on.
246. See supra note 219.
247. The examples picked for discussion in the text are unclassified and are already
well known to would-be proliferating nations.
248. In a boosted device, the weapon is designed so that the heat and pressure of the
fission explosion also causes a small amount of fusion to take place. The fusion does
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of hydrogen.24 9 Tritium is most easily obtained by the irradiation of an
isotope of lithium (Li6) in a nuclear reactor, followed by a separation and
purification process. At present, significant quantities of tritium are avail-
able only from the nuclear weapons states and Canada.25 0 The new dual-
use list covers both tritium gas itself, and equipment and materials for its
production and separation.25 1
Another example is Li6 itself. Efficient tritium production requires
that the Li6 be first separated from the more common Li7 before irradia-
tion takes place, making control of Li6 essential to an effective long-range
tritium control strategy.2 5 2 More importantly, lithium deuteride25 3 is the
prime material used in true thermonuclear weapons to provide the fusion
yield. In contrast to tritium, Li6 has no important peaceful uses per se,25 4
making a country's efforts to acquire it a particularly good indicator of an
interest in advanced nuclear weapons. Concerned nations should agree to
a categorical ban on assisting in any way the acquisition or production of
Li6.255 Such a ban would be a logical derivative of the expanded coverage
not by itself contribute importantly to the yield, but the high energy neutrons from the
fusion cause many additional atoms of plutonium or highly enriched uranium to fis-
sion. The result is a considerable increase in yield.
249. Tritium has some peaceful uses, such as for luminous watches, but that need is
decreasing as better batteries and alternative lighting methods become available. For
over two decades, the United States has had export controls and informal re-export
understandings for tritium with the few countries which need it for peaceful purposes.
The specifics of those controls cannot be found in any law or regulation. While the
export by a private person of significant quantities of tritium would require a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, 10 C.F.R. § 110.5 (1994), the real control is
derived from the fact that the only U.S. producer of significant quantities of tritium is
the U.S. Department of Energy. Peaceful uses of tritium are likely to expand only if
controlled fusion becomes an important power source. That possibility has prompted
growing interest in tritium technology.
250. Tritium is also created as the incidental by-product of a reactor's neutron flux
on the light water or heavy water moderator and coolant. The Canadians, with the
world's largest heavy water power reactor program, remove the tritium from the heavy
water for occupational health reasons, leaving tritium which is commercially competi-
tive with other techniques.
251. Suppliers' Guidelines, Part 1!, supra note 217, §§ 8.3-.5. The elaboration in these
sections is less than one might like, but they are a big step forward in international
control of tritium.
252. Li6 constitutes about seven percent of naturally-occurring lithium.
253. Lithium deuteride is a compound formed from Li6 and the deuterium isotope
of hydrogen. The deuterium gas for this purpose is usually obtained by the electrolysis
of heavy water.
254. Li6 is sometimes used in tiny quantities for dosimeters, and the new dual-use list
allows the transfer of these dosimeters without safeguards assurances. But that does not
involve the quantities of Li6 needed for weapons purposes. Indeed, for that reason 116
cannot really be considered a dual-use item. It and several other items on the new list
logically belong on a list of their own, namely non-nuclear materials needed for nuclear
weapons and nothing else. As obtaining international agreement on yet another
approach would have occasioned delay, we are fortunate that practicality triumphed
over terminological precision.
255. 1i6 itself is on the new international dual-use control list. See supra note 219.
Equipment designed for its separation from natural lithium is not. The reason for this
omission may be because the United States has largely classified the technology for
separating the isotopes of lithium. See 10 G.F.R. § 725, app. A (1994) (access to
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of NPT article I recommended above.
Agreement by the nuclear suppliers on the new dual-use list is a signif-
icant accomplishment 2 5 6 However, in addition to Li6 separation technol-
ogy, other key dual-use items relevant to advanced proliferation remain
uncontrolled. For example, the new dual-use list does not cover
supercomputers. 2 57 The computational requirements for advanced
designs, especially thermonuclear weapons, far exceed those for simple
weapons. Moreover, only a handful of countries can produce such highly
advanced computers. The fact that top-of-the-line supercomputers are not
on the new dual-use list is not due to the U.S. delegation's failure to try.
The placement of supercomputers on the dual-use list should be
attempted again soon, this time with political support from the highest
levels and using advanced proliferation, not proliferation in general, as
the rationale.
As discussed above concerning article I of the NPT, firms and scien-
tists in a number of non-nuclear weapons states are now in a position to
assist in some aspects of nuclear weapons programs even though their gov-
ernments do not possess nuclear weapons. 258 The number of these poten-
tial suppliers will continue to grow, as will the number of areas in which
they are capable of assisting other countries' advanced proliferation pro-
grams. Thus, a consensus on the need for export controls must be
reached with all states possessing relevant technologies, not just those
Restricted Data on separation of lithium isotopes by counter-current flows of lithium
amalgam and aqueous lithium hydroxide in packed columns can be approved to U.S.
persons under certain conditions). Thus the equipment used in that process is not on
the lists of controlled dual-use items whose export requires a Commerce Department
license. There are also no international controls on the technology for forming lithium
deuteride into shapes with the consistency and density ideal for thermonuclear weap-
ons. Of course, production of tritium and Li6 is significantly easier than production of
HEU or plutonium. That fact does not detract from the advantages of their interna-
tional control.
256. As a result of this agreement, a number of other materials which are not impor-
tant to initial proliferation, such as high purity beryllium metal, and specialized items,
such as certain ultra-high speed detection and diagnostic equipment, have now finally
been controlled for advanced proliferation reasons.
257. Controlling other mainframe computers would be useful to nascent prolifera-
tion but would not preclude the development of simple devices and is accordingly con-
troversial. Because they are used for so many other purposes, existing controls on many
computers may have outlived their utility except to particular end-users. Attempting
international controls on personal computers and work-stations-which could be help-
ful though not ideal for designing an initial nuclear explosive-would be a quixotic
quest in light of their widespread availability.
258. For example, other than the United States, the countries in the strongest posi-
tion to supply supercomputers to states of advanced proliferation concern are not the
other four nuclear weapons states (though both the United Kingdom and France have
some capabilities) but ratherJapan and Germany. The United States has had a quiet,
unpublicized understanding with the Japanese on supercomputers. Interviews with
Department of State and Department of Energy personnel, in Washington, D.C. (June
3-6, 1994); WilliamJ. Long, Global Security, Democratization, and Economic Development After
the Cold War New Goals for U.S. Export Control Policies, in INTEMaxaTONAL COOPERATION
ON NONPROLERATION EXPORT CoNTRoLs, supra note 203, at 59, 72. This needs to be
broadened into an international agreement.
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states currently adhering to the Nuclear Suppliers' Guidelines. 259 A bind-
ing international obligation, such as the broadening of coverage of NPT
article I discussed above, which would provide the juridical basis for such
lists, would facilitate that consensus.
2 60
We cannot expect countries with existing nuclear weapons programs
who wish to obtain more advanced nuclear weapons to be stymied forever
by improved international export controls. The equipment and material
unique to advanced proliferation is easier to obtain by indigenous efforts
than special nuclear material, which is the pacing item for a nascent pro-
gram. However, effective export controls will lengthen the process of
acquiring advanced nuclear weapons, and buying time is of great impor-
tance as favorable changes may take place in the interim.26 1 Even if no
favorable change takes place, the delay itself may be valuable. 262 More-
over, effective export controls will make the acquisition of a significant
nuclear weapons force substantially more costly and difficult than if the
materials, equipment, and technical assistance can be freely purchased.
259. The most importaht nonparticipant is China, which is governed by the NPT,
though it has joined no consensus on what it may and may not supply consistent with
that treaty. There are a number of non-nuclear weapons states which have not yet
adhered to the Suppliers' Guidelines, including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Tur-
key, Brazil, and Mexico. In addition, although Russia is a participant, most of the other
former Soviet republics are not. All of these are capable of manufacturing some items
on the current dual-use list, if only by reverse engineering. Some of these may resist
early adherence on the grounds that the Guidelines go beyond the requirements of the
NPT (or the Treaty of Tlatelolco) or because they did not participate in their formula-
tion. These factors may decrease the legitimacy of the enterprise in their eyes. Others
are likely to have an antipathy to the new rules in the correct belief that the Guidelines
were once aimed at them.
260. The new controls would then stand in the same posture to the new article I-like
agreement as the current Zangger list does to the NIT: not binding undertakings
under international law in their own right, but rather a consensus statement of the
actions that a state cannot take and remain in compliance with the treaty obligations
the country has undertaken. See supra note 203.
261. There is, after all, an antithesis to Murphy's law which says that occasionally
things go right, as they did in the South African and Argentine/Brazilian cases. It was
certainly easier for those states to give up a few weapons, and the capability to have a
few in a matter of months respectively than it would have been for them to give up large
sophisticated forces. In the nuclear weapons context, if export controls and related
measures delay the acquisition of far more significant nuclear forces by five or ten years,
the possibility always exists that during that time political conditions will change or
regional tensions will fade and countries of concern can reverse or halt their nuclear
weapons programs.
262. While this proposition has not been tested, and with luck never will be, the
international community can better adjust politically and militarily to a trickle of new
nuclear weapons states than it could to a sudden flood of them. Even Waltz, who favors
additional countries acquiring nuclear weapons, believes that the spread should be
slow. See Waltz, supra note 52. After all, outside the nuclear weapons context, history
shows that rapid changes in relative military and political power can often be quite
destabilizing, as was the case with the rapid rise of Prussia or the rapid decline of the
Ottoman Empire.
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4. Developing a New International Crime: Mercenary of Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the break-up of the Soviet Union
and the related decline in funding of the former Soviet nuclear weapons
establishment is the possibility that rich but less technologically-advanced
countries might hire highly qualified nuclear weapons designers to assist
their nuclear weapons programs. Comparable problems exist for chemi-
cal and biological weapons and for conventional arms. However, the
problem is more acute with respect to various aspects of advanced nuclear
proliferation, such as ballistic missiles. Perhaps the most severe risk is with
nuclear weapons design per se. When moving from simple nuclear weap-
ons to more sophisticated designs, the mental aspects-basic physics, mod-
eling and other computational skills, and conceptual design-are
relatively more important than either precision manufacturing or access
to exotic materials. A country that could assemble a team of experienced
nuclear weapons designers could greatly compress the design and testing
phase, obtaining sophisticated nuclear weapons far more quickly and
probably at much lower cost.
Although the specific problem of nuclear weapons design experts
making a major contribution to advanced nuclear weapons programs in
other countries is (hopefully) so far only a potential problem, there have
already been examples of the advent of a new kind of mercenary, one who
aids in the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction for gain. In several
recent cases, nations attempting to acquire nuclear, chemical, or biologi-
cal weapons and ballistic missiles have hired experts from firms or individ-
uals in more developed countries. It is possible that some of those
individuals and companies were duped and had no idea that the assistance
they were providing would be used for weapons of mass destruction. How-
ever, we know that some of them were aware of the true purpose but
engaged in the activity anyway. Often, the individuals or companies assist-
ing other countries in the design and construction of weapons of mass
destruction committed no crime under the laws of their country of nation-
ality. Moreover, unlike the United States, 263 some countries which control
the export of listed equipment and materials do not control technology
263. Except for the areas of weaponry and nuclear energy, technology controls are
not common under U.S. law, unless the transfer of the intangible technology is inciden-
tal to the export of tangible equipment. In the nuclear arena, U.S. controls on technol-
ogy and information not contained in exported equipment are far stronger. SeeAtomic
Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (1988); 10 C.F.R. Part 810 (1994). These provisions
make it unlawful for any person to engage directly or indirectly in the production of
special nuclear material outside the United States without the authorization of the
Department of Energy. (The export of special nuclear material itself requires a license
from the NRC. 10 C.F.R. Part 110 (1994)). The Department of Commerce also
requires a validated license for the export of "software" and "technology" for selected
items on the Commodity Control List, including many listed for nuclear proliferation
and missile technology control. See generaly 15 C.F.R. § 799.1, Supp. No. 1 (1994).
Authority also exists under 22 C.F.R. § 125 (1994) (control of technical data for items
listed on the Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121 (1994) (implementing the Arms Export
Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988 & Supp. V 1993))) for the State Department to
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6 4
To reduce that aspect of the problem involving former Soviet nuclear
weapons designers, the United States, the European Union, andJapan are
providing funds to establish a science center in Russia and negotiating for
another in Ukraine to keep the experts occupied at peaceful tasks.26 5 The
effort should be commended, but the odds against being 100% successful
are overwhelming.266 In the past, Soviet restrictions on the freedom of
travel and the right to emigrate, backed by the totalitarian power of the
state, proved the most important restraint against such risks. As a matter
of human rights, we can be delighted that those odious restrictions have
largely been lifted.2 6 7 But lifting them has made this aspect of the
control the export of technologies directly relevant to weapons and their production,
apart from the export controls on the weapons themselves.
264. One can infer from the terms of the new dual-use section of the Suppliers'
Guidelines that this poses a problem for some countries. The section declares "ft]he
transfer of 'technology' directly associated with any items in the list will be subject to as
great a degree of scrutiny and control as will the equipment itself, to the extent permitted
by national legislation." See Suppliers' Guidelines, Part AT, supra note 217, annex, iii (empha-
sis added). The provisions dealing with equipment contain no such national legislation
savings clause, suggesting that the participating nations did not foresee legal difficulties
in controlling equipment.
265. See The START Treaty: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 390 (1992) (testimony of Robert Galucci, Director, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Department of State) (United States to contribute $25,000,000, with
substantial contributions from the EC andJapan, and in-kind contributions from Rus-
sia). Other kinds of scientific collaboration also help in that effort: "American physi-
cists believe that a secondary benefit of [Russian assistance on the supercollider] and
other high-energy research is in providing peaceful pursuits for Russia's former military
laboratories and scientists, thereby reducing possible temptation to seek employment in
countries like Libya and Iraq." Malcolm W. Brune, Building a Behemoth Against Great
Odds, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 23, 1993, at B5.
266. The former Soviet nuclear weapons complex was a multi-billion dollar opera-
tion, with tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and technicians. For the Western
countries to provide enough money to keep even three quarters of the roughly 2,000
key former Soviet nuclear weapons design experts gainfully employed would be a major
accomplishment. But the remaining quarter of an enterprise of that size is an enor-
mous pool of talent. Moreover, even if they could all be offered some kind of science-
related job in Russia or Ukraine, the salaries offered for their services by the likes of
Libya or Iraq might be far more than they could make at home. One report claims
unnamed "third world" countries have offered Russian scientists three-year contracts at
salaries of up to $400,000 per year, while another claims Libyan agents offered two
scientists at the prestigious Kurchatov Institute $100,000 per year. Whatever the merits
of these reports, it would not take much to exceed the current exceedingly low Russian
salaries. Nigel Hawkes, Threats to Soviet Science, Timms (London), Feb. 3, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Int'l File. The following illustrates the problem, though it
deals with missile expertise, rather than nuclear weapons: sixty-four Russian missile
experts were stopped at Sheremetyevo airport bound for North Korea. Howard Witt,
Soviet Nuclear Threat Defies Usual Solutions, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 24, 1993, at 1. The experts,
who were making 15,000 rubles (less than $20) per month had been offered $3,000 per
month by North Korea. Jack Kelley, Russia Losing a Nuclear War-to Highest Bidders,
U.S.A. TODAY, May 21, 1993, at 4A.
267. One of the author's research assistants, a Russian citizen studying for a juris
doctorate in the United States, relates the following information, which we have been
unable to confirm or refute because recent laws and decrees of the Russian government
are difficult to obtain even in Russian: since the beginning of 1993, Russian law has
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advanced proliferation problem much worse.
It should be possible to reduce, though not eliminate, the problem if
a new treaty required the state parties to criminalize knowingly acting as a
mercenary of mass destruction. The international community would, in
the words of one U.S. court, speaking of torturers, declare them "hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind."268 The idea would be similar to
earlier international law efforts intended to prevent piracy and slavery and
the more recent successful international efforts in negotiating conventions
which require states to make specified conduct illegal and also to prose-
cute or extradite offenders in cases of aircraft hijacking,26 9 attacks on dip-
lomats and senior-most government officials, 270 and hostage-taking. 271
Parties reached agreement on those treaties fairly quickly despite the high
potential for political disagreement, and they are now widely adhered to.
The keys to broad international acceptance of the mercenary concept
in the area of weapons of mass destruction are: (1) the person or com-
pany is a true mercenary, namely, a national or business concern of one
country providing substantial services, equipment, or materials to another
nation for profit,2 72 (2) the only prohibited acts are those done with the
knowledge that they provide direct assistance in the acquisition of weap-
recognized a right to a passport; the government no longer has discretion. However,
persons who have had access to information regarding, for example, weaponry or intel-
ligence matters may still legally be denied an exit visa.
268. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
269. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970,
T.IAS. No. 7192. The Hague Convention requires each contracting state to make the
seizure or attempted seizure of an aircraft in flight by force or threat of force or intimi-
dation a crime punishable by severe penalties. Id. arts. 1, 2. An exception to the appli-
cability of the convention is made for wholly domestic cases, i.e., where the point of
departure and landing are the territory of the state of registration and the offender is in
the hands of that state. Id. arts. 3, 5. The contracting state must either extradite or
prosecute an offender found in its territory. Id. arts. 4, 7.
270. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internation-
ally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 23 U.S.T. 1975,
1035 U.N.T.S. 167. The convention obliges state parties to make certain serious attacks
on a defined class of protected persons crimes punishable "by appropriate penalties
which take into account their grave nature." Id. arts. 1, 2. A state on whose territory an
alleged offender is present must either extradite or prosecute, id. arts. 3, 6, 7, with a
limited exception for states which have treaties of asylum in effect between them. Id.
art. 12.
271. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, December 17, 1979,
T.IAS. No. 11081. The convention obliges each state party to make hostage-taking, as
defined in the convention, a crime "punishable by appropriate penalties which take
into account the grave nature of those offenses." Id. arts. 1, 2. The state party on whose
territory the alleged offender is found must either extradite or prosecute. Id. arts. 5-7.
In contrast to the two previously discussed conventions, however, some limitations are
placed on extradition. Id. arts. 9, 10. As with the aircraft hijacking convention, this
treaty does not apply in wholly domestic cases, i.e., where the offense takes place within
a single state by and against nations of that state, and the offender is found within that
state. Id. art. 13.
272. One can predict with great certainty that few if any countries would ratify a
treaty which made it a crime to assist one's own nation in the production of any form of
weaponry. It would be far easier for countries to agree that their nationals should not
be allowed to help some other country obtain mass destruction weapons.
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ons of mass destruction,2 73 and (3) the prohibited acts are very carefully
defined,2 74 forbidding a narrow core set of types of assistance to programs
developing weapons of mass destruction.
275
Under the proposed treaty, a natural or juridical person who know-
ingly engages in the prohibited acts would be subject to punishment by
the state party of which it is a national or resident or by any other state
which is party to the treaty. Each state party would be obliged to criminal-
ize such behavior and prosecute offenders. States party to the treaty into
whose hands accused natural persons fall would have the option of extra-
diting the offender to the state of nationality or residence for trial or of
trying the guilty persons themselves. Because any state party could either
try or extradite an alleged violator who came within its jurisdiction, irre-
spective of whether that person's home country or employing country was
a party to the treaty, widespread adherence would not be essential for the
treaty to be substantially effective, so long as several leading industrial
states and states which are key transportation hubs became parties.2 76 Vio-
lations by individuals should be punished as major crimes. 277 The mini-
mum punishment against corporations or other juridical persons should
273. There may be a place for strict liability crimes in the domestic law of some
countries, but there is no prospect for international acceptance of the concept in this
context.
274. Careful definition of prohibited acts is essential. First, most of us believe that
where criminal prosecutions are possible, considerations of fundamental fairness
demand that the prohibited conduct be clearly defined. Moreover, maintaining a
short, clearly defined list of prohibited conduct will increase prospects that nations
would ratify such a convention. Finally, to the extent that private causes of action may
be possible, the violation of international law needs to be very clear, at least in U.S.
practice. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (act of
state doctrine applicable to foreign expropriation).
275. In the author's tentative view, the areas of assistance for which criminal penal-
ties should apply under the treaty should be limited to (i) the design, testing, or pro-
duction of ballistic missiles and their launchers, (ii) the design and construction of
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or their critical components, and (iii) the con-
struction of facilities to produce the critical materials for nuclear weapons (ie., for the
enrichment of uranium or the production and/or separation of plutonium at facilities
not under IAEA safeguards or for the production of tritium or Li6).
276. One might wonder whether a multinational tribunal to try such cases might not
be more just and more efficient, particularly when many different companies and indi-
viduals have aided a program of weapons of mass destruction. However, the trend in
recent treaties is the one discussed in the text, authorizing or even obliging the state
into whose hands the accused person falls to extradite or prosecute in national courts,
rather than to create new international tribunals. Although there have been some
efforts to establish new international criminal courts, they have been unsuccessful. See
Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2359 n.70
(1991).
277. Suppose a Russian expert in the electronics of triggering nuclear weapons,
whose prospects for continued employment in that field in Russia are not good, is
offered $400,000 a year by Libya. The expert might expect to save enough in just a few
years to retire to Nice or San Diego. Such a future would be very tempting, no matter
what one's personal qualms. However, a future where setting foot outside Libya might
involve arrest and a long stint in a French or American prison would be far less
appealing.
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be a high multiple of the amount of profit earned.2 78
It might also be possible to use transnational lawsuits to accomplish
some of the same purposes. Private litigants could bring "traditional" suits
against persons responsible for causing them harm, e.g., for injuries or
property damage caused by weapons of mass destruction.2 79 Alternatively,
by analogy to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act (CERCLA),280 a new treaty could create a right for
any person, including the United Nations, governments, and private enti-
ties, to recover "response costs" for remedying the situation caused by per-
sons or firms who provide assistance to countries acquiring weapons of
mass destruction. 281 One advantage of imposing civil liability would be
278. Suppose a company stands to earn a net profit of $10 million for sending its
experts to help another country design a MIRV "bus" to put multiple warheads on bal-
listic missiles. It may be hard to resist the temptation to agree if the consequence of
being discovered and convicted were only a $1,000 fine. On the other hand, if the
minimum penalty for doing so knowingly, if convicted, were 10 times the amount earned
(ie., $100 million), amoral but prudent companies would decline to become involved.
279. This intriguing idea comes from the author's colleague, Bernard H. Oxman. In
municipal law, the tort system is designed not only to make the injured parties whole
but also, inter alia, to discourage undesirable behavior. In the past, the use of private
law as a major element of a control strategy would have seemed implausible, due to
foreign sovereign immunity and otherjurisdictional limitations and the act of state doc-
trine, although there had been occasional attempts, especially in maritime matters. Yet
in recent years, private litigants have had some success bringing transnational law suits
in U.S. courts, especially for violations of their human rights by foreign officials. See
generally Koh, supra note 276. In theory, this could provide an additional vehicle for
upholding community norms in the arms control field with the very considerable
advantage that suits could be brought against corporate entities, many of which may
have substantial assets. Being multinational corporations, they could be tried in a vari-
ety of jurisdictions. This could have important deterrent effects. If a company knew
that its assistance to an Iraqi chemical weapons program could make it liable to surviv-
ing family members of Kurds gassed by the Iraqis, or that its assistance to Iraq's SCUD
missile program could make it liable to persons in Saudi Arabia and Israel who suffered
losses, it would make providing such assistance seem exceedingly risky, even if there was
no real risk of prosecution in the company's home jurisdiction.
In theory, such suits could be brought now. In practice, such litigation would face
many difficulties even in the United States. There could be difficulties with jurisdic-
tion, doubts as to whether such exporters owed duties to the injured parties, and doubts
as to whether the harm was foreseeable. Above all, the U.S. courts are likely to find the
offending government more culpable. The situation with courts in other countries,
which generally have a less expansive notion of their jurisdiction, would be even less
promising. These practical litigation problems could be reduced by an international
convention which held private persons strictly and jointly and severally liable for any
harm resulting from assistance to programs of weapons of mass destruction supplied
after the convention entered into force. Affirmative defenses could be allowed, with
the burden on the exporter asserting the defense to prove that the export was without
knowledge that it assisted a prohibited weapons program.
280. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (more commonly referred to as
CERCLA or "Superfund"). CERCLA makes any of several statutorily-designated classes
of responsible parties liable for response costs undertaken at facilities or vessels from
which there has been a release of hazardous substances, subject only to a very narrow
set of defenses. 42 U.S.C. § 9607.
281. If the several score of German firms which provided critical assistance to Iraq's
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile programs had known
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that courts could impose a less stringent "knowledge" test than would be
appropriate where criminal sanctions may result. 28 2 Another advantage is
that private parties might be willing to bring suit under circumstances
where governments would eschew imposing discretionary sanctions for
political reasons. 283
5. Adopting a System of Challenge Inspections
Another step which could be taken in the context of the 1995 NPT
renewal conference would be to adopt a system of challenge inspections,
along the lines of article 16 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which allows any
state to trigger a challenge inspection based on an assertion that another
party is violating its obligation under the treaty.28 4 An international body,
rather than the challenging party, conducts the inspection.28 5 This fea-
ture reduces legitimate concerns the inspected country may have about
the challenges being a mere pretext for military or industrial espionage.
Moreover, the challenging state must pay for the cost of the inspection, a
feature designed to discourage frivolous charges.
Although challenge inspections would also be helpful in the case of
nascent proliferation, they would take on special importance in dealing
with advanced proliferation in those cases where a state proceeds some-
what along the lines of the Swedish model, 28 6 i.e., the state abides by its
NPT obligations to keep its nuclear material under safeguards, though
perhaps adopting fuel-cycle approaches which involve access to large
amounts of separated weapons-usable materials. Separately, the state
before they provided the assistance that they would be civilly liable to the United
Nations for the costs of investigating those programs and destroying the equipment
they provided and the facilities they constructed, they might have eschewed the transac-
tions in the first place or at least greatly raised their prices.
282. The details of a treaty along the above lines, and the possible use of transna-
tional law to bolster it, need further elaboration and will be the subject of a future
article.
288. This is apparently one of the reasons why private litigation has been so attractive
in human rights cases. See Koh, supra note 276.
284. Article 16, §1 (b) (i) provides for inspection "[w]hen so requested, the reasons
for the request being stated, by any Party which suspects that some activity prohibited by
this Treaty has been carried out or is about to be carried out, either in the territory of
any other Party or in any other place on such latter Party's behalf. .. ." Treaty of
Tlatelolco, supra note 48. An even broader challenge inspection system is provided for
in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Convention on the Prohibition of the Develop-
ment, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destination, S.
TREATr Doc. No. 21, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
285. As originally adopted, challenge inspections under the Tlatelolco Treaty were to
be carried out by the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(OPANAL), the regional organization established by the treaty. However, OPANAL
remained very small and without significant expertise of its own. Argentina and Brazil
both objected to the fact that there was no assurance that trade secrets would be pro-
tected in an OPANALled inspection. Both of these problems were resolved this past
year when the Treaty of Tlatelolco was modified to provide for the challenge inspec-
tions to be carried out by the IAEA, which has most of the needed expertise and a good
record of protecting trade secrets. 3 Latins Support No-Nuke Treaty, WAsH. TIMES, Aug.
27, 1992, at A2.
286. See supra note 207.
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begins a major nuclear weapons design effort so that it can have substan-
tial and sophisticated weapons as quickly as possible following a decision
to do so. Proving that suspected facilities, which may be confined within
or disguised as ICF programs, were engaged in weapons-related activities
would be difficult and probably impossible if they were detected, unless
there was a right of access.2 87 On the other lhand, with full access to
equipment and documents, a program oriented toward advanced prolifer-
ation would be hard to disguise, because substantial facilities and sophisti-
cated equipment would be required. 2
88
B. Adopting Additional Restraints on Strategic Delivery Systems
The advanced proliferation problem will be ameliorated if threshold
countries are unable to obtain highly-survivable, accurate, long-range
delivery systems except by wholly indigenous construction. A more realis-
tic near-term goal should be to prevent outright purchase of such systems
and to delay and increase the cost of indigenous development.
1. Multilateral Treaties To Constrain Ballistic Missile Development and
Deployment
It would be helpful to multilateralize the basic undertaking of the Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty,289 the U.S.-Soviet treaty ban-
ning the possession of intermediate range ballistic missiles with ranges
from 500 to 5500 kilometers.290 Former ACDA Director Ken Adelman,
writing prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, pointed out that it is
strange that under the INF treaty, the United States and the Soviets may
not legally possess such missiles but countries like Libya and North Korea
287. As explained in note 222, supra, the IAEA would have the right to conduct spe-
cial inspections under existing safeguards agreements only if the facility contained
nuclear materials or if it were a facility where nuclear materials are normally used or
produced. Nuclear weapons design facilities containing no nuclear material fall
outside the scope of the IAEA's current authority.
288. A challenge inspection system would also reduce the undeclared nuclear facili-
ties problem with NPT parties, which was a key aspect of the problem in Iraq. While
recent steps taken by the IAEA Board of Governors to assert its right to carry out special
inspections in NPT parties have been helpful, see supra note 222, a treaty instrument
establishing a challenge inspection scheme would be desirable. Doing so would make
the IAEA's rights to carry out such special inspections far clearer than they are at
present.
289. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles,
Dec. 8, 1987, 27 I.L.M. 84, 90 (1988) (entered into forceJune 1, 1988) [hereinafter INF
Treaty].
290. The INF treaty itself is not open to adherence by other nations, and the creation
of a multilateral agreement having identical substantive provisions to those of the INF
agreement would not make sense, if for no other reason than it is highly improbable
that each party would allow the intrusive inspection rights granted under the treaty to
be carried out by every other party. But a multilateral treaty repeating the nonposses-
sion and nontransfer provisions of the INF treaty, but with an international organiza-
tion carrying out the inspections, should not be too difficult to negotiate. See id.
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can. Adelman therefore advocated globalization of the INF agreement. 29 1
A world-wide undertaking not to acquire IRBMs or the technology for
their development and deployment could be significantly bolstered by a
provision in a new multilateral treaty or a separate treaty that would be
open to all states, under which the parties agree to freeze their ICBM
numbers at present levels. Even stronger would be a ban on new ICBM
types, bolstered by a ban on flight-testing ICBMs. Those undertakings
would leave some countries with ICBMs and most others without them
and would thus repeat some of the discrimination inherent in the NPT.
However, the discrimination would be less onerous than under the NPT,
in that every state would have an identical obligation not to acquire addi-
tional ICBMs.292
2. Strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was flawed from the
beginning and needs improvement.293 As its weaknesses have been dis-
cussed at length in other literature, 294 they will be repeated here only in
summary form. First, there is an urgent need to broaden participation
and encourage states that are in passive agreement to support the regime
through active cooperation.295 Second, the caliber of export controls
291. Ken Adelman, Curing Missile Measles, WASH. TrMEs, April 17, 1989. Others have
argued that a multilateral agreement would not be helpful, as it would make little sense
to allow those countries to have ICBMs and not IRBMs (because the INF agreement
does not limit ICBMs). See INF Treaty, supra note 289. Although that is correct, it is not
a conclusive argument against multilateralization. First, virtually everything needed to
design, test, build, and deploy ICBMs is also needed for IRBMs. Restraining the latter
will have the effect of making development of the former far more difficult. Second, in
some regional contexts, it is IRBMs we are most worried about. Third, an acquisition
ban could be supplemented by a provision barring flight testing, without which the
development of IRBMs is far less feasible. Space launch vehicle tests can give a country
some of the information it needs for the launch vehicle. But the accurate return of the
missile warhead to earth is not ideally tested through space launches, and with modem
communications technology, there is no real reason to return capsules of film to earth,
which would provide some experience with re-entry techniques and ablative materials.
Fourth, even though development of IRBMs is difficult to separate from nominal space
launch technologies, the actual deployment of IRBMs could be restrained. A categorical
ban on such deployments would be relatively easy to verify. The greatest difficulty may
be in getting China and France to agree, as each has IRBMs, and China's IRBMs consti-
tute a major part of its arsenal.
292. By way of analogy, it would have been far easier for some non-nuclear weapons
states to accept the NPT if the nuclear weapons states had been obliged to put a ceiling
on the number of nuclear weapons they had, so that every country, nuclear weapons
state and non-nuclear weapons state alike, would have had an obligation to construct
no additional nuclear weapons.
293. MTCR Guidelines, supra note 118.
294. ROBERTJ. LEMPERT, CRUISE MIsSILE ARms CONTROL (1989); Martha Fitzpatrick,
Arms Control: Export Controls on Missile Technology, 29 HARv. INT'L IJ. 142 (1988); CENTER
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURInY AND ARms CONTROL, supra note 118; Alton Frye, Zero Ba/!is-
tic Missies, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Fall 1992, at 3.
295. In February 1990, the Soviet Union announced it would follow the guidelines of
the MTCR and subsequently applied for membership in the group. Soviets Apply to Join
Missile Technology Control Regime Group, AERosPAcE DAILY, Nov. 30, 1990, at 357. How-
ever, there is an urgent need to assure the active participation of Russia and adherence
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needs to be improved under the existing regime. When compared to the
international nuclear controls, the MTCR guidelines are less detailed and
precise. Lack of clarity in international agreements can lead to ambigui-
ties and disputes,296 particularly where there is no treaty, but only a state-
ment of national policy. For example, suppose a company from an MTCR
supporting state was hired to design movable blast shields over missile
silos, to design the MIRV "bus" to put multiple warheads on existing
ICBMs in another country, or to supply highly precise ground-contour
data to allow another country to make its own terrain-following guidance
systems for cruise missiles. Nothing in the MTCR expressly forbids any of
these kinds of cooperation. 29 7 One would hope that countries would not
allow such cooperation despite the lack of an express provision, but in less
obvious cases, the lack of precision can be harmful to the purposes of the
MTCGR
Finally, serious consideration should be given to making the regime
binding under international law. It may well have been the case that a
nonbinding agreement was all that was negotiable at the time,2 98 but a
great deal has changed since then. There are several reasons for prefer-
ring a binding international instrument in this instance. First, the hypo-
thetical situations described above would be better handled under a treaty,
to the guidelines by those former republics of the Soviet Union which have missile
component production facilities or missile assembly facilities on their territory.
Although Chinese officials reportedly told the Bush Administration they will abide by
the principles of the regime, that is a unilateral assurance, made only to the United
States, in the context of trying to deflect Congressional attacks on China's most favored
nation trade status. Surely that is a weak reed on which to lean, particularly given
China's highly irresponsible behavior regarding ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and
related technologies in the recent past. See infra note 802.
296. Of course, some level of interpretation is always required in international agree-
ments as perfect clarity is impossible. See RicHARD FAL, THE STATUs OF LAW IN INTERNA
nONAL Socimv 343 (1970) ("The central place of interpretation in the legal order is
obvious."). Still, some legal standards are clearer than others, e.g., "the concentration
of nitrobenzene in the discharged water cannot exceed 57 ppb." is not entirely free
from ambiguity, but it is far less susceptible to differing interpretations than, for exam-
ple, regulating radio and television broadcasting "in the public interest."
297. It might be argued that a MIRV bus is a stage or re-entry vehicle under MTCR
item 2 or flight control equipment under MTCR item 10, but such an interpretation
would be farfetched as the bus is not a propulsion stage, nor is it itself designed to be
able to re-enter the atmosphere. Similarly, someone might claim that the raw geo-
graphic information relevant to developing Tercom guidance might be considered avi-
onics software under MTCR item 11, but it fits none of the examples. One might argue
that the blast doors are launch and ground support equipment under MTCR item 12,
but that is even more far-fetched as the blast doors do nothing to launch the missiles
(they would launch equally well if there were no such doors). See MTCR Guidelines,
supra note 118.
298. Elizabeth Verville, at the time the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Polit-
ico-Military Affairs, made that point at the 1991 meeting of the American Society of
International Law. If a nonbinding agreement was the most that could have been nego-
tiated, it would have been foolish to demand a treaty instrument, thereby passing up
the benefits which could be obtained by nonbinding means. On the other hand, the
negotiability of a particular approach is rarely an independent variable. It usually is a
function of how much effort is put into it, at what governmental levels, and what one is
prepared to exchange in return.
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as such cooperation would clearly be contrary to the object and purpose of
the treaty and as a result, would be a violation of it.2 99 Second, the current
status of the MTCR, as parallel statements of national policy which are
linked to no legal instrument, has led to some of the most severe disputes
under the MTCR.3 00 Under a treaty, an exporting country acting in good
faith would have to ask itself not what its policy is but what the treaty terms
really mean. Third, in a well-functioning treaty regime, the allowed cir-
299. The Vienna Convention does not say that in so many words. SeeVienna Conven-
tion, supra note 165. However, article 31 states that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose" Id. art. 31 (emphasis
added). Of course, that still requires a term which can be given two meanings: one
consistent with the treaty's object and purpose, the other not. That might be difficult
with the three hypothetical examples discussed in the text, as they are rather far
removed from the plain meanings of the terms of the MTCR. However, under article
18 of the Vienna Convention, a state which has signed but not ratified a treaty is not
bound by all the treaty's detailed provisions, but it is "obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty." Id. art. 18. The hypothetical exam-
ples discussed in the text are so egregious as to be acts which would clearly defeat the
object and purpose of the MTCR. An interpretation of the Vienna Convention that
prohibits nonparty signatories from defeating the object and purpose of a treaty but
allows parties to defeat the purpose, so long as they comply with the detailed require-
ments of the agreement, would be absurd. It would seem to follow that a party cannot
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty even if the treaty has no explicit provision
dealing with a specific matter.
300. Russia, for example, entered into a deal with India to provide it with $250 mil-
lion in cryogenic (supercooled liquified gas) engines for space launch purposes. The
United States protested, arguing that the sale violated the MTCRI The Russians said it
did not, and they continued with the deal. Ranjan Roy, Russia, India Sign Pact to Put
Troubled Ties Right, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File; Russia Will Go Ahead with Rocket Sale to India, REutRS, July 16, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Subsequently the United States imposed import
and export sanctions on both the Indian purchaser and the Soviet supplier, and the
Soviets reportedly backed down. Holmes, supra note 139. There is no question that the
engines were large enough to fall under MTCR item 2. But the MTCR by its terms does
not forbid all such cooperation. Rather, the state which announces it is abiding by the
MTCR pledges to make a determination, which it reserves entirely to itself, of whether a
particular item of assistance to a foreign space program should be allowed, taking into
consideration the following factors spelled out in the MTCR Guidelines:
A. Nuclear proliferation concerns;
B. The capabilities and objectives of the missile and space programs of the
recipient state;
C. The significance of the transfer in terms of the potential development of
nuclear weapons delivery systems other than manned aircraft,
D. The assessment of the end-use of the transfers, including the relevant
assurances of the recipient states referred to in sub-paragraphs 5A and 5.B
below;
E. The applicability of relevant multilateral agreements.
MTCR Guidelines, supra note 118, at 600-01.
As these are supposed to be wholly national decisions, different suppliers could weigh
the same factors differently. Thus the United States thought (probably correctly) that
this assistance would be helpful to Indian efforts to obtain ICBMs. The Russians may
have concluded that on balance the engines were more closely associated with legiti-
mate space efforts.
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cumstances might be clearer.30 ' Under a treaty regime, parties might be
given a duty to consult in questionable cases. In contrast, it is hard to
imagine such a legal duty in an agreement which purports to create no
legal obligations. Finally, a treaty would have provisions for formal adher-
ence. With some nonbinding agreements, it can be difficult to ascertain
who is and who is not an adherent to its provisions.3 0 2 That is far less
likely to be a problem with treaties, which have well-established structures
and procedures for adherence, including a depositary (the U.N. or a par-
ticularly interested government) with whom one can check.
One possible way to make the MTCR a binding arrangement without
converting it into an entirely free-standing treaty would be to make it
subordinate to nondissemination provisions in new global agreements
multilateralizing the INF ban on IRBMs or freezing ICBM levels at current
numbers. The MTCR would then have the same posture toward the new
treaties as the Zangger Committee list has to the NPT, i.e., an agreed state-
ment by parties to the treaty as to the exports that would not be consistent
with the treaty's requirements. Such lists can be amended without chang-
ing the treaties themselves.
3. Forbidding the Transfer of Other Strategic Delivery Systems
Efforts to impede advanced proliferation should deal with delivery systems
301. For example, space cooperation might be limited to NPT or Tlatelolco coun-
tries which do not have IRBMs or ICBMs and which agree to forego them as a condition
of space cooperation.
302. Consider, for example, the question of China's status under the MTCR. In May
1991, the United States announced that it was banning the sale to China of certain
computer and space equipment because of China's missile exports. In November 1991,
Chinese officials told Secretary of StateJames Baker during a visit that they intended to
observe the MTCR guidelines. In February 1992, China provided written assurance it
would do so. China's Commitment to Non-proliferation an Issue in Clinton's MFN Delibera-
tions, INT'L TRADE REP., May 12, 1993, at 795. President Clinton's report to Congress
said China did so in March 1992. Renewal of Most Favored Nation Status for China, supra
note 139. Buta Kyodo News Service report in May 1993 stated that China has yet tojoin
the MTCR, though China said in February that it would. U.S. Protests Missile Exports
Involving China, Russia, supra note 139. The United Press International then reported
in July that "China has not signed but agreed to abide by the Missile Technology Con-
trol Regime ...." U.S. Official Meets China Foreign Minister on Arms, UPI, July 27, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; see also Geoffrey Crothall, Arms Sals Warn-
ing; U.S. to Threaten Sanctions, SoUrH CHINA MORNING PosrJuly 23, 1993, at 10, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Schina File. Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director of the CIA's Non-
Proliferation Center, complicated matters further during CIA DirectorJames Woolsey's
Congressional testimony when Dr. Oehler stated "China has agreed to adhere to the
guidelines and parameters of the MTCR, but they are not expected to become mem-
bers of the MTCR." In response to a question Dr. Oehler added, "I don't know whether
they've been asked, but I don't think that they would if they'd been asked." U.S. Security
Policy vis-d-vis Rogue Regimes: Hearing Before the International Security, International Organi-
zations and Human Rights Subcomm. of the House Foreign Affairs Comm., 103d ong., 1st
Sess. (1993) (testimony ofJames Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence), reprinted in
FED. NEws SERvICE,July 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Someone
in the U.S. government probably knew what the facts were, but the President and the
CIA could not both have been correct.
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other than ballistic missiles.30 3 In considering options for restraints on
delivery systems beyond those on ballistic missiles, it is essential to bear in
mind that we are reduced to second-best solutions. Negotiation of severe
restrictions on access to all possible nuclear-capable delivery systems has
no prospect for international acceptance.3 0 4 In contrast, restrictions on
strategic delivery systems, which may be of far greater interest to advanced
proliferators than to nascent programs, should have far better prospects.
There are weapons delivery systems in addition to ballistic missiles3 05 that
are suitable for that role and have little justification for conventional
defense. Their ready availability on the market would seriously under-
mine efforts to control all types of weapons of mass destruction. More-
over, the more successful constraints become on ballistic missiles, the
more interest countries will have in acquiring other long-range delivery
systems. The delivery systems in question are available only from a hand-
ful of actual and potential suppliers, and there is little or no current com-
merce in them, which should make the negotiation of constraints much
easier.
a. Ban the Sale of All Bombers
There is no need for any state to transfer bombers to any other country.30 6
303. It was understandable for Western countries to focus their control efforts ini-
tially on ballistic missiles. Even though they are related to the equipment and technol-
ogy of space rockets, these long-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and IRBMs) have no
legitimate use except for delivering weapons of mass destruction. Countries of concern
were known to be seeking them, either under the guise of peaceful space research or
clandestinely. The number of countries capable of selling ballistic missile technology
was small but growing. Given these facts, it was sensible to begin control efforts with
ballistic missiles. It was much less understandable to exclude the Soviets and Chinese.
That decision was made early in the Reagan administration. Of course, the Soviets and
Chinese might not have participated if invited, but they could hardly be relied on to
abide by an international rule-making from which they had been so humiliatingly
excluded. In the end, both have indicated support for the MTCR but only after the
passage of a great deal of time, a large number of highly destabilizing transfers, particu-
larly by the Chinese, and lost opportunities to improve the controls.
304. Importing countries often have legitimate conventional defense requirements
for multi-purpose fighters, for example, or for conventionally powered attack subma-
rines, even though these may be capable of nuclear delivery as well. Moreover, the
export of conventional weapons systems is important to the economies of several coun-
tries. The annual value of arms exports over the two decades from 1971 to 1990 when
expressed in constant (1985) dollars ranged from just under $12 billion to over $27
billion, and it averaged $19.8 billion. Ian Anthony et al., The Trade in Major Conventional
Weapons, in SIPRI YEA"BOOK 1991, at 197, 231-32 (Stockholm International Peace
Research Inst. (SIPRI) ed., 1991). According to a more recent report by the Congres-
sional Research Service, sales to third world countries dropped 22% in 1993 but still
amounted to $20.4 billion, of which the United States had the single largest share. Eric
Schmitt, U.S. Arms Merchants Fatten Share of Sales to Third World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1994,
at A6. Thus, both the developed and the developing countries are likely to resist any
broad sweeping restrictions on all advanced nuclear-capable weaponry.
305. Cruise missiles are also covered by the MTCR, though the controls on parts,
exotic materials, and expertise for indigenously produced cruise missiles are poorly
elaborated when compared with the controls on ballistic missiles.
306. Older American terminology drew distinctions between light, medium, and
heavy bombers. The light bomber category has been eliminated due to the great gains
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Since the Korean War, no country has transferred heavy bombers to
another nation.3 0 7 Although medium bombers have been sold in the past,
there has not been a brisk trade in them, even within an alliance frame-
work, since at least the 1970s, when the Soviets sold Tu-22 Blinders to Iraq
and Libya. One might argue that because there is no commerce, there is
no need for an agreement. But relying on that reasoning is far less protec-
tive of global security interests than a treaty. After all, the best time to ban
something is when it is not yet an issue, as in the Antarctic Treaty's prohi-
bition on nuclear testing or waste disposal on that continent 0 8 or the
Outer Space Treaty's prohibition on placement of weapons of mass
destruction in orbit.30 9 Moreover, in times past, several nations did sell
light and medium bombers to other nations, and in the absence of a legal
prohibition, that commerce could resume. 310 In that regard, it would be
most unhelpful to world security if the United States were to sell B-I
bombers to Israel, if France were to sell Mirage IVs to Pakistan, or if Russia
were to sell Backfires to India.3 1 ' Negotiating suitable definitions of
bombers in terms of weight-carrying capability and range, so as to distin-
guish them from the more common fighter-bombers, should be relatively
easy.3 1 2
in weight-carrying capabilities and the range of fighters. Those fighters especially
suited to bombing missions are generally now called fighter-bombers, strike aircraft, or
attack aircraft. For reasons discussed in the text, there is no prospect for their global
control. While the medium bomber category has largely disappeared from the U.S.
arsenal, the distinction between medium and heavy bombers still has merit for analyti-
cal purposes and is used in this article. United States B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers would
all be considered "heavy," as would Russian Bear and Blackjack bombers.
307. The Soviets have sold a limited number (three or five) Bear F aircraft to India.
See supra note 135. But these were reportedly outfitted for antisubmarine warfare, not
long-distance bombing.
308. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. V(1), 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71.
309. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art.
IV, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
310. The British sold Canberra and Buccaneer bombers to several countries outside
NATO, including India and South Africa. The Soviets sold TU-16 Badgers to Egypt and
Indonesia and TU-22 Blinders to Iraq and Libya. Bill Sweetman, Backfire Goes to Market,
AIR FORCE MAG., Feb. 1993, at 42-43.
311. This is not an entirely hypothetical matter. Russia reportedly agreed to sell 12
Tu-22M-3s, the latest version of the Backfire supersonic bomber, to Iran. Gallery of Mid-
die East Airpower, Am FORCE MAG., Oct. 1992, at 64; Sweetman, supra note 310, at 42.
Tupolev officials later denied that they had sold or would sell Backfires to Iran. Ukraine
Shows Off Backfires in Iran, FUCHT r'tL, Jan. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Flight File. Ukraine, in contrast, has no such inhibitions and actually displayed two
Backfires in Iran. Id. Ukraine could not legally sell its Bear and Blackjack bombers as
they are currently counted as heavy bombers under START I and the Lisbon Protocol.
See START I, supra note 41; Lisbon Protocol, supra note 41. There appears to be no
such prohibition for the Backfires.
312. Negotiating an agreement to control bombers would raise two more difficult
collateral questions. One is whether it will be possible to identify and control the trans-
fer of components and subsystems of bombers so as to make it more difficult for coun-
tries to build their own bombers or to enhance the survival and penetration capability
of bombers they already possess. The second issue is whether comparable restraints
should be adopted on tankers and associated equipment for air-to-air refueling.
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b. Ban the Sale of Nuclear Submarines and of Missile Submarines
There is no reason for any country to sell or otherwise transfer nuclear
powered submarines to another. In recent years, in addition to the
nuclear weapons states, interest in nuclear powered submarines has been
shown by several states,3 13 including India,3 14 Brazil, 3 15 and Canada.3 16
Because of their great range and relative invulnerability and the compara-
tive ease with which attack submarines can be outfitted with nuclear-
armed cruise missiles or torpedoes, nuclear submarines present a poten-
tially formidable delivery system. A ban on the sale of nuclear powered
submarines would not interfere with existing commerce. 3 17 However,
313. Seth Shulman & Ricardo Bonalume Neto, Proliferation of Nuclear Subs, 338
NATURE 452 (1989).
314. India leased a Charlie One-class nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union for
three years, returning it in 1991. Soviet Nuclear Submarine Ends Leased Stay with Indian
Navy, REuTERs, Feb. 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. There have
been reports of renewed Indian interest in purchasing Russian nuclear powered attack
subs. Russian Indian Weapons Deals Likely During Forthcoming Visit, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, FE/1325/A2/1, Mar. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Intl File (quoting the Press Trust of India News Agency). Russian and Chinese sources
also quote Indian officials as claiming to be on the threshold of developing nuclear
propulsion technology. India To Make Own First Nuclear Submarine, TASS, Dec. 10, 1991,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File; India on Way of Developing Nuclear Subma-
rine, XINHUA, OCL 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (citing Press
Trust of India News Agency).
315. Brazil's Aramar Experimental Center, in addition to enriching uranium, also
has the objective of developing a 50-MW submarine reactor, to run on 20% enriched
fuel, a project on which it reportedly had spent $50 million by 1988. Turner, supra note
48.
316. The Canadian interest in nuclear attack submarines to protect their arctic
waters seems to have crashed on the shoals of budgetary reality. Canada had once
considered acquiring up to 10 nuclear submarines, in part a response to a dispute with
the United States over transit through the Northwest passage. However, the program
was cancelled in 1989, the casualty of a large defense spending reduction and substan-
tial public and political opposition to the multi-billion dollar cost. David Pugliese, Euro-
pean Firms Market Subs for Canada, DEF. NEWS (Canada), Feb. 25, 1991, at 3.
317. At one time the United States did transfer Polaris submarine missiles to Great
Britain, and in 1983 it entered into an agreement to supply Trident submarine-
launched ballistic missiles. Anthony et al., supra note 304, at 247. Reportedly, the deal
involves 72 Trident-2-D-5 missiles. The deal only involves transfer of the missiles; the
British will build the four Vanguard submarines and supply the nuclear warheads. Id.
According to another report, the United Kingdom has one Vanguard operational, two
under construction, and one on order. Mather, supra note 66. The British have not
announced how many warheads the missiles will carry, though it seems likely it will
involve a total force of several hundred independently targeted warheads. In an era of
reduced tensions in Europe, the British are not likely to be needing new ballistic missile
submarines beyond those already planned. In any case, they can build their own
nuclear submarines, as can all of the nuclear weapons states. William Webster, when he
was the Director of Central Intelligence, testified that the five nuclear weapons states
are also the states which currently build nuclear submarines. Nuclear Proliferation: Hear-
ing of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (testimony
of William Webster, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency) quoted in FED. NEws
S aVICE, May 18, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. Similarly, the
French are in the process of building new nuclear subs and associated missiles. France
is building a new class of nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines to carry the new
multi-warhead M5 missile, which can carry up to 12 warheads and has a reported range
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there has been enough interest in such weapons that it would be prudent
to preclude commerce in nuclear powered submarines and in related
nuclear power plants and technology.3 18 The more difficult question con-
cerns controls on related technology. The United States already has strict
controls on nuclear propulsion technology.31 9
No country should transfer submarines (whether nuclear or non-
nuclear powered) which are specifically designed or altered to serve as
carriers of ballistic or cruise missiles. There has been no such commerce
to date, but in recent years it has been clear that restraint and good sense
do not always govern suppliers' actions when there is much money to be
made and no legal prohibition on the sale. A prohibition binding at inter-
national law thus offers the best assurance that good sense will continue to
prevail.3 20
c. Limit the Transfer of Aircraft Carriers
Aircraft carriers provide the capacity to project power at great distances,
and their fighters could give such carriers a significant long-range nuclear
of 11,000 km. The first of the subs, Le Triomphant, was scheduled to enter into service
in 1994. Mather, supra note 66.
318. To minimize claims of discrimination, no agreement should be attempted
which would prevent indigenous development of attack submarines when it is consis-
tent with other treaty obligations; the limitations should be solely on the transfer of
nuclear submarines and related propulsion technology. Indeed, an argument could be
made that on balance it would be advantageous to the nonproliferation regime for
countries able to do so to provide guarantees of assured HEU fuel supplies for indige-
nously-produced nuclear powered attack submarines (but not for those for launching
ballistic missiles) so as to take away a legitimate reason (or a handy excuse) for those
nations to develop their own HEU production facilities. Of course, the recipients
would need to make adequate arrangements for IAEA safeguards up to the point where
the state manufactures the HEU into fuel and again when spent fuel is returned. (The
NPT allows such nonexplosive military uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear weapons
states. That was a mistake, but it is almost certainly too late to do anything about it.)
An illustration of the kinds of problems this can involve arose in the negotiation of
safeguards for the Brazilian nuclear program, because the Ipero facility is intended to
supply HEU for submarine fuel and the IAEA Statute only allows safeguards to be
applied to peaceful activities (military submarines being a nonexplosive but also
nonpeaceful use of atomic energy). Mark Hibbs, Brazil's Military May Block Safeguards
with Argentina, NUCLEONICS WEF--, Nov. 28, 1991, at 8. On the other hand, a good case
can be made that it would be better to limit assured supplies for naval reactors to 20%
enriched uranium.
319. Much of the technology for naval propulsion is classified. Nuclear naval propul-
sion plants are on the Munitions Control List, Category VI(e). 22 C.F.R § 121.1
(1994). The United States also has controls on the sale of other items relevant to
nuclear naval propulsion under the Commodity Control List. 15 C.F.R § 799.1, Supp.
No. 1 (1994).
320. For both nuclear submarines and missile-carrying conventional subs, a possible
alternative to a categorical ban would be to restrict sales to NPT parties and those states
that have undertaken comparable obligations. If this alternative is chosen, it is essential
that the supplying state obtain a legally binding assurance from the recipient state that
the supplied items will never be used to carry or deliver any weapon of mass destruc-
tion. This would only be a second-best solution and would need to be supplemented
with considerable supplier restraint to deal with states of doubtful intentions, such as
Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. A categorical ban, in contrast, would be far easier
to police.
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delivery capability. Even those that use conventional propulsion are
exceptionally expensive, so that it is barely plausible for current threshold
states to contemplate their indigenous construction. On the other hand,
countries such as Argentina and India have purchased used ones. An
agreement is needed which would: (1) bar the transfer of nuclear-pow-
ered aircraft carriers and (2) limit future sales of conventionally-powered
aircraft carriers, their major critical components, and carrier-capable air-
craft to states which are parties to and in compliance with the NPT or the
Treaty of Tlatelolco.3 21
C. New Arms Control Initiatives To Freeze Threshold Nations' Nuclear
Weapons Capabilities in Place
As previously noted, export control measures, including related controls
on information dissemination, are integral to an effective strategy for deal-
ing with advanced proliferation, but they are not themselves a sufficient
strategy. Perfection in execution is more than one can reasonably expect.
Moreover, in the long run, even airtight export controls will only slow a
determined country with adequate resources. Thus, by themselves they
cannot prevent the ultimate acquisition of advanced nuclear weapons and
delivery systems.322 An effective strategy against advanced proliferation
must also provide the threshold states with positive measures they can
either accept or be put at a political disadvantage if they do not become a
party to those measures. Naturally, the threshold states could already
become parties to the NpT3 23 or to a regional arrangement which would
require them to undertake comparable duties, as has been done with the
321. The provision limiting transfers to NPT (or equivalent) parties should be sup-
plemented with an informal understanding on restraint as to those NPT parties whose
non-nuclear intentions are in serious doubt, i.e., Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea.
322. By greatly delaying the date when a nation could acquire a militarily significant
force and by greatly increasing the cost, highly effective export controls can make
achievement of an advanced proliferation program far more difficult. Knowledge of
that fact could make the undertaking considerably less attractive to the threshold
country.
323. The author would strongly oppose trying to induce India, Pakistan, and Israel
into measures short of the NPT if there were any possibility that they would otherwise
become NPT parties in the near future. But there is no such prospect. As the most
recent ACDA Director put it, "It is important to recognize that the conditions for their
adherence to the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states do not exist. It is no good
demanding now what is not possible now." Ronald F. Lehman II, Arms Controk Passing
the Torch as Time Runs Out, WASH. Q., Summer 1993, at 43.
Consider also the following statement of Raja Mohan from the Indian Institute of
Defense Studies. While leaving open the possibility of some kind of regional non-
proliferation arrangement (presumably covering Pakistan, India, and China), he stated
that there was a "complete political consensus in our country" against the NPT. "I can
assure you that no government in our country can last for five minutes if it only thinks
of signing the NPT." Mark Hibbs & Ann MacLachlan, India Can't Count on France for
TarapurFuel Past 1993, NucxLo~ics WIL, Apr. 16, 1992, at 9. Pakistan will take no such
step unless India does as well. In deciding on intermediate measures to preclude the
growth in the size and sophistication of the arsenals of the threshold states, we should
do nothing that would permanently foreclose NPT adherence. But this is a circum-
stance where we cannot afford to let the ideal become the enemy of the good.
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Treaty of Tlatelolco.3 24 But the essence of the problem is the unwilling-
ness of states to abandon their option to acquire nuclear weapons and give
up the weapons they may already possess. A better strategy would provide
them with an intermediate point, whereby they would not be required to
give up their existing capabilities at this time,3 2 5 but they would effectively
give up the option to (1) increase the number of their devices and (2)
increase the yield of their weapons.
Two measures first proposed in the early days of arms control negotia-
tions, a multilateral agreement precluding the production of nuclear
materials for weapons purposes3 26 and a multilateral ban on all nuclear
testing,3 27 have been revived recently because they would have considera-
ble merit in their own right as arms control measures to further stabilize
324. There has been occasional talk of creating nuclear weapons free zones in, inter
alia, the Middle East and South Asia. No doubt the entry into force of such NWFZs
would resolve the most important nonproliferation problems, including the advanced
proliferation problem, in those regions. The difficulty has been, and remains, getting
the countries of greatest concern to agree to become party to any constraint which
conclusively requires them to give up their existing nuclear weapons capabilities.
325. George Perkovich argues for a slightly different approach to deal with problems
in South Asia, viz., in which the two countries would not give up their capabilities to
acquire nuclear weapons in short order but would agree not to actually deploy them,
resulting in what he calls "non-weaponized deterrence." George Perkovich, A Nuclear
Third Way in South Asia, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1993, at 86. This approach is highly
appealing, but its validity depends on Perkovich's assertion that neither Pakistan nor
India has chosen to build nuclear weapons. "Despite all their expense and effort,
though, India and Pakistan have not yet deployed nuclear arsenals or even declared
themselves to be nuclear weapon states." Id. at 87. While the author has had no access
to classified information for over 12 years and thus cannot personally determine
whether Perkovich is correct, it is widely believed among nongovernmental experts that
he is wrong. That suggests that his desire to freeze those capabilities in place may still
be a workable approach but that it will have to be done against a factual background
where one or both countries has at least some nuclear weapons already deployed to its
forces, and under present circumstances, neither country is likely to disassemble them.
326. In a letter to Soviet Premier Bulganin dated March 1, 1956, President Eisen-
hower proposed "to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrange-
ments so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world would
no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons." 1 DOCUMENTS ON
DISAIMUEN-r 1945-1959, at 593, 594 (U.S. Department of State ed., 1960). This
became known as the "Cutoff" proposal, and it was later combined with a further sug-
gestion that nuclear material from weapons purposes be converted and transferred to
peaceful uses. This combined proposal was thereafter called "Cutoffand Transfer." See
ACDA, supra note 231, at 2.
327. The Soviet Union first proposed a total ban on nuclear testing in 1955, separate
from other disarmament measures then under discussion. The United States, United
Kingdom, and France objected, arguing that such a ban should be linked to progress
on other matters, particularly Cutoff. Several years of intermittent negotiations, a mor-
atorium on nuclear testing, the resumption of testing, and more negotiations finally led
President Kennedy to conclude that a comprehensive ban could not be achieved
because of disagreements over the number of allowed on-site inspections. A more lim-
ited ban barring nuclear weapons in all environments except underground was quickly
negotiated. This became the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weap-
ons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T.
1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43; see ACDA, supra note 231, at 34-41. There remained, however,
considerable interest in a comprehensive test ban (CTB), and the non-aligned states
pushed for inclusion of a CTB (and sometimes also Cutoff) in the agreement or a
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relations among the nuclear powers. However, their value is greatly
increased when viewed through the lens of advanced proliferation.
1. A Treaty Banning Production of Nuclear Materials for Weapons
One step which would substantially assist in reducing the advanced
proliferation problem would be for the international community to nego-
tiate a treaty under which all parties agree to refrain from producing
nuclear materials for nuclear explosive purposes. This agreement would
apply to everyone: the existing nuclear powers, the threshold states, and
others. To provide verification of that guarantee, all state parties, includ-
ing the nuclear weapons states, would be required to place all their
nuclear facilities, including those used in the past to produce nuclear
materials for weapons purposes, under the safeguards system of theLAEA328
legally binding linkage of those measures to a nonproliferation agreement throughout
the negotiation of the NPT. See id. at 11, 24, 53, 86-87, 106-08.
328. Negotiating the details of such a nonproduction agreement would admittedly
be time consuming, and there are a number of issues which would need to be resolved.
A full discussion of them is beyond the purposes of this article. Among the most impor-
tant issues are:
(1) IAEA safeguards would need to be imposed at all nuclear facilities in all five
nuclear weapons states. As each of the five already has at least some of its peaceful
nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, that requirement would be less precedent set-
ting than it might seem. The United States has entered into a treaty with the IAEA
providing for IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in the
United States except that for national security purposes. Agreement Between the
United States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Applica-
tion of Safeguards in the United States of America, Nov. 18, 1977, 32 U.S.T. 3059. The
United Kingdom earlier entered into a comparable arrangement with the IAEA and
EURATOM. Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, the European Atomic Energy Community and the International Atomic Energy
Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, Sept. 6, 1976, 1111 U.N.T.S. 168. The agreement entered into by the Soviet
Union was not for all peaceful facilities but rather for selected power and research
reactors. Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Feb. 21, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1411 (1985).
China has also entered into an agreement to apply IAEA safeguards to peaceful facili-
ties. China Signs Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with IAEA, XINHUA, Sept. 20; 1988, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. The Chinese agreement means that TAEA safeguards
are now being applied to peaceful nuclear facilities in all five of the nuclear weapons
states. Id. Such a nonproduction agreement would require approximately a doubling
of the IAEA's safeguards effort and thus would pose a major administrative and budget-
ary challenge for the Agency. This estimate is based on conversations the author held
in November 1991 with former IAEA officials and in October 1992 with U.S. officials in
the State Department and ACDA. The nuclear weapons states may not want to rely
entirely on IAEA safeguards to assure that materials are not diverted from peaceful to
weapons purposes. Consequently, pairs of states should have the option of negotiating
supplemental bilateral verification agreements. The Argentine-Brazilian agreement
provides precedent for such specialized arrangements in the IAEA context. See supra
note 48.
(2) As shown graphically by the Iraqi case, IAEA safeguards as then practiced were
not able to detect wholly undeclared nuclear facilities, though as discussed, there is
legal authority to inspect suspect facilities once detected. See supra notes 284, 285 and
Cornell International Law Journal
A nonproduction agreement would have value in its own right as a
legally binding hedge against one of the two major nuclear powers sud-
denly deciding to reverse its unilateral pledges3 29 and beginning to
accompanying text. As is currently the case with non-nuclear weapons states which are
NPT parties, the task of discovering clandestine facilities in the nuclear weapons states
and in the non-NPT party states which might join a nonproduction treaty would fall
primarily on national intelligence systems. Although doing so should be somewhat eas-
ier in this comparatively open era than at the height of the Cold War, intelligence may
not be enough, by itself, to make a nonproduction agreement sufficiently well verified
with respect to clandestine facilities. It should be supplemented with a challenge
inspection system.
Challenge inspections in the United States could substantially raise concerns, like
those raised by Henkin and Koplow, over possible infringements of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. See supra note 62. The problem is somewhat less severe with nuclear
installations than other kinds of weaponry, because the credible installations should fall
into one of two categories: (1) government laboratories, bases, test sites, and other
installations or (2) civilian nuclear installations. The former should not raise signifi-
cant constitutional issues. The latter already falls under the so called "regulated indus-
try" exception to the Fourth Amendment. Even so, some precision will be needed in
drafting the agreement to reconcile these interests. One possibility would be to desig-
nate categories of installations which will be automatically open to IAEA inspectors (as
civilian installations already are under the U.S.-IAEA safeguards agreement) but require
the challenging state to make a threshold showing to the IAEA before any facilities
other than those in the designated categories could be inspected.
(3) While production of additional nuclear materials for nuclear weapons would be
forbidden to all parties, some renewed production of HiEU might eventually be needed
for naval propulsion and research reactors. However, the amounts of HEU already on
hand in both the United States and Russia, and the lIEU which will be freed-up as
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are retired, are so vast that they should meet
naval propulsion and research reactor needs for decades. Until a decade ago, virtually
all research reactors, even the smallest ones, were fueled with highly enriched uranium.
Technology has been developed which allows many of them to use 20% enriched ura-
nium fuel instead. Nevertheless, there may always be a few high-powered research reac-
tors that will require HEU as fuel. Safeguards arrangements through the IAEA would
also be needed to prevent the use of liEU for naval propulsion from becoming a loop-
hole through which materials could flow into additional nuclear weapons. Similarly,
some production of non-nuclear weapons materials such as tritium would almost cer-
tainly still be necessary for weapons purposes. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying
text. Tritium has a half-life of 12.26 years. Tritium, CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NUCLEAR
ENERGY 821 (D.E. Barnes et al. eds., 1962). Nuclear weapons containing tritium thus
need to have their tritium periodically replenished, otherwise the ideal quantity is no
longer present and the yield declines.
329. Both the United States and Russia have announced full or partial cessation of
production of special nuclear material for weapons as unilateral policies. Given present
realities, neither the United States nor Russia will be able to produce more material for
nuclear weapons for years, perhaps decades, without herculean efforts. The United
States has not needed to produce additional highly enriched uranium for nuclear weap-
ons since 1964. Michael Knapik, DOE Assessing Various Options for Inventory of High-
Enriched Uranium from Retired Weapons, NucLEAR FuEL, Apr. 1, 1991, at 1. The U.S. weap-
ons inventory of liEU has been estimated at 500 metric tons. Id. President Clinton has
ordered a cut of 200 tons of nuclear material from the U.S. stockpile and its conversion
to peaceful purposes. Nuclear Containmen BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1995, at 86.
United States plutonium production has been halted since 1988 because of concerns
with the safety of the reactors and the massive environmental mess which has been
created. In a major national defense emergency, these facilities could go back on line
fairly quickly, though at considerable environmental risk. Short of that, it is highly
doubtful that plutonium production could be resumed anytime this decade.
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increase the production of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons.330 Yet
such a non-production agreement would not interfere with the current
defense programs of the major powers,33' and the concept is now receiv-
ing serious international consideration as an arms control initiative.332
A multilateral nonproduction agreement could have a powerful
impact on advanced proliferation. 333 It would provide the threshold
The Russians have also announced the cessation of the production of HEU for weap-
ons purposes. Gorbachev Halts Uranium Output, LA. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1989, at Al. In fact,
the United States has agreed to purchase $12 billion worth of Russian HEU over a 20
year period. Transcript of Press Conference by President Clinton and President Yeltsin, U.S.
NEWSWvIRE, Jan. 15, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Currnt File. As for pluto-
nium production, at the time of the Gorbachev announcement on HEU, he also
announced that Russia had closed one plutonium production reactor in 1987 and that
two more would be closed in 1989. Gorbachev on Soviet Armed Forces' Numerical Strength,
BBC SuMrtv OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 8, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Intl File. The Russians have some of the same safety and environmental problems that
the United States has. They also have extreme budgetary limits, effectively discouraging
the resumption of large-scale plutonium production.
330. Although several agreements have been negotiated between the United States
and Russia that constrain delivery vehicles and the number of warheads or cruise mis-
siles they may have, there are no arms control agreements between them or any other
nuclear weapons states which would limit the number of nuclear weapons per se which
they may possess.
331. Given the large cuts in strategic arms already agreed to in principle, neither the
United States nor Russia will need additional nuclear materials for weapons purposes.
Indeed, the weapons they will scrap under the INF, START I, and START II agreements
and their respective unilateral decisions to curtail the deployment of tactical nuclear
weapons will provide more than enough special nuclear material for all new weapons
systems and the reconstruction of existing ones, with massive quantities left over. See
INF Treaty, supra note 289; START I, supra note 41; START II, supra note 59. Accord-
ing to one report, the United States will have to scrap 70 tonnes (metric tons) of pluto-
nium under the START agreements alone, and the former Soviet Republics will have to
scrap 120 tonnes. DAVID ALBRIGHT Er AL., DISPOSITION OF SEPARATED PLUTONIUM
(1992). That is a very large fraction of the 89 metric tons of plutonium the U.S.
recently revealed it had produced for weapons purposes since World War II. See
Krauer, supra note 241.
332. The United States has held extensive consultations on the concept. Perhaps
more importantly, in the context of the Conference on Disarmament (the Geneva
forum for negotiating multilateral arms control agreements), a Special Coordinator,
Ambassador Shannon of Canada, has been named, and is engaged in consultations
leading to the opening of negotiation for such a treaty. ACDA's Role in the Post Cold War
World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Operations and the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., June 23, 1994 (testimony ofJohn D. Holum, Director of
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), reprinted in FEDERAL DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Holum
Testimony]; see also U.S. Plans Arms Control Ban on Production of Nuclear Materials for Weap-
ons, PREss Ass'N NEwsniLE, July 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. In
his statement on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the NPT, the President reiterated his
support. "[We] are pushing for a global ban on the production of fissile material for
weapons." Statement by the President on the 25th Anniversay of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, U.S. NEwswIRE, Mar. 7, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
333. It could also be beneficial to the general nonproliferation regime by reducing
the inequality inherent in the NPT. While some NPT parties would still have a right to
possess nuclear weapons and others would not, no nation will have a right to produce
nuclear materials for weapons, and every country party to the treaty would be obliged to
have all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
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states with an alternative to the NPT that would effectively freeze their
nuclear weapons capabilities in place, at least in terms of the number of
weapons in their arsenal.3 34 Some threshold states which are currently
unwilling to get rid of their existing nuclear weapons or the capability to
have them on short notice may nevertheless find the status quo satisfactory
if their neighbors or security rivals will be similarly frozen in place or if the
agreement resolves otherwise difficult political problems for them. A
legally binding multilateral nonproduction agreement also provides the
only realistic vehicle whereby freezing the status quo can be verified, with-
out a participating country having to make an accounting for past produc-
tion of special nuclear material.33 5
A nonproduction agreement may be particularly helpful in South
Asia.33 6 In 1989, then Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
announced that Pakistan would not produce "weapons-grade uranium,"
3 7
though U.S. officials believe that Pakistan resumed HEU production in
1990 because of rising tensions with India.33 8 Whatever Pakistan's current
enrichment efforts are, Pakistani adherence to a multilateral nonproduc-
tion convention would convert that announcement into a treaty obligation
that could be readily verified. That may be sufficiently attractive to India
to be worth taking the same step, especially if China were to join the agree-
ment. In that regard, the Indian government has recently expressed sup-
port for a global ban on fissile material production.
3 3 9
In the context of recent progress toward regional peace, a nonpro-
duction agreement could also provide a way to deal with Israeli nuclear
capability. President Bush, in his May 29, 1991 initiative on arms control
in the Middle East, called on all states in the region to place their nuclear
facilities under IAEA safeguards.340 That statement would only apply to
Israel's Dimona reactor, as all other known nuclear facilities in the Middle
334. Some increase in weapons numbers could still take place if the threshold coun-
tries moved to more efficient weapons designs which used less special nuclear material.
But that might require nuclear testing, see infra section C.2, and in any case, there are
limits as to how large a percentage increase in an arsenal is possible solely by that
means.
335. Such a past accounting would be essential for a new NPT party. For an interest-
ing discussion of the special problems caused by states which step back from the thresh-
old having partially crossed it, see Spector, Repentant Nuclear Proliferants, supra note 169.
336. As former ACDA Director Lehman put it, "A freeze on the production of fissile
material on the subcontinent would not close all nuclear doors but it would open a
number of important alternatives. Whatever stock of unsafeguarded material that may
exist would be frozen in size." Lehman, supra note 328.
337. David B. Ottaway, US. Relieves Pakistan of Pledge Against Enriching Uranium, WAsH.
PosT, June 15, 1989, at A38.
338. Pakistan Says Nuclear Programme is Peaeful, REuTr.as, Dec. 2, 1992, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
339. US., India Vow to Promote Comprehensive Nuclear Ban, KYODo Nws SERVICE, May
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file. The Indian Foreign Minister
has rejected an Indian/Pakistani cutoff but reiterated support for a global ban. India
Against Cut-off on Fsile Production, XINHUA NEws AcENcy, Feb. 28, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
340. Helena Cobban, Nonproliferation Treaty Crucial in Post-Cold-War World, CHRISTIAN
Sci. MoNrroPJune 11, 1991, at 19.
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East are already under an IAEA safeguards obligation. Most Arab League
states, even in the context of an otherwise acceptable peace, would
strongly object to a situation in which they continue to refrain from having
any nuclear weapons while the Israeli arsenal continues to grow.a4 1 At
least some of those states might find it more acceptable in the short run to
let Israel leave its nuclear capabilities "in the basement," provided that the
Israeli arsenal is not permitted to grow. Egypt and other Arab moderate
states have indicated they would view imposition of IAEA safeguards at
Dimona as a useful confidence-building step.a4 2 A global multilateral
treaty that required that result might be easier for Israel to join than a
measure aimed solely at itself.34 3
2. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Negotiations are currently underway for a comprehensive test ban (CTB),
i.e., a treaty which prohibits all testing of nuclear explosives in any environ-
ment.344 While such a treaty is considered desirable as a restraint on the
development of increasingly sophisticated nuclear weapons by the existing
nuclear weapons states, it is also favored by many as a constraint on
proliferation. One of the arguments advanced is that it would strengthen
the existing nonproliferation regime3 4 5 and give greater legitimacy to it by
341. Even the moderate Arab states are finding the Israeli nuclear weapons capability
increasingly difficult to ignore. At the ceremony to sign the convention banning the
possession of chemical weapons, the Arab states announced they would not adhere to it
until something is done about the Israeli nuclear capabilities. Alan Riding, Signing of
Chemical-Arms Pact Begins, N.Y. Timzs, Jan. 14, 1993, at A16. They have balked at a per-
manent extension of the NPT and have signalled that they intend to press instead for a
short renewal period for the NPT in the absence of progress on the Israeli nuclear
issue. See, e.g., Peres To Meet with Mubarak About NIP, JERusA IEM Posr, Feb. 22, 1995, at
2.
342. Cobban, supra note 340.
343. For their part, many Israelis recognize that lasting peace will require some con-
cession on their nuclear capabilities, though Israelis who favor dismantling their
existing nuclear weapons are rare. However, the advancing age of the Dimona reactor
may make a virtue of necessity, as Washington rumor has it the reactor is increasingly
difficult to keep operating.
344. These negotiations are currently underway in Geneva under the auspices of the
Conference on Disarmament, with the objective of having a treaty completed by April
1995. Holum Testimony, supra note 332. While the prospects for meeting that dead-
line seem remote, significant progress has been made, with considerable support shown
by the Indian, Pakistani, and Israeli delegate or observer missions. Interview with a
Member of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, in Miami, Fla.
(Jan. 1995).
345. Article VI of the NFT compels the nuclear weapons states to pursue good faith
negotiations on nuclear disarmament. "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
NPT, supra note 2, art. VI. Logically that ought to have focused political pressure on
the need for steep reductions in warheads and delivery systems, an issue on which the
record of the superpowers was dismal until very recently. Instead, the political pressure
was translated primarily into a demand for a CTB. A quick scan of the United Nations
Disarmament Yearbook over the past two decades reveals a virtually unbroken string of
comments and criticisms directed against the nuclear powers for their failure to con-
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reducing the inequality inherent in the NPT.346 The other argument, and
the one more relevant to the specific problem of advanced proliferation, is
that states of actual or potential proliferation concern would become par-
elude a comprehensive test ban. UNITED NATIONS, OFFICE FOR DisAummENTr AFFmiRS,
DisArtmAmrr YEARBOOK. While criticism from the NATO allies tended to be mild,
stronger criticism came from both developed and developing countries. These
included not only ones with which the United States had generally poor political rela-
tions, but also others, like Australia andJapan, which are close allies. The dispute over
a CTB was the primary reason no final declaration was adopted at the 1990 NPT Review
Conference. See Spector & Smith, supra note 217, at 43-44. See also William Epstein,
Conference a Qualified Success, Buu.. ATOM. Sci., Dec. 1990, at 45.
Part of the explanation for this heavy focus on halting nuclear testing was historical:
progress toward a CTB was explicitly called for in both the preamble and the operative
provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, preamble, 14
U.S.T. 1313 [hereinafter Limited Test Ban Treaty]. The preamble provides that the
original parties "[seek] to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear
weapons for all time." Article I goes on to state that "the provisions of this sub-para-
graph are without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent
banning of all nuclear test explosions.., the conclusion of which, as the Parties have
stated in the preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve." Id. art. I(1) (b). The desira-
bility of a CTB is recited in the preamble to the NPT itself. Moreover, some countries
believed that halting the growth in the number of nuclear weapons was insufficient if
qualitative improvement was left unrestrained, and they saw in a CTB a way to restrain
improvements in the arsenals of the superpowers. In any event, such pressure was and
remains a political reality.
346. An unavoidable but serious flaw in the NPT is its inherent discrimination. The
treaty divides the world into two classes of countries, those allowed to go on having
nuclear weapons and those that are not allowed to possess them. Although too much
can be made of the argument, the author believes a CTB would make a substantial
contribution to the existing nonproliferation regime by reducing the assertions that the
NPT perpetuates and even fosters the inequality of states. Professor Frank, for exam-
ple, in distinguishing between legitimacy and justice (while recognizing they blend into
each other), notes:
The legitimate rule pulls toward compliance because those addressed perceive
themselves as perpetually interacting parties engaged in a secular community
with rules and rule-based institutions within which the rule-induced benefits of
safety, order and predictability promote the aggregate well-being of the com-
munity. The just rule gets its capacity to pull toward compliance from the
agreement of the parties of a moral order on principles governing the fair allo-
cation of finite resources among individuals. Obviously, rules of the secular
state, or of the secular community of states, exert their most powerful pull
toward voluntary compliance when they are generally perceived to be both legit-
imate and just, and a legitimate rule may pull less powerfully toward compliance
when it is seen to be unjust.
THOMAS M. FRANK, THE POWER OF LEGrnMAcy AMONG NATIONS 242 (1990).
In Professor Frank's terms the NPT is a legitimate rule necessary for the preservation
of international safety and order, but at least for some states, it is an unjust rule because
it promotes the inequality of states. Nonproliferation will become a more powerful idea
to the extent that it can harness both legitimacy and fairness by minimizing the discrim-
inatory aspects of the treaty. Conclusion of a CTB may also decrease the risk that some
non-nuclear weapons states might use the absence of a CTB as an excuse to pull out of
the NPT. This argument for a CTB is related only to the general nuclear weapons
proliferation problem because its validity does not depend on whether any particular
country becomes party to a "TB and thus has no special relevance to advanced prolifer-
ation. For these purposes, the current Russian, U.S., and French moratoria on testing
are somewhat helpful, and a treaty among the five nuclear weapons states would be
almost as beneficial as a multilateral agreement.
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ties to a CTB but would not become parties to the NPT or Treaty of
Tlatelolco. Doing so, it is argued, would impose a substantial impediment
to their development of nuclear weapons. When assessing this argument,
it is vital to distinguish between nascent proliferation and advanced
proliferation.
The claim that a CTB would constitute a serious impediment to a
state acquiring a few simple nuclear weapons has been oversold by some
CTB proponents. Although each of the current nuclear weapons states
tested a simple device at the start of its nuclear weapons program, from
the inception of the nuclear age, testing was not necessary for the acquisi-
tion of some nuclear weapons.3 47 Even with plutonium as the explosive
material, a country might be able to circumvent the need for nuclear test-
ing through a combination of extensive testing of the non-nuclear compo-
nents, computer modeling, and the knowledge (from either the public
record, espionage, or the assistance of foreign experts) of what has worked
for others.348 Some combination of these measures apparently worked for
Israel3 49 and probably for Pakistan.3 50 In short, the inability to test would
be an impediment for a nascent nuclear program but not one which
would ultimately prevent the development of simple nuclear weapons,
347. The first U.S. HEU device was dropped on Hiroshima without the design ever
being tested. United States weapons designers were confident that the device would
work and that they could calculate its yield accurately enough to allow its military use.
Countries developing HEU devices would probably have no more need to test than the
United States did, and that is apparently what happened in the case of South Africa.
Plutonium devices are trickier for several reasons, such as the need to use an implosion
to bring about a critical mass and yield uncertainties caused by the possibility of "pre-
ignition." In contrast to HEU, plutonium gives off substantial numbers of spontaneous
neutrons. This can cause the chain reaction to begin too soon, reducing the yield,
sometimes considerably. The extent to which this is a problem is largely a function of
isotopic composition of the plutonium and the sophistication of the weapons designers.
The United States was sufficiently concerned about these problems that, despite a
severe shortage of the material, the first plutonium device was tested at Alamogordo,
New Mexico, before the second was dropped on Nagasaki.
348. In the early years of the nuclear era, countries acquiring nuclear weapons were
aided by association with other nuclear powers (the United Kingdom and later France
with the United States, China with the Soviet Union), and by espionage aimed at the
United States (admitted in the case of the Soviet Union, widely rumored in the case of
China).
349. For decades there have been rumors in Washington that Israel received nuclear
weapons design information from sympathetic individuals within the U.S. weapons
design establishment. Whatever the evidence supporting those assertions, it would be
more than mildly surprising if a state like Israel would be willing to use its intelligence
service to obtain and clandestinely smuggle out nuclear weapons-related parts and
materials from the United States, as it has, but would abstain from trying to use its
intelligence establishment to obtain nuclear weapons design information. After all, the
illegal export of information is far less likely to be detected than the illegal export of
tangible items.
350. There have been numerous press accounts that the Pakistanis received actual
fission weapons designs from China. Professor Milhollin, for example, stated that in
1983, China provided Pakistan with the full, tested design details for a 25 kiloton bomb.
John M. Broder & Stanley Meisler, The TemrjyingPursuit ofNuclearArms, LA. TrmEs,Jan.
19, 1992, at Al. If this is true and the plans were of sufficient detail (ie., blueprints and
shop drawings), no design work or testing would be needed.
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whether announced or kept in the basement.3 5'
A CTB will have a vastly more significant impact on advanced prolifer-
ation than its impact on the development of initial devices.3 52 In the
absence of widespread assistance from experts in the nuclear weapons
design programs of the nuclear weapons states, major improvements in
fission weapons would require either nuclear testing or a substantial and
sustained effort by a large, well-financed, and well-equipped scientific and
technical establishment. Developing boosted weapons is more difficult.
Doing so without testing or extensive external help would require a high
level of sophistication. If that describes any current threshold state, it is
limited to Israel.
An even higher leap in sophistication is needed to design thermonu-
clear weapons. Arguments that very high yield, low weight, asymmetrically
shaped, exceptionally safe thermonuclear weapons can be designed and
deployed without any testing by countries which do not now possess them
border on the frivolous. It is impossible to believe that Indian or Pakistani
designers are so much more talented than their more numerous, far more
experienced, and vastly better equipped and financed U.S. counterparts,
that they could develop highly sophisticated designs without testing at all,
even though this was something the United States could not accom-
plish.3 53 Indeed, those who make the argument that a CTB would not
351. A country acquiring its first nuclear devices would still prefer to have the legal
option to test because testing aids further refinement of the devices and because pru-
dent military leaders do not like the idea of relying on weapons (conventional or
nuclear) which have not been well tested. Indeed, India may have had a "dud" before
its successful test of a plutonium device in 1974. Thus the ability to test legally is useful
but not essential to a first device. Of course, a country may want to prove that it has
"arrived" as a nuclear power. If that is what a country wishes, a mushroom cloud is a
highly visible exclamation point. Lately, however, threshold countries seem to prefer
ambiguity.
352. Some people otherwise knowledgeable in nonproliferation matters have not
understood this point. Consider the following statement by the now Deputy Secretary
of Defense: "To be sure a prohibition on testing may slow the pace of proliferating
nations to acquire thermonuclear weapons, but possession of crude fission weapons is
the essential threat that the world seeks to avoid." John M. Deutch, The New Nuclear
Threat, FoREIGN Arr., Fall 1992, at 120, 130. In contrast, the author would like to avoid
the possession of crude fission weapons by additional states, but he worries far more
about those states acquiring significantly more destructive weapons.
353. The Department of Energy recently announced that the U.S. conducted 1051
nuclear tests from the end of World War II through 1990. Krauer, supra note 241. This
was accomplished at a cost of several billion current dollars. In 1988, the Natural
Resources Defense Council, a strong opponent of nuclear testing but with a good repu-
tation for its factual studies, announced the results of an analysis of the cost of testing.
Department of Defense and Department of Energy budgets showed a cost of $241 mil-
lion in 1980 rising to $726 million in fiscal year 1987. David Evans, Secret U.S. Nuclear
TestingDiscovered CHI. TRIa.,Jan. 19, 1988, at 3. Although the number of tests per year
has gone down since then, the program was still costly. The last administration's final
budget request for nuclear testing was for half a billion dollars. START Treaty, Hearing
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992) (questioning of
Secretary Baker by Senator Simon), repinted in FED. NEws SEavrcr, June 23, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Fednew File. The author has difficulty believing this was
all a purposeful waste, which is the unavoidable consequence of the argument that the
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restrain efforts at advanced weaponization by nuclear threshold countries
are virtually always advocates for the U.S. nuclear weapons design estab-
lishment, which has a very strong self-interest in being allowed to continue
to test. The same persons forcefully make the opposite argument with
respect to any restraints on U.S. testing, namely the claim that testing lim-
its will harm U.S. security because the design of new types of weapons
cannot be accomplished without testing.
Of course, this benefit of a CTB depends on states of current or future
proliferation concern joining the new treaty. In that regard, there are rea-
sons to be optimistic that India3 54 and Israel3 55 would adhere to such a
treaty. Many other states which have been mentioned as proliferation con-
cerns in the past such as Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, and Indonesia would do
so as well, 3 5 6 tending to bolster the pledges they made as parties to the
NPT or Treaty of Tlatelolco.3 57 Because this benefit of a CTB depends on
states of advanced proliferation concern having a binding legal obligation
not to test, it follows that this benefit of a CTB can only be achieved by a
multilateral treaty. An extension of the current American-Russian-French
moratorium,3 5 8 or even a treaty governing all five nuclear powers,
Pakistanis can develop the most sophisticated thermonuclear weapons without testing,
but we cannot.
354. India Calls for Global Ban on Nuclear Testing UPI, Jan. 12, 1993, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. In 1989, Indian Defense Minister K.C. Pant, while
rejecting the NPT as discriminatory and an Indo-Pakistani test ban as ineffective, stated
that India favored a global ban. Jeff Swimmer, Top Indian Official Doubts Pakistan Promise
on Nuclear Weapons, REuTERs,June 30, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
More recently, during his visit to the United States, Indian Prime Minister Rao strongly
endorsed a global CrB. See U.S., India Vow To Promote Comprehensive Nuclear Ban, supra
note 339. Indian representatives have made strong statements in favor of a CTB in the
context of the Conference on Disarmament's negotiations on such a treaty. See supra
note 344 and infra note 355.
355. Israel India Back Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Rtrrms, June 2, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file.
356. Moon Ihlwan, Indonesia to Seek Global Ban on Nuclear Tests, REuTrm, July 26,
1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws file. Indonesia had been host to a 1991
effort to amend the Limited Test Ban Treaty to bar all nuclear testing, and has enlisted
Egypt, Mexico, India, and several other nations as co-sponsors of an effort to do so
again. See supra note 345. See infra note 357 for a discussion of the advantages of
amending the LTBT to obtain a CTB.
357. Of course, favorable statements made at the Conference on Disarmament are
not a guarantee that a state will adhere to a CTB once it is opened for signature, and
both the Indian and Israeli statements suggested adherence of other states would be
important to their decision. But India, Brazil, and Egypt in particular would look fool-
ish if, following their prominent multi-decade campaign for a CTB and having commit-
ted themselves to negotiating a (TB as parties to the LTBT, they did not adhere once a
nondiscriminatory CTB was open for their participation. See supra note 345. Of course,
states are willing to suffer consequences far worse than mere diplomatic embarrassment
when their supreme national interests are at stake. However, the consequences of hav-
ing to reverse strongly held positions is not solely a matter of appearances-there can
be severe costs to a nation's reputation and perception as a trustworthy member of the
international community. If India were ultimately to decline to adhere to a nondiscrim-
inatory C'B, it would be a heavy blow to its prestige and to its claim to moral and
political leadership among Third World nations.
358. The French are currently observing a moratorium on further nuclear testing.
Pacific Nuclear Tests Suspended, FAcrs ON FI.E WORLD NEWS DIG=ES, Apr. 16, 1992, at 275
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whatever their benefits to the general nonproliferation regime, would be
worthless on this particular pointA
5 9
Conclusion
There are far fewer nuclear weapons states now than virtually anyone
would have imagined three decades ago. While there are many reasons
for this widespread failure in forecasting the future, the most important is
the failure to understand the powerful centripetal forces which a carefully
nurtured complex regime could exert, gradually pulling the countries into
a common endeavor with shared norms, decision-making and verification
structures, and common legal standards. It is true that there are three
threshold states which have nuclear weapons or could have them on very
short notice. But that too is only half the number that was widely expected
until very recently, because in the past five years South Africa, Argentina,
and Brazil reversed course and joined the nonproliferation regime. Nev-
ertheless, a watershed has now been reached, where the exclusive focus on
keeping countries from acquiring any weapons is no longer a sufficient
policy response. We have vital interests-ranging from realist-oriented
security interests to cooperative law-regarding interests in forging a more
peaceful world-which will be severely harmed if current or future thresh-
old states can rapidly acquire large nuclear forces with high yield weapons
and long-range delivery systems.
A2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. They put their moratorium into effect in
1992 and have called for a total ban. France Calls for Complete Nuclear Test Ban, REUTERs,
July 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Intl File. The Russians have similarly
ceased nuclear tests unilaterally and have declared they will not be the first to resume
testing. Russia Will Not Breach Nuclear Test Ban First--Spokesman, REUTERS, July 1, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File. On July 3, 1993, President Clinton
announced a 15-month extension of the U.S. moratorium, which had been imposed on
the Bush administration by Congress. Rxtrrr.n, July 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File.
359. Indeed, because the primary benefit of a CTB may be to restrain advanced
proliferation, the amendment of the LTBT to preclude testing in all media is preferable
to a new treaty. The LTBT is a highly unusual treaty in that it may be amended if a
majority of the parties, plus the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.
(now Russia for these purposes) deposit their instruments of ratification of the amend-
ment to the treaty. The amendment then becomes binding on all parties, notjust those
which ratify the change. Limited Test Ban Treaty, supra note 345, art. II. India and
Israel are parties to the LTBT, as are several of the states which have been mentioned in
this article as possible future advanced proliferation candidates. Of course, those states
would have a right to pull out of the LTBT, but doing so would be a drastic step and
could only be done legally if the state asserted that "extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." Id.
art. IV. A number of the threshold countries might find the political cost of making
such a declaration to be excessively high.
The United States and other nuclear powers prefer to draft a new treaty, as there are
considerable details which need to be worked out. On the other hand, a simple modifi-
cation of the LTBT to preclude all testing, with the benefit of wrapping India, Israel,
and others into a legal obligation not to test without awaiting their ratification, could be
coupled with a separate treaty among the nuclear powers regulating some of the
detailed matters necessary to verify the ban and deal with other technical issues.
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We have the tools under international law to do something about that
advanced proliferation problem, by making it more costly and time con-
suming to build up nuclear forces and also by offering the current thresh-
old states an intermediate status, through new arms control initiatives, that
will freeze their capabilities in place pending larger geopolitical changes
which might induce them to abandon those weapons altogether. While
success should be our primary concern, it is important that we take steps
that minimize complaints of discrimination, which serve progressively to
de-legitimize nuclear weapons (while recognizing that some will be with us
for a long time), and which strengthen the role of legally binding instru-
ments as part of a larger strategy of creating a more peaceful international
order.

